CA Unpub Decisions

In 1995, petitioner Khamchan Bret Ketsouvannasane was convicted of (among other things) first degree murder, with a robbery-murder special circumstance. In 2019, he filed a petition for resentencing under the then-recently amended version of the felony-murder statute. (See §§ 189, subd. (e), 1170.95.) The trial court denied the petition; it ruled that the robbery-murder special circumstance finding conclusively established that he was not eligible for relief.
Petitioner contends that he was entitled to relitigate the robbery-murder special circumstance finding. We disagree. That finding is final and binding, unless and until it is set aside in a habeas corpus or similar proceeding. Hence, we will affirm.

Fifteen-year-old A.W., 12-year-old S.W., and seven-year-old E.W. (collectively, Minors) appeal from the juvenile court’s disposition order removing Minors from Heather W.’s (Mother) custody. Minors argue the evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding that removal of Minors from Mother’s custody was the only way to protect them. We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that removal was necessary and that there was no other reasonable means to protect Minors. Accordingly, we affirm the order.

In 2001, a jury convicted defendant Keith Wallace Jackson of five counts of robbery (former Pen. Code, § 211) and found true he personally used a firearm in the commission, or attempted commission, of each charged offense (former § 12022.53, subd. (b)). The court sentenced Jackson to 32 years and 4 months in prison.
On November 21, 2019, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) sent a letter to the trial court, recommending that Jackson’s sentence be recalled and he be resentenced under former section 1170, subdivision (d). In support, CDCR relied on the changes to section 12022.53, subdivision (h), which became effective January 1, 2018 and which gave the court discretion to strike or dismiss, in furtherance of justice, a personal use firearm enhancement. (§ 1385.) Also copied on the November 21 CDCR letter was the District Attorney’s and Public Defender’s Offices, but not Jackson.

Noel Allen was charged with committing a forcible lewd act upon a child under 14 years of age (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1); count 1) and a lewd act upon a child under 14 years of age (§ 288, subd. (a); count 2). Allen pled no contest to count 2. In exchange for the plea, the superior court dismissed count 1 and sentenced Allen to prison for eight years but suspended imposition of that sentence. The court then placed Allen on probation for five years subject to certain terms and conditions. In addition, the court imposed fines and fees. Allen timely filed a notice of appeal (case No. D078439).
On May 4, 2021, the court ordered Allen to pay restitution damages to the victim and the victim’s mother. Allen timely filed a notice of appeal of the order awarding restitution damages (case No. D078884).
On its own motion, this court consolidated case Nos. D078439 and D078884.
In this consolidated appeal, among other things, Allen challenges certain probation conditions.

Lowell Robert Fuselier, a California licensed attorney and real estate broker, owns and runs Ambassador Real Estate, Inc. (Ambassador), a property and homeowner association management service company. In July 2019, Osborne Mobile Home Park (Osborne Park), through its homeowner’s association (HOA), hired Ambassador to manage the HOA. Osborne Park is a senior community of 28 units with residents 55 years or older. Soon after Ambassador was hired, Lynna Kashay, a resident, raised concerns about the company’s management of the HOA, including its handling of the election of the HOA Board of Directors and Fuselier’s mistreatment of the members. Those concerns prompted Kashay to report Fuselier for elder abuse to the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department and to file a business complaint with the Better Business Bureau (BBB).
As a result, Ambassador and Fuselier (together, Plaintiffs) sued Kashay for defamation.

In this appeal from a Yolo County Superior Court judgment, Terry Buford argues he was entitled to various forms of declaratory and injunctive relief arising out of the Sacramento County Superior Court’s denial of his request for a transcript of his criminal trial. Buford seeks the transcript to launch a collateral attack on his criminal convictions in Sacramento County Superior Court for orchestrating the killing his unborn child by conspiring to beat his seven months’ pregnant ex-girlfriend. (See generally People v. Curry (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 766 (Curry) [affirming the convictions of Buford and his coconspirators].) Rather than dismiss Buford’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Yolo County Superior Court accepted a stipulation of the parties to adjudicate Buford’s civil complaint about actions by Sacramento County Superior Court judges and clerks. Subject matter jurisdiction, however, cannot be manufactured by consent or stipulation of the parties.

Appointed counsel for defendant Charles Frank Hindbaugh asked this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

This appeal comes to us ostensibly pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. In 2018, defendant Aaron William Ashby pleaded no contest to two counts of receiving a stolen motor vehicle, both felonies under Penal Code section 496d, subdivision (a), stemming from two separate cases: case Nos. 17F6605 and 17F5498. As to the count in case No. 17F6605, defendant admitted that he sustained a prior serious and/or violent felony conviction (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). As to both counts, defendant admitted a special allegation of aggregate and consecutive terms for multiple convictions (§ 1170.12). He was sentenced to a total of eight years four months in state prison.
Defendant subsequently filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.18. The prosecutor filed an opposition to the petition, arguing the specified offenses were not eligible under section 1170.18, the total value of the property exceeded $950, and that defendant posed an unreasonable risk to public safety.

Defendant Vladislav Leonidov Baranovych appeals his conviction for felony grand theft. He claims that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of prior burglarious acts to be considered by the jury, and then by confusing the jury with improper instructions. He claims that his conviction cannot stand, as the jury likely convicted him based on a desire to punish him for his prior acts. We affirm.

In 2014, defendant Alejandro Javier Gonzalez was found guilty of second degree murder and shooting at an occupied vehicle. In 2021, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, alleging he was convicted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The trial court summarily denied defendant’s petition. On appeal, defendant contends he was entitled to counsel, briefing, a hearing, and an explanation for the trial court’s denial; the Attorney General agrees remand is appropriate. We agree with the parties; we reverse the order and remand with directions to the trial court to issue an order to show cause under section 1170.95.

In light of recently enacted Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3) (Senate Bill 567), effective January 1, 2022, defendant Stephen West Dean III appeals the upper-term sentence imposed following his plea of guilty to battery with serious bodily injury. Defendant contends Senate Bill 567 necessitates a remand for resentencing in light of the recent statutory changes limiting the trial court’s discretion to impose the upper term. The People agree. We remand for resentencing.

Defendant Victor Barragan was convicted of murder and several other offenses based on his participation in an attempted home invasion robbery. He petitioned the trial court for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 based on changes made to the felony-murder rule by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437). The trial court denied defendant’s petition, finding the record established defendant was ineligible for resentencing because the jury found true two special circumstance enhancement allegations. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in summarily denying his petition. We disagree and affirm.

Defendant Joshua Louis Dennisbellairs pleaded guilty to violating a domestic relations court order with a prior conviction. After defendant violated his probation a second time, the trial court revoked his probation and sentenced him to the upper term of three years. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the upper term. We affirmed the judgment. Defendant filed a petition for rehearing arguing he was entitled to have the matter remanded for the trial court to reconsider his sentence under Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) because he asserts his failure to be successful on probation is no longer a proper basis to impose an upper term sentence. We granted that petition, and after briefing, affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Don H. Lee and defendant Bank of America, N.A., settled a prior action between them. Before the terms of the settlement had been satisfied, Lee filed this action against Bank of America alleging causes of action related to the settlement. After the terms of the settlement in the prior action had been satisfied, the trial court ordered the parties to show cause why this case should not be dismissed as moot. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed this action as moot.
Lee now contends (1) the trial court improperly determined mootness at a hearing on an order to show cause, (2) the trial court improperly relied on inadmissible evidence, and (3) the trial court erred in finding the case moot.
Finding no error, we will affirm the judgment.