CA Unpub Decisions

On May 4, 2021, Oscar Vargas was charged with assault with a deadly weapon, making criminal threats, and resisting arrest. (Pen. Code, §§ 422, subd. (a), 245, subd. (a)(1), 69.) The trial court declared a doubt concerning Vargas’s competence to stand trial, suspended proceedings, and transferred the matter to mental health court.
Three mental health evaluations were completed, the evaluators reporting that Vargas suffered from bipolar disorder, presented a danger to himself and others, and was incompetent to stand trial.
Based on these reports, the trial court determined that Vargas was incompetent to stand trial and issued a one-year order for the use of involuntary psychotropic medication.
(§§ 1368, 1369, 1370.)
Vargas appeals.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Tommie Lawson Lynex of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) in 2000. The court sentenced him to a base term of 25 years to life, plus an additional 25 years to life for personally using a firearm to cause great bodily injury or death. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) The trial court also imposed a restitution fine of $10,000 (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a parole revocation fine of $10,000 stayed pending the completion of parole (§ 1202.45), and $5,000 in restitution to the family of the victim (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)). We affirmed the conviction on appeal. (People v. Lynex (July 17, 2001, B145639) [nonpub. opn.).)
Two decades after his conviction, on July 16, 2021, Lynex filed a petition to modify his restitution and parole revocation fines. He alleged that the fines were unauthorized, and that they constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.

Father E.R. appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional order concerning his son, A.R., arguing the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) made an inadequate inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We affirm.

S.C. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, Ar.C. (the child), contending the court erred when it found that the parental-benefit exception to the termination of parental rights in Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) did not apply; and (2) the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) failed to perform its duty of inquiry under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We dismiss mother’s appeal, in part, and conditionally reverse and remand, in part, with directions to comply with ICWA.

In these dependency proceedings, L.B. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights over A.H., her four-year-old son, contending the court erred in finding no substantial evidence supported a finding that the parental-benefit exception to adoption applied, in applying improper legal criteria to that determination, and in finding the lack of a complete inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) to be nonprejudicial. We agree with each contention, and thus reverse with directions to order a further ICWA inquiry.

This appeal concerns a failed business relationship between the individual plaintiff and his corporation, on the one hand, and the individual defendant and her several entities, on the other. Various of the parties entered into four separate contracts governing different aspects of their relationships. As relevant to this appeal, two of the contracts contained arbitration clauses—one subject to Delaware law, and the other to California law—while the other two contracts did not. After the relationships between the parties ended, plaintiffs filed suit in Los Angeles Superior Court asserting 14 causes of action against the various defendants. Defendants moved to compel arbitration, and the trial court granted the motion as to some, but not all, of the causes of action. Defendants have appealed from the order to the extent that it denies the motion to compel arbitration.

In this juvenile dependency appeal, S.A. (mother) challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings, removal order, and limitation of her educational rights as to her 14-year-old twin children. Relying on our Supreme Court’s decision in In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869 (I.C.), mother claims her children are truth-incompetent. She argues, therefore, the juvenile court erred in making its jurisdictional findings because the court relied “almost solely” on her children’s statements of physical abuse without considering whether those statements demonstrated special indicia of reliability. Because we disagree with mother’s characterization of her children as truth-incompetent, her I.C. argument fails. Moreover, her children’s statements are supported by other evidence in the record. Thus, we affirm the court’s jurisdictional findings.

O.S. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders declaring his two minor children dependents of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 300, subdivision (b). He argues the evidence was insufficient to support the jurisdictional finding that his substance abuse issues placed the children at a substantial risk of harm. We affirm.

The juvenile court terminated jurisdiction with an order granting a father sole physical custody and granting joint legal custody. The mother appeals. The court did not abuse its discretion by terminating jurisdiction rather than ordering reunification services. The child was safe with the father. The court had broad discretion to make custody orders in the child’s best interests. Its order granting joint legal custody was appropriate. We affirm. Citations to statutes are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

Defendant and appellant Alex Demetrius Graves (defendant) appeals from the denial of his petition for vacatur and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. While this appeal was pending the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775), which amends section 1170.95. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2 [eff. Jan. 1, 2022].) In light of this recent legislation we asked the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the effect, if any, of Senate Bill 775 on defendant’s appeal. In his supplemental brief, defendant acknowledges that Senate Bill 775 is not relevant to this appeal because the legislation expands section 1170.95 relief to include attempted murder and manslaughter. Here defendant challenges his murder conviction. Defendant asserts that Senate Bill 775 bears some future relevance to his case, however, that is not the issue here, and we leave it to defendant to file a new or amended petition in the future if he chooses.

Randy J. Bedford (appellant) appeals from an order denying his request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against his former wife, Samantha R. McGranahan (respondent). Appellant appears to primarily object to the trial court’s evidentiary decisions. Without providing any citations to the law of evidence, appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to consider the evidence he offered. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit exhibits that were incomplete or were hearsay. Further, the court did not err in declining to consider allegations that were made in another court and previously ruled upon. Appellant has also failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for a DVRO. We affirm the order.

This is an appeal from an order granting a permanent domestic violence restraining order against a divorced husband, Steven E. Jensen. Steven appeals, contending that (1) the California court no longer has jurisdiction over this matter because Steven and Kristen, his former wife, now live in North Carolina, (2) the court erred in denying his forum non conveniens motion to dismiss, (3) in any event the trial court applied the wrong law, and (4) the order is not supported by substantial evidence. We reject Steven’s claims of error and affirm the order.

Over three decades ago, when David Rory Lynch was a minor, he was convicted of murder. When he was resentenced under Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller), the trial court included two counts he had not been convicted of. But he never appealed. Years later, he moved for a juvenile transfer hearing under Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 (Cal. Const., art. I, § 32). But he did not raise the issue of his unauthorized sentence, and the trial court denied his motion for lack of jurisdiction.
This case asks the question: If an unauthorized sentence is never challenged, is the judgment never final for purposes of relief under Proposition 57?
We hold the answer is: No. A judgment is final once the time for direct appellate review has elapsed irrespective of the sentence because a final judgment may include an unauthorized sentence until it is corrected.
We affirm.

Saumal Martin Williams pleaded no contest to one count of second degree murder and one count of attempted murder. He challenges an order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. We affirmed this ruling in an opinion filed June 2, 2020. Pursuant to an order of the California Supreme Court filed January 26, 2022, we vacate our decision and reconsider our ruling in light of Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) and People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis).
Under Lewis and Senate Bill No. 775, the trial court should have appointed Williams counsel. Senate Bill No. 775 also expressly allows petitioners to challenge attempted murder convictions. Nothing in our record refutes Williams’s section 1170.95 allegations as a matter of law. Therefore, with counsel, it was reasonably probable the court would not have summarily denied his petition. We remand for further proceedings.
Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.