CA Unpub Decisions

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael D. Washington, Judge. Affirmed.
Russell S. Babcock, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
David Stanton pleaded guilty to all of the charges without any agreement with the prosecution. Specifically, Stanton pleaded guilty to felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)); prohibited person owning/possessing ammunition (§ 30705, subd. (a)(1)); possession of short barrel rifle or shotgun (§ 33215); and possession of a firearm silencer (§ 33410). Stanton also admitted a strike prior (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)).
The trial court struck the “strike” prior and sentenced Stanton to a term of 32 months in custody.
Stanton filed a timely notice of appeal.

Father and Mother were not married when Minor was born in November 2014 and given Mother’s surname. Mother filed a proceeding under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA; Fam. Code, § 7600 et seq.) to establish Father’s paternity. A judgment was entered in November 2016 establishing paternity and granting custody to Mother and visitation to Father.
In March 2018, Father filed a request for an order modifying custody and visitation and changing Minor’s surname to Father’s. Father was then living in North Carolina and Mother in California. Father requested joint legal custody and more visitation, including overnight visits and visits outside California, so that Minor could spend more time with Father and his extended family. He requested the name change to strengthen his relationship with Minor. Mother opposed the requested modifications to custody and visitation and the requested name change.

Evans is the owner of a wellness studio called Level Ten Pro Performance (Level Ten). In 2017, Evans hired a commercial real estate brokerage firm, Hughes Marino, Inc. (HM), to help her secure a larger space for her growing business. HM suggested Evans lease a space on the ground floor of a new luxury condominium building that Bosa was developing, Pacific Gate. On behalf of Evans, HM began discussing a possible lease with Bosa’s broker, CBRE Group, Inc. (CBRE).
After preliminary verbal negotiations, HM sent CBRE “a proposed list of terms pursuant to which [Evans] would lease space on the first floor of the Pacific Gate building.” On October 30, 2017, CBRE responded with a letter, addressed to HM, with a subject line of “Proposal to Lease at Pacific Gate, San Diego, California” (the letter). The letter began with: “Thank you for your proposal on behalf of Level 10 Pro Performance.

Bayside moved for summary judgment on the basis that Sarah completed a registration form for Ashton that included an assumption of risk and liability release that discharged Bayside of any liability for negligence claims. Bayside argued electronic signatures are enforceable in California and can be authenticated by security procedures.
It is undisputed that Ashton was registered for the 2017 Hume San Diego High School summer camp by Sarah. A confirmation email and receipt for payment for the camp was sent to her.
As relevant to the issues on appeal, Bayside also offered the following purportedly undisputed facts in support of its motion for summary judgment:
To register a student for the camp, a person had to use the InFellowship website. The website required a person to sign in by entering their email address and password to access the registration form.

At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, defendant Markus Marzetta was arrested after stabbing a security guard during an altercation in front of a store. Pursuant to the Governor’s emergency orders, the Chief Justice, acting in her capacity as Chairperson of the Judicial Council of California (Judicial Council), issued an order extending the statutory time frame in which to hold a preliminary hearing for defendants held in custody pending trial. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint filed against him when his preliminary hearing was not held within the 10-day statutory deadline. He argued the Chief Justice lacked authority to extend the deadline and the prosecution’s failure to hold a preliminary hearing within the time provided by the statute constituted a violation of his speedy trial right.

Because defendant’s appeal raises primarily legal issues, the factual background is abbreviated.
In 2007, defendant began living with A.C. and her 7-year-old son Isaiah. Defendant lived with A.C and Isaiah for about a year and a half. Over the course of that year and a half, defendant sexually molested Isaiah on multiple occasions.
Isaiah did not tell his mother about the incidents until 2015. Following the disclosure, his mother put him in therapy, and the therapist disclosed the abuse allegations to law enforcement. Isaiah spoke with a detective in August 2016, and told the detective he had been forced to engage in sex acts with defendant.
Defendant was charged with seven counts of lewd and lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14 in violation of section 288, subdivision (a). All counts were alleged to have occurred between August 12, 2007, and August 11, 2009.

We set forth the facts of this case in our unpublished opinion affirming the judgment on direct appeal in People v. Murphy (April 24, 2001, C029954) [nonpub. opn.] (Murphy).
R.F., her sister M.F., and her boyfriend T.B. checked into a motel. There, they met the victim, Jeffrey Stetka, who was staying in a room nearby. (Murphy, supra, C029954.)
Defendant and his friend, Aaron, joined R.F. and T.B. at the motel. The four went to Stetka’s room, rummaged through his stuff looking for a gun, and took some of his clothes. (Murphy, supra, C029954.)
Later that evening, Stetka joined the group in R.F.’s room. They drank and smoked methamphetamine. Stetka returned to his own room after he became intoxicated. After he left, defendant, Aaron, and M.F. hatched a plot to steal Stetka’s gun. R.F. implored the group not to do this and went to Stetka’s room to urge him to leave the motel. Stetka was lying on his bed and would not get up. (Murphy, supra, C029954.)

The victim and his girlfriend, L.A., lived together on the same property where L.A. worked for a towing company. The victim sold methamphetamine from a shed on that property. Sometime between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. on February 7, 2016, L.A. went out to the shed to ask the victim if he wanted something to eat. The door to the shed was open, the television was on, and the victim was seated behind a desk. Defendant was standing to the side of the desk.
Defendant and L.A. said hello to each other. L.A. knew defendant because defendant’s brother and the victim were friends. Defendant had been to their home a few times before, with his brother. The day before, defendant came over and brought some potted palms. The victim told L.A. he would be up to the house in five minutes. L.A. walked back to the house.
No more than 10 minutes later, L.A. heard a gunshot and she heard the victim yell her name.

L.R. and M.G. are cousins and former members of the Red Krewe Norteños, a subset of the Norteños criminal street gang. L.R. and M.G. were hanging out at L.R.’s house on the evening of March 17, 2016, St. Patrick’s Day. They drank beer for several hours. During the course of the evening, L.R. checked Facebook and saw photographs posted by another cousin, Rosemarie. L.R. reached out to Rosemarie through Facebook in hopes of getting together.
Rosemarie had been celebrating St. Patrick’s Day with her cousin and roommate, “Rita.” Rosemarie and Rita shared an apartment with Ramirez, who was Rosemarie’s boyfriend and a current member of the Red Krewe Norteños. Rosemarie and Rita spent several hours barhopping before meeting up with Ramirez. The trio continued barhopping and eventually found themselves at a bar called the Spot, where they would soon be joined by Castaneda and Labrasca.

P.G. (Mother) appeals from juvenile court orders establishing a legal guardianship over K.B. and K.S. (Minors) and terminating dependency jurisdiction. Mother contends the juvenile court erred in two ways: (1) by delegating authority to the appointed guardian to determine whether and when visitation between Mother and Minors would occur; and (2) by not ensuring adequate inquiry into whether Mother or the Minors’ father, M.B., have any Indian heritage such that Minors would qualify as Indian children under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California law. Mother, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), and Minors have stipulated to a conditional affirmance of the guardianship order and a limited reversal of the order terminating dependency jurisdiction to remedy these deficiencies. We accept the parties’ stipulation.

In 2006, Willie inherited the property; title was in his name alone. In 2010, when he signed the grant deed transferring title to Jessica, Willie lived in the front house on the property with his wife Lanarwee Spellman and their then 11-year-old daughter Lachey. There was a back house on the property rented to a tenant. Jessica was an adult at the time, had a different mother, and did not live on the property.
It was undisputed that Willie transferred title to the house to Jessica to become eligible for social security disability benefits. At the same time, he transferred a different property at 947 W. 60th Street to Spellman for her and for Lachey, who was a minor.
Willie, Spellman and their daughter Lachey continued to live in the front house on the property until Willie died on February 11, 2019. In the period between the 2010 property transfer and his death, Willie paid the taxes, insurance and upkeep on the property, and collected the rent from the back house.

In February 2019, the Santa Barbara District Attorney filed a petition and later an amended petition charging J.U. with forcible sex crimes, assault likely to produce great bodily injury with a great bodily injury allegation, criminal threats, and sexual battery, among other crimes. (§ 602.) On June 20, 2019, J.U. admitted the assault and great bodily injury allegation, and felony false imprisonment crimes. (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(4), 12022.7, subd. (a), 236.) On the prosecutor’s motion, the juvenile court dismissed the remaining charges in the interests of justice. At the later disposition hearing, the court ordered J.U. placed on probation with electronic monitoring.
As the factual basis for her crimes, J.U. admitted repeatedly striking her former friend C.J. in the face as C.J. stood at a public bus stop. C.J. required hospitalization and two surgeries to repair a nasal fracture.

In 1981, a jury found Mallet guilty of one count of first degree murder under section 187 (count 1), two counts of forcible rape in concert under sections 261 and 264.1 (counts 2 & 3), one count of assault with intent to commit rape under section 220 (count 4), one count of burglary under section 459 (count 5), and three counts of robbery under section 211 (counts 6 through 8). The jury found true the allegations that Mallet personally used a firearm and that a principal was armed with a firearm in the commission of all offenses, except count 4, assault with intent to commit rape. (People v. Mallett (June 29, 1983, 41449) [nonpub. opn.], 2-3, 12.) This court’s opinion in Mallet’s direct appeal states the murder victim died as a result of a gunshot wound.

Defendant was convicted in 2014 of first degree murder as an aider and abettor of first degree burglary during which his accomplice committed a homicide (count 1). Defendant was also convicted of attempted first degree robbery (count 2) and first degree burglary (count 3), with a principal armed in the commission of the offenses (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole due to the jury’s finding true the special circumstance alleged pursuant to section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), that an accomplice committed the murder during the commission of a first degree burglary and during the commission of attempted first degree robbery. (See § 190.2, subd. (d).) Defendant was also sentenced to a determinate term of three years plus a one-year firearm enhancement as to count 2, and a term of six years plus a one-year firearm enhancement as to count 3. The sentences on counts 2 and 3 were stayed pursuant to section 654.