CA Unpub Decisions

M.G. (Mother) appeals from the judgment terminating her parental rights to her 11 year old daughter, A.R., and her 10 year old son, C.R., and placing them in a permanent plan of adoption by their paternal grandparents. M.G. does not challenge the merits of the order; instead, she argues it must be reversed because the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) failed to conduct an inquiry into whether the children had Native American ancestry, as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; ICWA).
County counsel concedes SSA erred in failing to comply with ICWA but contends the judgment should nonetheless be affirmed because Mother failed to make any showing that her children may have Native American ancestry, and she has thus failed to demonstrate the error resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice in this case.

In 2009, a jury convicted defendant Angel Garcia of two counts of murder, one count of attempted murder, and one count of active gang participation. In 2019, Garcia filed a Penal Code section 1170.95 petition to vacate his murder convictions. The trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage. Garcia filed an appeal.
Effective January 1, 2022: “A person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, [or] attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine . . . may file a petition with the court . . . to have the petitioner’s murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced . . . .” (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).)
During Garcia’s trial, the court did not instruct the jury on the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

This appeal arises from the judgment entered in favor of defendant attorney, Sharona Zahabian, after the trial court sustained her demurrer against plaintiff Ahmad Hajj’s complaint alleging conversion. In an earlier litigation, Zahabian had, on behalf of her client, levied upon a default judgment against Hajj. Although the judgment was subsequently vacated and the money ordered returned, Hajj now alleges that the money has still not been returned.
We review the demurrer ruling de novo and conclude Hajj has sufficiently stated a claim against Zahabian. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this matter for further proceedings.

Appellant Hongli Sun was convicted of first degree murder for killing his wife’s paramour, Xuan Liu. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred by refusing to give his proposed pinpoint instruction on the prosecution’s lying-in-wait theory. In addition, he argues the verdict is tainted because the jury was not required to unanimously agree on whether he was guilty under that theory, or the alternative theory of premeditation. Finding these claims unavailing, we affirm the judgment.

Based on a vehicle-pedestrian collision incident, a jury convicted defendant Ricardo Jimenez of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1) and leaving the scene of an accident that resulted in an injury to another person (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a); count 2); the jury found true that Jimenez inflicted great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12077, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Jimenez to an aggregate prison term of 43 years to life based on sentencing enhancement allegations found true for prior serious or violent felony convictions as well as aggravating circumstances.
Jimenez contends the trial evidence was insufficient for the jury to find he had driven his vehicle with the requisite knowledge about his victim’s presence. We conclude substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding, but because the prison term in the abstract of judgment conflicts with the trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment, we modify the judgment and affirm.

Defendants Snell & Wilmer LLP and Colin Higgins (collectively, Snell & Wilmer) appeal from the trial court’s denial of their special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP motion) addressing plaintiff Mark Cordova’s petition for instructions and complaint. Mark’s petition and complaint alleges Snell & Wilmer committed legal malpractice by jointly representing Mark’s mother and brother, whose interests Mark contends were adverse, in various legal matters including litigation against Mark. The trial court denied defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, concluding Mark’s causes of action did not arise from protected activity. We reverse and remand for the trial court to determine whether Mark met his burden on the second prong of the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) analysis.

M.B. (Mother) and A.E. (Father) are the divorced parents of six children, V., A., Ad., Al., Aa., and S.E. (collectively children), who are now between the ages of four and 16 years old. In 2019, the children were detained and made dependents of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institution Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j), after S., then two years old, was found wandering alone on a busy street and the conditions inside the home the family shared were deemed unsafe for children. At the 12-month review hearing, the children were returned to Father’s custody with family maintenance services. (§ 364.) Mother, by then living out of state with her new husband, also continued to receive services. At the 18-month review hearing, the juvenile court continued family maintenance services for Father, but terminated Mother’s services.

In this appeal, appellant Allen Cortez Thompson seeks the reversal of a trial court decision declining to recall his sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d). Appellant wants the opportunity to present evidence to the trial court on the issue of his eligibility for a recall of his sentence. The Attorney General does not oppose this request and believes appellant should be allowed to present evidence to the trial court. Due to a very recent change in the law governing this matter, we reverse the trial court’s decision refusing to recall appellant’s sentence, and remand this matter for further proceedings.

Pursuant to a complaint filed on August 14, 2020, in case No. CR-20-007715, Newton was charged with felony intimidating a witness with force or fear or threat of force or fear (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1); count 1) and misdemeanor petty theft (§ 484, subd. (a); count 2).
On September 21, 2020, the parties negotiated a plea wherein Newton pled no contest to one misdemeanor count of dissuading a witness. (§136.1, subd. (a)(1).) Newton was sentenced to 365 days in custody. Newton appealed and was granted a certificate of probable cause. The appeal related to case No. CR-20-007715 has been transferred to the Appellate Division of the Stanislaus County Superior Court per order of this court dated April 14, 2021.

Following a collision along Dehesa Road, plaintiff Tramaine Cooper sued the County of San Diego (the County), alleging it had created a dangerous condition via placement of a “Welcome to Dehesa” sign and by allowing left-hand turns across the road. Cooper also alleged the County negligently failed to warn drivers of a concealed dangerous condition caused by a reduction in the sight distance resulting from the sign’s placement. In a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the County claimed there was no dangerous condition, it lacked notice of any dangerous condition, and it had immunity from liability pursuant to Government Code section 830.6, design immunity. The court agreed the County had design immunity and granted the motion for summary judgment.
Cooper appeals, contending the court erred by finding design immunity barred liability.

A jury convicted Steve Sengphachanh of a lewd act on Jane Doe, the 12-year-old daughter of his best friend, and found true the allegation he had “substantial sexual conduct” with Jane, making him ineligible for probation. (Pen. Code, §§ 288, subd. (a), 1203.066, subd. (a)(8).) The jury deadlocked on the charge that Sengphachanh committed aggravated sexual assault of Jane. (§ 269, subd. (a).) The trial court declared a mistrial as to that charge and later dismissed it on the People’s motion. The court sentenced Sengphachanh to the upper term of eight years in state prison and imposed various fines and fees.
On appeal, Sengphachanh asserts several errors deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial and mandate reversal of his conviction.

C.C., mother of the minor (mother), appeals from the juvenile court’s order finding the Yolo County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) provided her with reasonable services. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 362.1, 366.21, 395.) Mother claims she was not provided with in-person visitation, or timely and appropriate assistance with housing and medical training related to the care of, the medically fragile minor. We will affirm the juvenile court’s judgment.

Defendant Ladon Bowden appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion for relief under Penal Code section 1473.6. Defendant contends the trial court erred in summarily denying his motion after determining that he failed to establish a prima facie case for relief under the statute. The People note that the trial court construed defendant’s motion as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which is unappealable, and invite us to do the same and deny it. For reasons we explain below, we will decline this invitation and dismiss the appeal.

A jury found defendant Vincent Flavio Chavez guilty of second degree robbery and resisting or obstructing a peace officer. The jury also found true two firearm enhancements against defendant. The trial court sentenced defendant to 13 years in state prison for second degree robbery and one firearm enhancement. Defendant previously appealed the convictions. We affirmed the convictions but remanded to allow the trial court to consider whether to strike or dismiss defendant’s firearm enhancements under its new discretion granted by the amended Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (h). (People v. Chavez et al. (Aug. 10, 2020, C080117) [nonpub. opn.] (Chavez).)
Following remand, the trial court declined to strike the enhancements. Defendant timely appealed. When defendant’s appeal was pending, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 695) (Assembly Bill No. 124).