CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Lovalle Damon Collins and his girlfriend were visiting a resident at a senior living apartment complex in Oroville. At some point, their continued presence was no longer welcome and the onsite manager, G., asked them to leave. As G. escorted them off the property, in an admittedly annoying manner, defendant punched him once in the face, causing serious injuries to his jaw.
Defendant was convicted by jury of one count of battery causing serious bodily injury. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found defendant was previously convicted of a strike offense within the meaning of the three strikes law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) which also triggered the five-year prior serious felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). Following a successful motion to strike defendant’s prior strike conviction pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, the trial court sentenced him to serve seven years in state prison.

A jury found defendant Elias Garcia guilty of murder and found true a special circumstance enhancement that the murder occurred during the commission of an attempted robbery. Defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 alleging he was not the actual killer, did not have the intent to kill, and was not a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The trial court denied the petition, in part, because of the special circumstance finding. On appeal, defendant contends he can challenge the special circumstance finding through a section 1170.95 petition. We affirm, concluding the special circumstance finding renders defendant ineligible for relief as a matter of law.

Defendant Domingo Vasquez appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. Defendant contends the trial court incorrectly engaged in factfinding when it considered several documents to evaluate his prima facie eligibility under the statute and denied his petition as a result. We will reverse the trial court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings.

Defendant, Tony Ramon Gerolaga, Jr., appeals the trial court’s denial of his in propia persona petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 (statutory section citations that follow are to the Penal Code). Defendant complains the court erred in failing to appoint counsel prior to denying his petition and in determining he was not eligible for relief because he was convicted of attempted murder.
In our original unpublished decision, we affirmed the trial court’s order denying defendant’s section 1170.95 petition because the record and previous appellate decision showed that defendant was not charged with, nor tried on, a theory to which the amendments of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) could arguably apply. (People v. Gerolaga (April 27, 2020; C089457) [nonpub. opn.], [pp. 1-2] (Gerolaga).)

Plaintiff Eric Williams was injured when a cyclist collided with him during an early morning group exercise run. Williams sued defendant CrossFit Anywhere (CFA), the fitness club that had organized the run. Following the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to CFA, Williams appeals contending (1) a liability release he signed was unenforceable because it was subtitled, “insurance jargon”; (2) CFA’s failure to satisfy minimum safety standards constituted gross negligence; (3) being struck by a cyclist is not an inherent risk of participating in a group fitness class; and (4) triable issues of fact exist as to whether CFA could have minimized the risk without fundamentally altering the nature of the activity.
We affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Jeffrey Anthony Thomas of two sex crimes against his stepdaughter. Thomas claims insufficient evidence supports one of his convictions. He also seeks reversal based on an instructional issue our Supreme Court already has decided against him. We affirm Thomas’s convictions. However, we vacate his sentence and remand the matter for resentencing in light of recent sentencing legislation. We also direct the trial court to adjust the fees Thomas owes. Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

Defendant Robert Monroy is an Offender with a Mental Health Disorder (OMD) committed to the Department of State Hospitals at Atascadero (DSH) in April of 2020 as a condition of parole. DSH obtained an order compelling defendant’s involuntary treatment with antipsychotic medication pursuant to In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1. The court granted DSH’s petition to renew the order on October 15, 2021. (Pen. Code, § 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B)(i).) Defendant timely appealed.
We appointed counsel to represent defendant in this court. Appointed counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) that states the case and facts but raises no specific issues. Wende review, however, is available only in a first appeal of right from a criminal conviction. (People v. Serrano (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 496, 501 (Serrano); Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 543-544; People v. Taylor (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 304.)

When J.P. (Minor) was 14 months old, the juvenile court removed him from his parents’ care because he was at risk of harm from domestic violence between his mother R.R. (Mother) and father J.V.P. (Father). Following termination of Mother’s reunification services for noncompliance with her case plan, Mother asked the juvenile court to order a bonding study in advance of a parental rights termination hearing to make a case that the juvenile court should preserve some avenue for visitation between Mother and Minor. We are asked to decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mother’s request for a court-ordered bonding study.

In March 2017, defendant Dillon Mitchel Gaines pled no contest to a violation of Penal Code section 261.5, subdivision (c). The trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for five years—the maximum term of probation authorized under former section 1203.1, subdivision (a). The court revoked and reinstated probation several times. In November 2019, the court summarily revoked defendant’s probation for the final time and at the probation violation hearing conducted in July 2021, the court terminated probation and imposed a sentence of 16 months to be served in county jail.
Defendant argues the court lacked jurisdiction to terminate probation and impose a sentence in July 2021.

Appellant is a 57-year-old woman with a longstanding diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder bipolar type. In June 2004, the San Luis Obispo County Public Guardian was appointed as the conservator of appellant’s person. In January 2021, the San Luis Obispo County Public Guardian filed a petition for reappointment of the conservator under section 5361. The declaration submitted in support of the petition, signed by Drs. Matthew Lilly and Ricki-Leigh Brampton, stated among other things that appellant’s mental disorder rendered her unable to meet her basic needs for food, clothing and shelter because “she lacks the organization of thought [and] the appropriate insight [and] sound judgment needed to develop and execute a viable self-care plan. [She also has u]nrealistic expectations of 3rd party support [and] poor understanding of subsidized housing options.” Appellant waived her right to a jury trial.

In October 2017, defendant Jose Ramon Cano was placed on probation for five years—the maximum term of probation authorized under former Penal Code section 1203.1, subdivision (a). In April 2020, the trial court summarily revoked his probation for the second time. Before the violation hearing could be conducted in April 2021, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (AB 1950), which limited the maximum probation term for most felonies to two years. Defendant claimed AB 1950 retroactively shorted his probation term to two years, thereby absolving him of the alleged probation violation that occurred more than two years after probation had originally been imposed. The court disagreed and revoked and reinstated probation and ordered that defendant serve 364 days in jail, with probation to terminate upon his release from custody.

The juvenile court assumed dependency jurisdiction over four-month-old R.K. (Minor) when her parents, M.J. (Mother) and E.K. (Father), pled no contest to allegations that Minor was endangered by her parents’ history of substance abuse and domestic violence, and by Mother’s mental health issues. The court found Minor was not an Indian child under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California law.
At a later contested review hearing, the juvenile court found Minor’s return to Father’s care would be detrimental and released Minor into Mother’s custody. Father appealed and argued, among other things, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) failed to satisfy its inquiry and notice obligations under ICWA.

D.G. (father) appeals from a juvenile court exit order granting sole legal custody to A.G. (mother). We find no abuse of discretion, and thus we affirm.

Appellants Zhengjun Wang and Baohua Wang (father and son) sued respondents Lone Oak Fund, LLC (Lone Oak) and Qualfax, Inc. (Qualfax) (among others), seeking to quiet title to a piece of real property owned by Baohua or, failing that, to establish an equitable lien against the property. Appellants alleged that without their knowledge or consent, the property was encumbered with deeds of trust in favor of both Lone Oak and Qualfax, securing loans made by respondents to entities unaffiliated with appellants. In 2019, Qualfax purchased the property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale that it initiated.
In the proceedings below, both respondents filed motions for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the operative complaint failed to state causes of action against them because they were good faith encumbrancers.