CA Unpub Decisions

Frank Ruiz appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court resentenced him upon remand by this court. In our original opinion (People v. Ruiz (Feb. 10, 2020, B291732) [nonpub. opn.] (Ruiz I)), we directed the trial court to exercise its discretion whether to strike a prior serious felony conviction and a firearm-use enhancement. On remand, the trial court refused to strike either. A second appeal followed. In People v. Ruiz (October 19, 2021, B307717) [nonpub. opn.] (Ruiz II), we stayed execution of a five-year gang enhancement and affirmed the judgment as so modified. The California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back to us “with directions to vacate [our] decision and reconsider the cause in light of Assembly Bi1l No. 518 [(A.B. 518)] (Stats. 2021, ch. 441).”

Appellant David Max challenges the trial court’s order requiring him to post a bond under Corporations Code section 800 and the ultimate dismissal of his lawsuit after the court sustained, without leave to amend, a demurrer to Max’s complaint against 8e6 Corp. (8e6), 8e6 agents George Shih, Frank Wood, Mahendra Vora, and Rodney Miller (the individual respondents), and several entities owned or controlled by the individual respondents.
Max’s complaint alleges three causes of action: a derivative breach of fiduciary duty cause of action regarding the individual respondents’ improper use of corporate funds to pay their legal fees in both this and a previous lawsuit; an individual cause of action to recover the attorney fees Max incurred in a previous lawsuit seeking inspection of 8e6 corporate records; and a “mixed” cause of action containing both an individual fraud claim and a derivative breach of fiduciary duty claim.

In 1991, defendant Donald Lee Williams and a codefendant were convicted of first degree murder. The jury also found a felony-murder special circumstance true. Williams appeals from the denial of his petition for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. He contends that the trial court improperly reviewed the record of conviction and that the true finding on the special circumstance does not bar relief. We conclude that based on the instructions at trial, the jury could not find the special circumstance true unless it concluded Williams was either the actual killer or acted with malice aforethought. Because he could not have been convicted under a now-invalid theory of murder, he is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. We therefore affirm.

Defendant and appellant Joe Alfred Taylor III appeals from the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of multiple sex offenses and first-degree robbery. On appeal, Taylor argues: (1) the trial court improperly imposed a 25-year-to-life term on count 10 because the District Attorney did not allege a three strike enhancement on count 10; and (2) he had a right to have the jury determine whether his act of sexual penetration by a foreign object and acts of forcible sodomy (counts 1 through 4) took place “on separate occasions.” We reject his contentions and affirm the judgment.

Plaintiffs BLF Inc., doing business as Larrabure Framing (Larrabure), Cal Coast Construction Specialties Inc. (Cal Coast), and MWL Solutions Inc. (MWL) appeal from an order granting a special motion to strike brought by defendants, Carpenters-Contractors Cooperation Committee Inc. (the Committee) and Favian Guillen (Committee defendants), Carpenters Local Union No. 661 (Local 661), Barry Jenkins, and Michael McCarron (Union defendants), pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. We affirm.

In February 2005, the People filed a petition to commit appellant Victor Ballardo as a sexually violent predator (SVP). After a March 2018 trial, the court found appellant to be an SVP and ordered him committed for a two-year term.
On appeal, appellant does not dispute that substantial evidence supported the court’s finding that he was an SVP. Instead, he argues that: (a) the length of delay between the filing of the petition and the trial thereon violated his due process right to a timely trial; (b) the court erred in failing to inquire into a potential conflict of interest between his counsel and him, namely that bringing a motion to dismiss would have been beneficial to appellant, but damaging to his counsel; and (c) his counsel was ineffective in failing to bring a motion to dismiss.

The Juvenile Court of Sacramento County denied a motion to suppress brought by appellant T.G., then 17 years old, found that he had committed multiple firearm offenses and transferred his case to Solano County Superior Court. There, the juvenile court granted him deferred entry of judgment. T.G. appeals from the denial of his suppression motion.
His appellate counsel has requested that this court independently review the record under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). (See In re Kevin S. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 97, 99 [Wende procedure applies to juvenile appeals].) T.G.’s counsel informed him of his right to file a brief of his own and he did not file one.
Upon our independent review of the record, we conclude that we must dismiss this appeal because, contrary to his appellate counsel’s assertion, T.G. has not appealed from an appealable order.

In our prior opinion affirming defendant Daryl Wakefield’s conviction for murder, attempted murder, and misdemeanor child abuse, we ordered the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment with respect to its award of actual custody and conduct credits. On remand, the trial court held a hearing on the issue of credits and prepared an amended abstract of judgment and amended sentencing minute order. Because the amended abstract of judgment and amended minute order do not reflect the judgment as modified by our prior opinion, we again remand for the trial court to enter the correct award of credits.

Kimberly P. challenges the renewal of a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her and in favor of her sister, Valerie S. Because Kimberly has failed to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion or that the order is not supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.

Mariia Eroshin (Mariia) appeals from an order denying her request for renewal of a domestic violence restraining order. She contends the trial court erred by applying the wrong legal standard and by concluding she did not meet her burden to show she had a reasonable apprehension of future abuse as required for a renewal under Family Code section 6345. (Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290 (Ritchie).) We disagree and affirm the order.

Rosa Adriana Araujo was convicted in 2008 of three felony counts of attempting to deter or resisting an executive officer in the performance of duty by means of threats or violence. She now appeals from denials of her motions to reduce the convictions to misdemeanors and dismiss them. Araujo challenges the trial court’s decision on a number of grounds, including that it constituted punishment in violation of her constitutional right to freedom of speech, the prosecution used improper methods and the court considered improper factors. She also argues various fines and fees imposed when she was sentenced must be vacated due to subsequently enacted legislation. As we will explain, although we do not agree with all of Araujo’s claims of error, we find reversal necessary because we are unable to conclude the trial court exercised its discretion impartially.

Appellant E.M. contends the juvenile court erred in denying his petition to withdraw his admission to a probation violation. He also contends he is entitled to the benefit of an amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code section 731 , regarding the determination of the maximum time of confinement. We remand for redetermination of the maximum time of confinement and otherwise affirm.

Defendant and appellant Timothy Wayne Harrison (Harrison) appeals from an August 20, 2020 order denying his Penal Code section 1170.95 petition to vacate his 1996 first-degree murder conviction.
Harrison contends the trial court erred in denying his petition at the prima facie stage, without issuing an order to show cause and without holding an evidentiary hearing. We agree and, accordingly, we reverse and remand.

These appeals require us to decide a single question: when, several years after its founding but before it became practically the household name that it enjoys today, a pioneering automotive startup company called Tesla, Inc. offered stock options to its employees in its standard offer letter of employment, what was the vesting schedule of the stock options? Specifically, could newly hired Tesla employees exercise a portion of their stock options immediately, beginning on the very first day they started working at Tesla, or was there a “cliff” that required them to work for one year before they could start to do so?
These two consolidated cases involved 47 former Tesla employees who sought redress for Tesla’s allegedly wrongful refusal to allow them to exercise their stock options when their employment ended after less than one year.