CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant Stanley Cheng of three offenses arising out of a single episode of domestic violence against his wife, L. Specifically, jurors convicted defendant of two counts of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and one count of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse. The jury also found true allegations that, in the commission of each offense, defendant personally committed great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence. The trial court denied probation and sentenced defendant to a two-year state prison term. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court committed instructional error, provided insufficient responses to jury questions, and erroneously concluded that the presumption of ineligibility for probation was not overcome. Finding no prejudicial error, we shall affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Scott Webb of mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203), and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and found that he had personally used a deadly weapon while committing the offenses (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and that he had personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the assault with a deadly weapon (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a), 1203, subd. (e)(3)). In a separate proceeding, the trial court found that Webb had suffered two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12), and a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)).

In 2011, a jury found defendant Prospero Ramirez Guadarrama guilty of two counts of murder and one count of attempted murder. The jury also found true a gang special circumstance allegation, and a multiple murder special circumstance allegation. The trial court imposed a life sentence.
In 2020, the trial court denied defendant’s Penal Code section 1170.95 petition, finding that the jury’s true findings on the two special circumstance allegations rendered him ineligible for relief as a matter of law. We disagree.
The trial court instructed the jury on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, which is no longer a valid theory of murder liability. While the special circumstance allegations required the jurors to find defendant acted with the intent to kill (the mens rea), the special circumstance allegations did not require the jurors to find defendant directly aided and abetted the target crime of murder (the actus reus).

In this partition matter, Andrea P. Hogan challenges the trial court’s determination that a grant deed conveying a one-third ownership interest to her in a residential property only entitled her to “1/3 of the equity that accrued from December 8, 2014 and forward.” We agree the trial court erred, and remand the matter for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Petitioner B.C. (mother), in propria persona, seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.450−8.452) from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a six-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (e)) terminating reunification services as to her now one-year-old son, R.R., and setting a section 366.26 hearing on May 16, 2022. Mother seeks a writ directing the juvenile court to provide her reunification services. She contends in her writ petition that she was “not given an opportunity to reunify” but does not cite to the appellate record or legal authority to support her contention. We conclude her petition fails to comport with the content requirements of rule 8.452 regarding extraordinary writ petitions and dismiss the petition.

In 2013, appellant Alvis Vernon Rhodes entered into a negotiated disposition and pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter, admitted enhancements and a prior strike conviction, and was sentenced to an aggregate second strike term of 18 years in prison.
In 2020, Rhodes filed a petition in the superior court, in pro. per., for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.91, that “obligate[s] a sentencing court to consider a criminal defendant’s qualifying service-related conditions as mitigating circumstances in making discretionary sentencing choices.” (People v. Panozo (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825, 831 (Panozo).) The superior court denied the petition and found such factors were considered at his sentencing hearing in 2013.
On appeal, Rhodes’s appellate counsel has filed a brief which summarizes the facts with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) We affirm.

In 2010, Wayne Deshown Perkins (Perkins) and Anthony Jones (Jones) were convicted after a joint jury trial of the first degree premeditated murder of Deondre McGruder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), § 189), with a gang special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)). Perkins was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
In 2020, Perkins filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95, and alleged he was entitled to relief because he was not the actual killer, and his murder conviction was based on the felony-murder rule and/or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The superior court denied the petition.
On appeal, Perkins’s appellate counsel has filed a brief which summarizes the facts with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Perkins has filed a letter brief raising sentencing issues. We affirm.

In 2010, appellant and defendant Carol Laverne Harris was convicted of the second degree murder of her husband, Karl Johnson, and sentenced to 15 years to life. In 2014, this court affirmed her conviction.
In 2019, defendant filed a petition in the superior court for resentencing of her second degree murder conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95, and argued she was improperly convicted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and she was not a major participant and did not act with reckless indifference to human life. The court denied the petition.
On appeal, her appellate counsel has filed a brief which summarizes the facts with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We affirm.

Appellant and defendant David Wayne Brown drove his girlfriend, Amber J., to an orchard in a rural area. He shot her in the face and arm. He realized she was still alive, so he dragged her to a canal, kicked her down the embankment into the fast-moving water, even though he knew that she could not swim, and drove away. She managed to climb out of the canal; a passing driver found her sometime later. She was taken to the hospital by helicopter and survived. The gunshot wounds left her with numbness in her face and right hand and visible scars. Defendant was arrested later the same day after leading law enforcement officers on a lengthy high-speed chase.

A jury convicted Alejandro Arellano (appellant) of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187) and found true an enhancement for personal and intentional discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The court sentenced appellant to 25 years to life plus five years in state prison.
On appeal, appellant contends the trial court should have granted his motion to exclude his custodial interview, alleging his waiver of his Miranda rights was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because he was under the influence of methamphetamine and other drugs. We conclude the evidence established appellant was able to understand his rights and execute a valid waiver. Appellant also claims the trial court was unaware of its discretion to substitute the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement with a lesser enhancement within the same section. We agree, and remand the matter for the trial court to exercise its discretion in accordance with People v. Tirado

K.P. (mother) filed this petition for extraordinary writ after Riverside County Superior Court Judge Michele Mathis of the juvenile court terminated family reunification services and set a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. Mother argues there was insufficient evidence to support the judge’s conclusion that returning the children would be to their detriment and that the department provided reasonable services. We deny the petition.

A jury found Thien Duc Nguyen guilty of committing arson of an inhabited structure or inhabited property (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced Nguyen to a three-year prison term.
Nguyen makes a series of arguments challenging the jury instructions and the trial court’s evidentiary rulings. He also contends that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial error, and that the trial court erred in declining to order mental health diversion (§ 1001.36). We conclude that the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to properly instruct the jury on the concept of malice in law in response to questions asked by the jury during deliberations. We accordingly reverse the judgment.

In 2003, a jury convicted Edward Villa of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and found true an allegation that Villa was a principal in the murder and that another principal personally used a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)). The jury also convicted Villa of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and found the assault was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).
Villa was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life for murder, plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement consecutive to a nine-year term for the assault offense and the gang enhancement.
Villa appealed and this court affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion. (People v. Villa (May 4, 2005, D043572) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2019, Villa filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95, seeking resentencing of his murder conviction.

Rich Allison brought an action under Civil Code section 51, the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh Act or the Act), and section 51.5, after an adult store denied him entry into its four-hour “Ladies Night” event because the event, which involved educating women about intimate sexual products, was restricted to women. The trial court sustained the adult store’s demurrer and dismissed the complaint. We conclude the trial court properly determined, based on the facts contained in the complaint and the materials attached to the complaint, that the adult store’s decision to limit attendance of the Ladies Night event to women did not violate the Unruh Act.