CA Unpub Decisions

The People’s May 11, 2021, complaint charged defendant Ryan Joseph Connolly with driving a car on the highway in the opposite direction of traffic during flight from a peace officer (count one) and driving with disregard for the safety of people or property while fleeing from a pursuing peace officer (count two).
On July 29, 2021, defendant pled no contest to count one, and in exchange, the trial court dismissed the remaining count and sentenced defendant to two years of formal probation, including the condition that he serve 165 days in county jail with credit for 165 days. The court also imposed a $300 restitution fine, a $40 court operations assessment fee, and a $30 conviction assessment fee.
The factual basis for defendant’s plea was that “[o]n May 7th, 2021, in the County of Sacramento, law enforcement conducted or attempted to conduct a traffic stop on the Defendant for driving a vehicle without license plates.

J.Q., mother of minor R.L. (mother), appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights and freeing the minor for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it found the beneficial parental relationship exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) and the sibling exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v)) to adoption did not apply. She also argues respondent Sacramento County Department of Child, Family and Adult Services (Department) failed to comply with section 16002 by placing R.L. in a foster home separate from her siblings.
We conclude mother forfeited her challenge under section 16002 by failing to object on that basis below, and that the juvenile court properly terminated mother’s parental rights and found that no exception to the preferred plan of adoption applied. We shall affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

This appeal comes to us ostensibly pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.
On May 28, 2015, a jury found defendant Ruben Guajardo guilty of first degree murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court also found true defendant had a prior strike. On July 17, 2015, defendant was sentenced to 75 years to life. Defendant appealed and we reversed the strike finding but otherwise affirmed. (People v. Taylor et al. (May 12, 2017, C079829) [nonpub. opn.].) Defendant was resentenced on August 24, 2017, to 50 years to life.
On June 11, 2020, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. The petition asserted he could not now be convicted of first degree murder because of the changes made to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019. After briefing by the parties, the trial court denied defendant’s petition, finding him ineligible for relief.

Defendant Matthew Edward Norton was convicted by a jury of sexually assaulting his 15-year-old niece, B.S., when she was staying overnight at the house defendant shared with his girlfriend.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) allowing a witness to testify under Evidence Code section 1108, subdivision (a), that defendant committed an uncharged sex crime, and (2) imposing consecutive sentences for forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)) and forcible sexual penetration (Pen. Code, § 289, subd. (a)(1)(A).) We find no abuse of discretion.
Defendant also challenges various fees and fines imposed by the trial court without a finding of his ability to pay them. Defendant contends that imposition of a fee or fine without a finding of ability to pay violates his constitutional rights. We disagree that fines imposed under a statute that does not require consideration of ability to pay are unconstitutional.

Plaintiff Gaynell Martin was injured in a collision with a driver exiting the driveway of an apartment complex parking lot into an intersection. Martin asserted a cause of action for premises liability against defendant CFY Development, Inc (CFY), the company that built the complex. The trial court granted CFY’s motion for summary judgment and denied Martin’s request for leave to amend her complaint.
We will affirm.

E.P. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with its duty of inquiry under section 224.2 and related rules of court. We hold that any such failure was harmless, and therefore affirm.

Adrian Arturo Arango, Jr. (Arango) appeals a judgment entered following conviction of second degree robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, making criminal threats (two counts), brandishing a deadly weapon, resisting a police officer, shoplifting, and hit-and-run driving. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 245, subd. (a)(1), 422, subd. (a), 417, subd. (a)(1), 148, subd. (a)(1), 459.5, subd. (a) ; Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a).) The trial court found that Arango personally used a deadly weapon during commission of the robbery, suffered a prior serious felony and strike conviction, and served a prior prison term. (§§ 12022, subd. (b), 667, subd. (a), 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667.5, subd. (b).) We strike the stayed one-year prior prison term enhancement but otherwise affirm. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)
This appeal concerns crimes including robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and making criminal threats that Arango committed during three unrelated incidents during two days.

Mike Andrew Hays was convicted by a jury of battery with serious injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d) ), assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), and simple battery (§ 242). The jury also found true a great bodily injury enhancement pursuant to section 12022.7, subdivision (a).
The trial court sentenced Hays to the low term of two years for assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, plus a consecutive three years for the great bodily injury enhancement. The court ordered concurrent sentences for the remaining counts, for a total term of five years. We affirm.

Petitioner, T.V., who was the prospective adoptive parent (PAP) for minor L.M., brings this petition for an extraordinary writ under Welfare & Institutions Code section 366.28, challenging the juvenile court’s finding that removing L.M. from placement with T.V. was in L.M.’s best interest (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(3)(B)). We find no error in the juvenile court’s ruling and deny the petition.

Following an earthquake in Napa, a dispute arose between a landlord and its tenants regarding the extent of damage to the building, and thus issues of repair, the upshot of which was the landlord declared the lease terminated. The tenants sued the landlord, which successfully moved the matter to arbitration, which occurred in 2020. Following seven days of hearing and several post-hearing briefs, the arbitrator found for the tenants on one of their five claims, that for breach of contract, and awarded them damages, attorney fees, and costs that were a fraction of what they sought.
The landlord moved to vacate the award on several bases including, as pertinent here, that the arbitrator failed to disclose certain documents and pleadings in two lawsuits in Los Angeles County, the first a 2004 lawsuit involving a construction company owned by the arbitrator and her husband, the second a 2008 lawsuit in which it was alleged that the arbitrator had made a fraudulent conveyance.

In these consolidated appeals, Community Venture Partners (CVP) challenges postjudgment orders granting Marin County Open Space District’s motion to discharge a peremptory writ of mandate and denying CVP’s request for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. Because the District’s return failed to satisfy the writ, we reverse the order discharging the writ. We also reverse and remand the attorney fees order so that the trial court may consider our holding regarding what was required to discharge the writ in assessing CVP’s request for attorney fees under section 1021.5.

Alphonso Ray Wilson, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court denied his petition at the prima facie stage on two grounds: (1) Wilson was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because his 2010 murder convictions included felony-murder special circumstance findings and (2) on the merits, Wilson failed to make the prima facie showing that would entitle him to an evidentiary hearing.
On appeal, Wilson contends he established a prima facie case for relief as a matter of law and the trial court erred by engaging in factfinding at the prima facie stage. We conclude, however, that it was appropriate for the trial court, at the prima facie stage, to review the record of conviction to determine whether Wilson’s felony-murder special circumstance findings were supported by substantial evidence. We further conclude sufficient evidence supports the felony-murder special circumstance findings in this case.

Plaintiff and appellant Edward Kwuan (appellant) appeals from the trial court’s judgment in favor of defendant and respondent NorCal Research Development, LLC (respondent) in appellant’s commercial unlawful detainer action. Appellant alleges respondent violated the parties’ lease agreement for a warehouse by growing marijuana without the required permits from the City of Oakland. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that respondent was unable to obtain the permits because there was no fire sprinkler system in the warehouse, and that appellant could not evict respondent because the lease agreement obligated appellant to provide a functioning sprinkler system. We conclude the court erred in interpreting the lease and reverse.

Defendant Sione Motuapuaka appeals an order resentencing him after the trial court was made aware of an error in his original sentence. He contends he was deprived of his constitutional and statutory rights to be present at the hearing. We agree defendant had a right to be present that he did not waive, and because we are not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that this error was harmless, we remand the matter for resentencing.