CA Unpub Decisions

In June 2012, a jury found defendant Darrell Miller guilty of second degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 187.) The jury found true a second degree drive-by murder allegation (§ 190, subd. (d)) and a firearm use allegation (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 21 years to life in state prison. In 2013, we affirmed defendant’s conviction in an unpublished opinion. (People v. Miller (Dec. 2, 2013, C071700).)
In 2019, defendant, through counsel, filed a petition for resentencing under newly enacted section 1170.95. The People filed a response and moved to dismiss the petition. The court ordered additional briefing, defendant filed a reply, and after reviewing the record of conviction, the trial court denied defendant’s petition.
Defendant timely appealed and now contends the trial court erred in determining defendant failed to state a prima facie case. The People concede the issue and agree the matter should be remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant Nhi Lee’s eight-year-old daughter H. told defendant’s two sisters, A.L. and J.L., that defendant had molested her; she told them after A.L. told H. she had been molested by defendant. This exchange took place after A.L. and J.L. told each other about having been molested by defendant in the past. Defendant was subsequently convicted of four counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) following a six-day jury trial. He was sentenced to a 12-year state prison term.
Defendant contends on appeal: (1) it was an abuse of discretion and violation of his due process right to a fair trial to admit evidence of the sexual misconduct against his sisters pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108; (2) the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) expert gave improper profile testimony; (3) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek redaction of portions of his police interview; (4) cumulative error warrants reversal;

Emmanuel N. admitted he committed carjacking. The juvenile court ordered suitable placement and imposed probation conditions. One of those conditions required Emmanuel to register as a gang member. Emmanuel’s sole contention on appeal is that the court erred in doing so. The Attorney General agrees there was insufficient evidence the crime was gang-related. As the parties agree on this point, we order the gang registration requirement stricken and otherwise affirm the court’s order.

In February 2003, defendant and appellant Anthony Carnell was involved, along with three codefendants, in a gang-related shooting that resulted in the death of an innocent bystander. Defendant and two of his fellow gang members, along with a female associate who drove them, were attempting to retaliate for the earlier shooting of another member of their gang. Once they arrived outside the home where they saw the rival gang members (including Jermaine Booth), defendant and codefendant Larry Harris got out of the car and both started shooting. Defendant’s handgun jammed, but Harris emptied his gun before the two jumped back in the car and they fled the scene. One of the bullets struck and killed an innocent bystander, Betty Jean Rothchild.
Defendant and his codefendants were charged with multiple felonies, including the murder of Ms. Rothchild and the attempted murder of Mr. Booth.

Melissa L. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court judgment declaring mother’s two children, Neveah G. (born May 2012) and Serena G. (born February 2014) dependents of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 360, subdivision (d), and asserting jurisdiction over them. Specifically, mother argues that insufficient evidence was presented to support the jurisdictional findings. Mother contends that despite evidence of drug use by both parents, there was no evidence that the children were at risk of serious physical harm while in the care of either parent.
We find that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that the children were at risk of serious physical harm or illness as required under section 300, subdivision (b). Therefore, we affirm the judgment.

A father appeals an order terminating parental rights over his daughter, J.C. He challenges, not the merits of the termination decision, but the juvenile court’s earlier determination the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (the Act) does not apply. We affirm.
The father argues both the juvenile court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services failed to discharge their initial duties of inquiry under the Act and related California law. Citing Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (b), he argues the Department learned of extended family members on his side yet erred by not asking them about the child’s possible Indian heritage. The father’s arguments fail.
We review findings under the Act for substantial evidence. (In re Josiah T. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 388, 401 (Josiah T.).) Substantial evidence supports findings that the Act did not apply and that the duty of inquiry was met here.

Appellant Homayoun “Tony” Namvar challenges the denial of his motions to vacate the renewal of a New York judgment against him that respondents Nader & Sons, LLC and Sisko Enterprises, LLC originally domesticated in California in 2009. He contends the judgment has been satisfied, because a settlement agreement in a related bankruptcy case entitles him to dollar-for-dollar credit for payments made to respondents by another individual. Appellant also contends that a recent New York judgment rejecting this argument was incorrectly decided and should not be given binding effect here. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirm.

Father, E.G., challenges the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights over his children S.G. and L.G. Father argues social workers failed to comply with state law (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2) implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; (ICWA)). Specifically, father argues, and respondent agrees that the child welfare agency failed to interview mother’s and his extended family members about Indian ancestry. The issue before us is whether that error was prejudicial. We conclude it was not. The record belies father’s speculation that extended family members would have had meaningful information about Indian ancestry.
Father also argues we should remand the case so the juvenile court can consider the parental-benefit exception to adoption, an exception father failed to raise in the juvenile court. Father has thus forfeited this challenge.

Mother Diondria D. appeals the order terminating her parental rights to A.W., arguing the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) did not comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.), because it made an inadequate inquiry about A.W.’s possible Indian ancestry and the notices sent to the tribes were inadequate. We affirm.

Tony McClain entered into a negotiated plea that provided for probation. When McClain was late to his subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court found that he had violated the plea agreement and sentenced him to prison. McClain appeals, contending that the trial court violated his plea agreement. We agree and reverse the judgment.

Raymond Ayala appeals from the judgment entered after he pleaded no contest to one count of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) with a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)). We affirm.
On November 7, 2017, Ayala was the passenger in a car driven by his codefendant Christopher Aguilera. Both Ayala and Aguilera were documented gang members. The car stopped on the street near where two men were standing, and Ayala called out the name of his gang. Ayala then fired multiple shots at the men from the front passenger seat of the vehicle.
Shortly after the shooting, the police conducted a traffic stop of the car and detained Ayala and Aguilera. A firearm and a spent casing were recovered from inside the vehicle. The police also obtained video from a nearby surveillance camera that captured the shooting. In a field show-up, one of the victims identified Ayala as the shooter.

J.B. (mother) challenges the juvenile court’s order at the six-month review hearing declining to return her children to her custody. Mother argues (1) substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court’s finding that the children would be at substantial risk if returned to mother; (2) the juvenile court failed to specify the factual basis for its conclusion that the return of the children to mother would be detrimental; and (3) the juvenile court lacked sufficient evidence for its finding that reasonable services have been provided or offered to mother. As discussed below, we conclude mother’s contentions are without merit. Accordingly, we affirm.

This is an appeal from an action originally begun in 2017 by plaintiff Alice Jackson, who sought partition by sale of a five-unit residential rental property in Inglewood in which she owned a 50 percent interest. Defendant Suzanne Chandler owned the remaining 50 percent interest. Ultimately, in January 2021, the trial court ordered Chandler and Jackson’s successor-in-interest Frida Dilonell (appellant) to accept an offer of $1.050 million for the property from a third party.
Appellant appeals from the trial court’s January 25 and 26, 2021, orders determining the third party offer to be the highest offer and ordering appellant to accept the offer. She contends the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the sale of the property to a third party when she submitted a higher but technically non-compliant offer. We affirm the trial court’s orders.

In 2017, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Sergio Delacruz of (count 1) willful and deliberate attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664) and (count 2) discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle (§ 26100, subd. (c)), and found true various firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(e)) and gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)) enhancements on both counts. Delacruz contends the trial court erred by imposing firearm enhancements on his conviction in count 2 because discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle is not an enumerated offense for enhancements under section 12022.53. In addition, he contends we must remand the case to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion under Senate Bill No. 620 (2017−2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2017, ch. 682) (Senate Bill No. 620) whether to strike the firearm enhancement on his conviction of attempted murder in count 1. We agree with both contentions, and therefore remand the case for a new sentencing hearing.