CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Adam Douglas Branks appeals after a jury found him guilty of attempted murder and various other crimes. On appeal, defendant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his attempted murder conviction; (2) a witness improperly and prejudicially testified about his parole status; (3) trial counsel was ineffective; (4) the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony; (5) the court committed instructional error; and (6) cumulative prejudice requires reversal. In supplemental briefing, defendant raises a number of sentencing issues. We agree that several of defendant’s claims concerning sentencing require us to remand the matter to the trial court. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

Antonio Medina-Puerta appeals from an order striking his motion to modify child support, as a terminating sanction for his abuse of the discovery process. His claims challenge the authority of the trial judge to issue any orders in the parentage action, the procedural regularity of the order for terminating sanctions, as well as its merits. Because the record substantiates none of Medina-Puerta’s claims about the trial judge or process while amply supporting the court’s factual findings and exercise of discretion, we affirm the order.

The Santa Clara County Office of Education and Santa Clara County Superintendent of Schools Mary Ann Dewan appeal from an order granting respondents David Kissner’s and Shahryar Rokni’s petition for a writ of mandate to compel Dewan to certify a signed petition and schedule a special election to fill a vacancy on a school board. Appellants argue the petition was not legally sufficient because it failed to comply with applicable Education Code requirements. For the reasons stated below, we conclude the petition complied with those requirements. Accordingly, we affirm the order.

Maternal grandmother J.S. (Grandmother) appeals from an April 2021 order denying her request for placement of dependent minors J.C., M.M., and Baby Boy S. (collectively Minors unless context requires otherwise) made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.3. Grandmother asserts the court abused its discretion by failing to return the Minors to her care after their December 2020 removal from her home. She also maintains the court erred by refusing to grant her request to be deemed a de facto parent.
Several months later, and after Grandmother filed her notice of appeal, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the Minors’ biological mother (Mother) and respective fathers. We dismissed Mother’s appeal from the termination order after her counsel filed a brief raising no arguable issues. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952.) The Minors’ respective fathers did not participate in the dependency proceedings nor file appeals.

This case arises from an action brought by Alexander J. Hashtroudi against David Hamid Saber and Caltrop Corporation (Caltrop). This appeal concerns the trial court’s orders regarding Hashtroudi’s attempts to bring third parties Lili Haj-Azimi and Nagmeh Reshad (collectively referred to as Respondents) into the case as Doe defendants. The court did not err by granting the motion to quash service of documents (motion to quash) in favor of Respondents and subsequently striking the Doe amendments.

Jonathan Aaron Samoff was convicted of second degree murder. The prosecutor’s theory was he acted with conscious disregard for human life when he drove a speeding car while intoxicated, causing an accident which resulted in the death of his passenger.
Samoff appeals, arguing the prosecutor abused his discretion by refusing to agree that the jury could be instructed on the lesser charge of gross vehicular manslaughter. He also contends the trial court erred by refusing to instruct on the lesser charge because it qualifies as a lesser included offense of murder under an “expanded” accusatory pleading test. We reject both claims and affirm.
As Samoff acknowledges, our Supreme Court determined in People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983 (Sanchez) that gross vehicular manslaughter is not a lesser included offense (LIO) of murder.

Albert John Krusick appeals from the judgment committing him to a state hospital after a jury found he was a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) “The . . . SVPA or the Act[ ] allows the state to petition superior courts for the involuntary civil commitment of certain convicted sex offenders whose diagnosed mental disorders make them a significant danger to others and likely to reoffend after release from prison.” (Walker v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 177, 184, fn. omitted.) At the trial on a commitment petition, the People must prove three criteria beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the person was previously convicted of a qualifying “‘sexually violent offense’” as defined in section 6600, subdivision (b) (§ 6600, subd. (a)(1)); (2) the person has “a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others” (ibid.);

J.C. (minor) appeals from a disposition order finding that he committed vandalism and granting him informal probation. On appeal, minor’s appellate counsel has filed a brief which summarizes the facts with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende); In re Kevin S. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 97.) We offered minor the opportunity to present his own brief on appeal, but he has not responded.
Pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have reviewed the entire record. Following the Supreme Court’s direction in Kelly, at page 110, we provide a brief description of the facts and the procedural history of the case. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to minor, we affirm.

Defendant Eliseo Argomaniz appeals the denial of his unopposed motion under Penal Code section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) to vacate his 2006 guilty plea. The superior court determined the motion was untimely and the evidence was not sufficient to demonstrate Argomaniz’s own error in understanding the immigration consequences of his plea.
First, the timeliness of a motion to vacate a plea is governed by subdivision (b) of section 1473.7. (People v. Perez (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1008, 1013 (Perez).) Under subdivision (b)(1) of section 1473.7, a motion “shall be deemed timely filed” if the moving party “is no longer in criminal custody” and the exception in subdivision (b)(2) does not apply. Here, Argomaniz is no longer in custody and the events that trigger the exception have not occurred. Therefore, Argomaniz’s motion must be deemed timely under the plain meaning of the mandatory rule in subdivision (b)(1) of section 1473.7.

After the juvenile court denied A.M. (Mother) reunification services, she filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 seeking reunification services. The juvenile court denied the petition, terminated parental rights to Mother’s son, L.M., and freed him for adoption by his caregivers. Mother appeals, arguing that the juvenile court erroneously denied her section 388 petition and refused to apply the parental bond exception to the termination of her parental rights to L.M. We disagree and affirm.

R.B. (mother) purports to appeal from a juvenile court order denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, in which she requested the court to reinstate her family reunification services and authorize unsupervised visitation with her children, Zy.G., Ze.G., and Zo.G. (the children). The children’s father, L.G. (father), filed a letter brief joining in mother’s brief. We conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review the order denying mother’s petition, since the notice of appeal she filed expressly stated she was appealing only from the order terminating her parental rights. Furthermore, because mother presents no reasoned argument why the court erred by terminating her parental rights, we conclude she has waived her challenge to that order. Therefore, we must affirm.

Defendant and appellant Luis Armando Gonzalez appeals from the November 22, 2019 order of the superior court dismissing the petition for resentencing on his 2006 conviction for attempted premeditated murder. (Pen. Code, § 1170.95) In an unpublished decision, we affirmed the order dismissing defendant’s petition on the ground that persons convicted of attempted murder were not entitled to relief under section 1170.95. (People v. Gonzalez (Mar. 30, 2021, E074653) [nonpub. opn.].)
The Supreme Court granted review on June 9, 2021, and while review was pending, the Legislature enacted, and the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 775 into law. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.) Senate Bill No. 775 amended section 1170.95 to clarify, among other things, that persons convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine are eligible for resentencing under the statute. (Id. at §§ 1-2.)

Originally charged with first degree murder along with her mother, in 2013 defendant and appellant Briuana Lashanae Hunter ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)) and three counts of attempted murder (§§ 664 & 187, subd. (a)). Defendant also admitted that a principal used a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) during the commission of the voluntary manslaughter.
In 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. The trial court denied the petition finding voluntary manslaughter and attempted murder convictions were ineligible for relief under the statute, which was the correct result at the time, and in a prior nonpublished opinion, People v. Hunter (Oct. 19, 2020, E073825) (Hunter I), we affirmed the trial court’s order.

Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc., acting through its agent Bail Hotline Bail Bonds (collectively Surety), posted a bond to secure the pretrial release of Christopher B. Trujeque, who failed to appear at a subsequent readiness hearing. The bond was forfeited, and the court entered summary judgment against Surety. On appeal, Surety asks us to set aside the summary judgment, vacate the forfeiture, and exonerate bail because the court used a constitutionally inadequate process to set Trujeque’s bail, rendering the penalty clause of the bail contract void. Specifically, Surety relies on In re Humphrey (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1006 (Humphrey I) to allege it was constitutional error to set Trujeque’s bail without considering his ability to pay or the availability of less restrictive alternatives to money bail. But as multiple courts have held, any Humphrey error in setting bail does not affect the enforceability of the bond.