CA Unpub Decisions

In 2010, defendant Shayana Hollis’s codefendant, Marquis Greenwood, shot and killed defendant’s boyfriend during a botched armed robbery while defendant waited in the car. Originally charged with first degree murder under a theory of felony murder, defendant ultimately pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)) and admitted that she was a principal who was armed during the commission of the offense (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced defendant to a stipulated 12-year prison term.
In 2019, defendant petitioned the trial court for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. The trial court denied the petition, concluding defendant was not convicted of murder and thus was not eligible for relief under the statute. Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of her petition, arguing it erred when it ruled that her voluntary manslaughter conviction bars her from relief.

Ellen Price, an employee of the City of Sacramento (City), retired after being on a medical leave of absence for six months. She sued the City for disability discrimination, claiming the City did not provide reasonable accommodation, but a jury found in favor of the City. On appeal, Price contends the evidence does not support the jury’s verdict. We conclude Price’s contention is without merit and will affirm the judgment.

Charged with numerous counts of domestic violence, child molestation, dissuading a witness, and violating a no contact order, defendant Donovan Chad Brevik had a difficult trial. Based on his inability to assist counsel, defendant was found incompetent to stand trial early in the proceedings. When the trial resumed after competency was restored, defendant briefly sought, then withdrew, a request to represent himself. During the course of the proceedings, defendant filed several Marsden motions, had one appointed counsel successfully request to be relieved, and engaged in numerous disruptive outbursts.

The trial court denied a defense motion to compel arbitration. We reverse.

This is appellant Jordan Stremfel’s second medical negligence lawsuit against respondent Nader Kalantar, M.D., seeking compensation for an anoxic brain injury sustained on May 18, 2016. Dr. Kalantar performed a tonsillectomy on Stremfel on May 10, 2016, followed on May 18 by emergency surgery to correct a post-tonsillectomy hemorrhage, during which Dr. Kalantar performed a tracheostomy at the request of anesthesiologist Phillip K. Lau, M.D. In Stremfel’s prior suit, in which he named both Dr. Kalantar and Dr. Lau as defendants, Dr. Kalantar moved for summary judgment in reliance on evidence that he complied with the standard of care, including during the May 18 procedure. Without taking Dr. Lau’s deposition, Stremfel filed a notice of non-opposition to Dr. Kalantar’s motion for summary judgment. After entry of judgment in Dr. Kalantar’s favor, Stremfel deposed Dr. Lau, then relied on his testimony concerning the May 18 procedure in filing a motion for new trial, which was den

In a previous appeal, we reversed the judgment that had confirmed an award after arbitration in favor of University Village Thousand Oaks (UVTO). We remanded this case to the trial court for trial. (Harris v. University Village Thousand Oaks CCRC LLC (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 847 (Harris 1).) On remand, the trial court denied, without prejudice, appellants’ pretrial motion for costs and attorney’s fees incurred in opposing and conducting the arbitration proceedings. We conclude that the interlocutory order denying costs and attorney’s fees without prejudice is not appealable. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

This is a slip and fall case in which the trial court granted a defense motion for summary judgment. Appellant Dora Monroy was descending an exterior staircase from an Alaska Airlines, Inc. plane, using the handrail for support. When her hand came in contact with a clear slippery substance, her hand slid and she fell. The issue is whether Monroy presented evidence establishing a triable issue about Alaska’s knowledge of the slippery spot on the handrail (or, put differently, whether its inspection was legally sufficient). The trial court found that, under the circumstances of this case, the inspection was reasonable. We agree and affirm the judgment.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the juvenile court’s order removing one-year-old P.H. from Mother Michelle G. is supported by substantial evidence.

Anthony Robert Ultreras appeals from the judgment after the jury convicted him of molesting a child under the age of 18 (count 1, Pen. Code, § 647.6, subd. (a)(1)) and committing a lewd act on a child under the age of 14 (count 3, § 288, subd. (a)). He pled guilty to possession of child pornography with prior convictions (count 2, § 311.11, subd. (b)). He admitted that he suffered a prior conviction of section 288, subdivision (a), as a prior strike (§§ 667, subds. (c)(1), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) and as a sentence enhancement (§§ 647.6, subd. (c)(2), 667, subd. (a)(1), 667.61, subd. (d)(1), 1170, subd. (h)(3), 1170.12, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced him to 50 years to life in prison plus a determinate term of 14 years eight months.

Ryan Patrick Jensen appeals the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of two counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211 ) and three counts of grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a).) Jensen contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to replace his appointed counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). Jensen also contends insufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict on one of his theft counts.
We affirm.

A jury convicted defendants and appellants Everardo Estrada and Carlos Flores of torture, first degree residential burglary, attempted kidnapping, assault with a deadly weapon, assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, and home invasion robbery, with gang and great bodily injury enhancements. Appellants contend the evidence was insufficient to prove the torture count and the gang enhancements; the trial court committed evidentiary, instructional, and sentencing errors; and the prosecutor committed multiple instances of misconduct during argument. In supplemental briefing, they contend that Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333), effective January 1, 2022, applies retroactively to their case and requires reversal of the gang enhancements.

After an incident in which defendant Richard Rodriguez beat his then girlfriend with two golf clubs while she was asleep, a jury convicted him of torture and domestic violence and he was sentenced to a lengthy prison term. Rodriguez argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the intent element of his torture conviction, that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the definition of “cruel or extreme pain and suffering” in the jury instructions on torture, and that convictions for crimes he committed as a juvenile should not have been used to enhance his sentence. We affirm.

These writ proceedings arise out of an action brought by the People of the State of California against several oil and gas firms alleging their participation in a multiyear conspiracy to manipulate the California gasoline market to the detriment of California consumers. Defendant SK Trading International Co. LTD (SK Trading), a South Korean corporation, has petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to reverse its order denying its motion to quash service of the summons for lack of personal jurisdiction. SK Trading argues that its limited contacts with California are insufficient to support the court’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. We disagree and shall deny the petition.

In 2018, a jury convicted Harold Malbrough of robbery, assault, and hit-and-run. He was sentenced to an aggregate 24-year prison term, which included multiple sentence enhancements. Malbrough’s convictions were affirmed on appeal in 2020, but his case was remanded for re-sentencing. (People v. Malbrough (Aug. 12, 2020, A155835) [non.pub. opn.] (Malbrough I).) In February 2021, Malbrough was resentenced to an aggregate term of 23 years in prison.
In the present appeal, Malbrough contends the trial court erred by imposing an upper term sentence for robbery and consecutive sentences for robbery and hit-and-run. We reject these contentions, but will remand this case pursuant to the parties’ stipulation that Malbrough is entitled to re-sentencing under recently enacted ameliorative amendments to Penal Code section 1170.