CA Unpub Decisions

Hector Macias appeals after conviction on his negotiated plea of guilty. Macias was charged by felony complaint with five counts: (1) possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)); (2) possession of ammunition by a prohibited person (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1)); (3) possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, §11377, subd. (a)); (4) possession of controlled substance paraphernalia (Health & Saf., § 11364, subd. (a)); and (5) driving on a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a)). The complaint also alleged that Macias previously had been convicted in Los Angeles County of a felony, a violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(4).
Macias entered a negotiated plea to counts one, two, and five and admitted the prior conviction. The court sentenced Macias to formal probation for a period of two years and ordered appellant to serve 365 days in county jail with credit for 230 days (115 actual days and 115 days for conduct)

In 2010, appellant Oiram Roman Ayala was sentenced to life in prison without parole for his part in two special circumstance gang murders. He contends the trial court erred in denying his recent petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. However, because the jury found appellant either personally killed the victims with malice or he aided and abetted the killings with such intent, he is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. We therefore affirm the trial court’s ruling.

This is the third opinion we have written in this case. Following our most recent one, we granted rehearing to consider the effect of Assembly Bill No. 518 (AB 518) on appellant’s sentence. Effective January 1, 2022, AB 518 amended Penal Code section 654 to give trial courts the authority to impose sentence for any offense, not just the greatest offense, when that section applies to preclude multiple punishment for crimes that were based upon a single act or omission. Because the judgment in this case is not yet final, we agree with the parties that appellant is entitled to the benefit of AB 518, as well as any other new sentencing provisions that may apply to his case. Therefore, we reverse appellant’s sentence and remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing. We also direct the trial court to resolve a key factual issue relating to appellant’s presentence credits. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

This case comes to us on transfer from the California Supreme Court. After we affirmed the judgment committing appellant to prison for 28 years, the Supreme Court granted his petition for review and ordered us to vacate our decision and reconsider the matter in light of various sentencing laws that became effective on January 1, 2022. Given these new laws, we agree with the parties that appellant is entitled to be resentenced. Therefore, we vacate our prior opinion in People v. Buenrostro (Sept. 14, 2021, G058813) [nonpub. opn.], reverse appellant’s sentence, and remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing. However, we remain convinced appellant’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and the introduction of certain evidence lack merit. Therefore, we affirm the judgment in all other respects.

Roger R. (father) seeks an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested combined six- and 12-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subds. (e)(1) & (f)(1)) on January 5, 2022, terminating his reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing on May 4, 2022, as to his now one-year-old son, R.R. We deny the petition.

Samantha A. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order summarily denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition. Mother’s son, Gabriel G., has been the subject of a juvenile dependency case since 2011 when he was 10 months old. At the permanency planning hearing (§ 366.26), the juvenile court ordered a permanent plan of legal guardianship with his paternal grandparents. In 2021, mother petitioned the court to terminate the legal guardianship, alleging that circumstances had changed in that mother had moved out of state and the proposed order was in Gabriel’s best interests because she wanted to transition him to living in her care full time. We affirm the juvenile court’s order.

On January 15, 2021, the Stanislaus County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a)) alleging minor committed attempted murder without premeditation (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 1), assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2); count 2), possession of a concealable firearm (Pen. Code, § 29610; count 3), and misdemeanor possession of live ammunition by a minor (Pen. Code, § 29650; count 4). As to count 1, the petition further alleged that minor personally inflicted great bodily harm (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)).
On April 8, minor admitted the truth of count 1 and the related enhancement. The remaining counts were dismissed in the interest of justice, on the People’s motion. The Stanislaus County Superior Court then ordered jurisdiction over the matter transferred to Merced County for disposition.
On April 15, the Merced County Superior Court accepted jurisdiction over the matter.

On October 3, 2018, the Kern County District Attorney filed an information charging defendant with knowingly possessing marijuana in prison (Pen. Code, § 4573.6; count 1) and willfully and unlawfully possessing a cellular phone in prison (§ 4575, subd. (a); count 2). The information also alleged that defendant had previously served two separate prison terms following felony convictions in 2012 and 2014 (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)).
On December 15, 2020, defendant pled no contest to an amended count 1 (§ 4573.8). Count 2 (§ 4575, subd. (a)) and the one-year enhancement allegations (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)) were dismissed. Defendant reserved the right to appeal his conviction.
On January 8, 2021, defendant was sentenced to a low-term sentence of 16 months to run concurrently with the term he was already serving, plus fines and fees.
On January 11, 2021, defendant filed a notice of appeal.

In 2018, appellant Robert Darrell Williams II pled no contest to receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)) and admitted to serving a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) (2018 case). He was sentenced to a split sentence of five years—18 months of which he was to serve in custody in county jail and 42 months of which he was to serve on mandatory supervision. While on mandatory supervision, appellant committed additional offenses. In 2019, he pled no contest to dissuading a victim (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(2)), possession of heroin and fentanyl (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351), and being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) (2019 case). On the 2019 case, appellant was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of four years eight months. A few days later, the court ordered appellant’s remaining term of mandatory supervision on his 2018 case to be converted to a straight prison sentence and be served concurrent to his prison term in the 2019 case.

Pursuant to Penal Code section 1238, subdivision (a)(7), the People appeal from an order dismissing the underlying case after the superior court granted codefendants Bryan and Zackary Hineman’s pretrial motion to quash a search warrant and suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5). The People contend the court erred in granting the defendants’ motion because (1) there was sufficient probable cause to justify issuance of the warrant on its face and (2) the court erred by finding the affiant had made a misrepresentation without following the procedure set forth in Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154 (Franks). We reverse the superior court’s orders dismissing the case and granting defendants’ motion to quash the search warrant and suppress evidence and remand for further proceedings.

In 2012, Hakim Rashad Salone pled guilty to attempted second degree robbery and second degree robbery and was sentenced to 24 years in prison. In 2020, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) recommended recalling and reducing his sentence based on his exemplary behavior while in prison. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d).) The trial judge declined the CDCR’s recommendation. Originally, Salone argued this was an abuse of discretion, and we disagreed, affirming the decision not to recall his sentence.
After our initial opinion, Salone requested rehearing on the basis he was entitled to the ameliorative effects of then newly passed, now enacted, Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1540) and Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 483). Salone argues we must remand to the trial court for a new hearing allowing the judge to reconsider whether to recall and resentence him under these new laws.

The appellants/petitioners, Nadine Garcia, James Marmor, and Helen O’Neill-Pottery, all “low-income residents of the City of Desert Hot Springs and the surrounding area,” sued the City of Desert Hot Springs, Desert Hot Springs City Council, Desert Hot Springs Successor Agency (successor agency), and Desert Hot Springs Housing Authority (housing authority) to force them to carry out their long-overdue obligation to revise the housing element of the city’s general plan. Eventually, the parties entered a stipulated judgment, which set a timeline for the city to complete the revision.

A jury found defendant and appellant Traevon Denae Stewart guilty of (1) first degree murder with the special circumstances of the killing occurring during a kidnapping and an attempted robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subds. (a)(17)(A) & (B)) ; (2) attempted robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211); (3) kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207); (4) assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b)); (5) reckless driving while fleeing from a pursuing peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)); and (6) two counts of dissuading a witness with force or a threat of force (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (c)(1)).
The jury found true the allegations that (A) during the murder, defendant discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); (B) during the kidnapping and attempted robbery, defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)); and (C) during the assault with a semiautomatic firearm, defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).

Sisters Minoo Shayesteh and Nagin Welch dispute the ownership of property located at 240 North Cypress Avenue, in Santa Clara, California. Shayesteh maintains she and her sister provided equal funds for the down payment and that they both contributed to the mortgage, property taxes, and maintenance. She filed suit in 2015 to quiet title, among other things. Welch denied Shayesteh’s allegations, and the matter went to trial in 2018. Shayesteh sought to introduce recordings she had made of conversations with her sister about the property. The court excluded one such recording made November 21, 2013 after concluding it regarded settlement negotiations and was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1152, subdivision (a) for purposes of proving liability. Following trial, the court entered judgment in favor of Welch. Shayesteh appeals the judgment, contending the court erred by excluding the November 21, 2013 recording.