CA Unpub Decisions

Ivan Vasquez appeals from a judgment entered after defendant SFM, LLC (SFM), the parent company of Sprouts Farmers’ Markets grocery stores, and plaintiffs Julio Hernandez, Carmen Valenzuela and Jeffrey Wasik (the Hernandez Plaintiffs) settled a case involving numerous PAGA and class action claims brought on behalf of all nonexempt California employees for violations of the Labor Code (the Hernandez action) for a total of $1,200,000. Under the terms of the settlement in the Hernandez action, the parties allocated $300,000 of the total settlement amount to the PAGA claims, and allocated the remaining $900,000 to the class claims.
In proceedings in the trial court, the parties to the Hernandez action filed bifurcated motions seeking the court’s approval of the settlement of the PAGA claims and the class claims.

After denial of his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, defendant and appellant Jacob Louis Schoultz pled no contest to taking a vehicle without consent, in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). The trial court imposed and suspended a two-year sentence and placed Schoultz on probation for 18 months, with probationary conditions including 97 days in county jail.
In his timely appeal, Schoultz contends his suppression motion should have been granted with respect to evidence obtained in a search of his person because the exception to the warrant requirement for a search incident to arrest did not apply.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant and appellant Oscar Olloqui appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition made pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95, which permits a person convicted under a felony murder theory of liability to petition to have his murder conviction vacated and be resentenced if the petitioner “is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) (People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 723.)

Donald Leon Sabados pleaded guilty in 1983 to first degree murder based on his participation in a robbery and burglary during which the victim died of a heart attack. In response to his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 1991, Sabados’s offense was modified to second degree murder and his sentence reduced from 25 years to life to 15 years to life. In November 2020 the superior court denied Sabados’s petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 without holding an evidentiary hearing, finding Sabados had failed to make a prima facie case for relief because the facts in the record of conviction established he could still be found guilty of first degree murder pursuant to section 189, subdivision (e)(1) and (3), as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) (Senate Bill 1437).

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Mikell Buchanan of the first degree premeditated murder of Davion Gregory (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) [count 3]), five counts of premeditated attempted murder (§§ 187/664 [counts 5–9]), one count of shooting from a motor vehicle (§ 26100, subd. (c) [count 4]), and five counts of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1) [counts 28–32]). The jury found true the special circumstance allegations that the murder was accomplished by lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) and shooting from a motor vehicle (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21)), and that Buchanan intentionally killed Gregory while Buchanan was an active participant in a criminal street gang (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)).

A jury found Kevin Anthony Payne, Jr., guilty on four counts of attempted murder, two counts of shooting at an occupied vehicle and several related weapons offenses based primarily on surveillance videos showing him firing multiple shots at two individuals standing near a liquor store and into a bystander’s SUV. On appeal he contends the trial court erred by permitting the investigating officer to identify him as the shooter as the surveillance videos were shown to the jury. He also argues the court committed other evidentiary error, the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial misconduct during closing argument, defense counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance and he was improperly deprived of the advice of standby counsel while representing himself at his preliminary hearing. Finally, he contends he was wrongly convicted on two counts of shooting at an occupied vehicle based on a single shot.

Ralph Jordan (appellant) and three other men were charged with attempted robbery of a bank in violation of Penal Code sections 211, 664 and attempted murder during the failed robbery in violation of sections 664, 187, subdivision (a). One codefendant, Jeffery Brown, entered into a plea agreement and testified at trial against appellant and remaining codefendants Bryan Speight and Harold Johnson. Speight and Johnson had unsuccessfully sought plea agreements before trial; later, at the end of the People’s case-in-chief, they were able to reach plea agreements, but did not enter their pleas until after the trial. Jordan’s case was submitted to the jury, which convicted him as charged, and found true the allegation that a principal was armed with a handgun in the commission of both offenses. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).)
Jordan waived his right to jury trial on prior conviction allegations.

Defendant Donnell McGilberry was convicted by a jury and sentenced to a lengthy prison term on charges of second-degree murder, attempted robbery, and carrying a loaded firearm on the person in an incorporated city, which prison term included the upper term of three years for the attempted robbery. McGilberry argues—and the Attorney General concedes—that he is entitled to resentencing on the attempted robbery count under two pieces of legislation that became effective while this appeal was pending, the first of which created a presumption that the trial court will impose the middle term unless aggravating factors are found true by the jury, and the second of which created a presumption that the lower term will be imposed where the defendant is a youth or has suffered certain types of trauma. Accordingly, we will vacate the sentence on the attempted robbery count and remand for resentencing.

Plaintiff Michael Williams, M.D., appeals a judgment entered in favor of defendants ValleyCare Medical Center (also known as Stanford Health Care – Valley Care) and ValleyCare Medical Foundation, Inc. He contends the trial court erred by sustaining defendants’ demurrer to his first amended complaint for intentional infliction of emotional distress and elder abuse. We find no error and affirm the judgment.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s order finding defendant Ralph Manning Scott mentally incompetent to stand trial and committing him to a state hospital or treatment facility pursuant to Penal Code sections 1367 and 1370. Defendant contends the court and appointed experts improperly relied on the “mere fact” of his mental illness and ignored his “demonstrated ability to work and cooperate with his counsel” in finding him incompetent. (Initial caps and boldface omitted.) We affirm.

In 2003, defendant Sammie Lee Ford was sentenced to two 25 years to life sentences for two Sonoma County burglaries, and a 28-month sentence for a Los Angeles County burglary, which was to be served consecutively to the indeterminate terms. In 2019, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) notified the trial court that the 28-month sentence was illegal. Ford asserted the CDCR’s letter was a recommendation for recall and resentencing under former Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d), and he requested resentencing on all his counts. The court disagreed, noted it was not recalling Ford’s sentence, and denied his requests for resentencing on the indeterminate terms and the striking of a prior felony conviction.

California has adopted a number of ways to finance the construction and maintenance of public schools. Two of those ways, authorized by the Government Code, are what is known as Level 2 and Level 3 fees. These can be imposed by a school district, requiring developers of a new housing project to pay some of the cost of school facilities to handle the number of new students anticipated from the project.
The developer here is CP V Walnut LLC (Walnut), which describes itself as “the owner and developer of the Walnut Residences Project in the City of Fremont,” which is planned to have “632 rental apartments.” During the course of administrative proceedings before the Fremont Unified School District (District), Walnut was assessed both Level 2 and Level 3 fees.

Defendant Paul Jacob Soulik appeals after pleading no contest to murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) for a stipulated sentence of 25 years to life. After denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea, the trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life and imposed a gang registration requirement (§ 186.30) over defendant’s objection.
Defendant contends that the gang registration requirement must be vacated because there is not substantial evidence in the record that the murder was gang related. Defendant further contends that if the gang registration requirement is not vacated, the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded to give him an opportunity to withdraw his plea. The Attorney General concedes that insufficient evidence supports the registration requirement, but asserts that the matter should be remanded to allow the prosecution an opportunity to provide the requisite proof. Defendant has no objection to a remand.

M.H. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order issued at the six month review hearing which terminated his reunification services for his daughter B.H. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (e).) At the hearing, the court found Father continued to be unwilling to participate in services and concluded services would be “a poor use of resources.” The court also found that the rule generally limiting reunification services to six months from the date of the disposition hearing applied because, in the words of the statute, B.H., “on the date of [her] initial removal from the physical custody of the child’s parent or guardian, was under three years of age.” (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B), hereafter sometimes § 361.5(a)(1)(B).) Father had therefore reached the limit of his services under the statute. (Ibid.)
Father contends he was entitled to a minimum of a year of reunification services, not just six months.