CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Pamala Tuzzolino signed an arbitration agreement purportedly on behalf of her deceased husband, Paul Tuzzolino, when admitting him to a skilled nursing facility. Following Paul’s discharge from the facility, Paul and Pamala sued the nursing facility, Windsor Twin Palms Healthcare Center, LLC dba Windsor Palms Care Center of Artesia, and its owners and operators, S&F Management Company, LLC and Windsor OMG Holding Company II, LLC (collectively, Windsor) for negligence and elder abuse.
Windsor filed a petition to compel arbitration under the arbitration agreement Pamala executed. The trial court denied Windsor’s petition, concluding Pamala lacked authority to sign the agreement on Paul’s behalf. We agree Pamala’s execution of the arbitration agreement was unauthorized and accordingly, affirm.

Monica T. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights to her minor sons, E.T. and M.T. She contends the termination orders should be conditionally vacated and the case remanded for the proceedings to comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). We affirm.

M.W. (mother) challenges orders of the juvenile court denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition and terminating her parental rights as to her daughter C. Mother contends the juvenile court erred by denying her section 388 petition because she demonstrated changed circumstances and continuing her reunification services was in C.’s best interests. Mother also contends the juvenile court erred by terminating her parental rights because the beneficial parental relationship exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) applied. We find no abuse of discretion, and thus we will affirm.

Ashley B. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights to her child J.B. Mother does not challenge the juvenile court's substantive findings. Instead, mother's sole contention on appeal was that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) failed to satisfy its duty of initial inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA). Specifically, mother contended the Department did not make meaningful efforts to locate and interview her biological mother. We use the past tense because mother filed a concession letter instead of a reply brief. In her letter, she concedes the Department contacted her biological mother and thereby complied with its duty of initial inquiry under ICWA.

After David A. (father) pled no contest to allegations that he had abused his two children and their mother, the juvenile court granted a permanent restraining order prohibiting father from contacting all three of them. Father appeals that restraining order, contending that the juvenile court abused its discretion because it relied upon “nebulous” statements regarding father’s purported stalking activities and because it erroneously denied his request to call the children as witnesses at the evidentiary hearing.
A juvenile court may issue a restraining order enjoining anyone from disturbing the peace of a parent or child if a failure to issue such an order might jeopardize their safety. The record here unambiguously demonstrates that father severely traumatized both of his children and their mother over a period of many years. The documented incidents of domestic violence with mother were long-standing and predated both children.

Amber W. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition orders declaring her three daughters dependents of the court and removing her eldest daughter, A.A., from her custody. Mother contends insufficient evidence supports the court’s jurisdiction findings that she physically and emotionally abused A.A. or neglected her mental health issues. We affirm.

Locadio Aguirre appeals from the judgment committing him to a state hospital as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) He contends: (1) the trial court denied him due process and a fair trial when it refused to consider potential parole conditions, (2) the trial court erred when it admitted evidence regarding a male victim, (3) counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and (4) cumulative error requires reversal. We affirm.

Following A.C.’s (father) assault of G.S. (mother), the juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over the couple’s infant daughter (the child) and removed physical custody of her from father. On appeal, father contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s jurisdictional findings and its removal order. We affirm.

Salina Sanchez (appellant) appeals from an order denying her petition for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Edward Dominguez (respondent). Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence a recording made on respondent’s cell phone. Appellant argues that no substantial evidence supports the trial court’s factual determination that the recording was not surreptitious, and the trial court was required to make an additional determination that appellant affirmatively consented to the recording. Appellant further argues that the admission of the recording constituted a miscarriage of justice, and the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in denying her petition for a DVRO.
We find substantial evidence in the record that supports the trial court’s decision on the factual issue of appellant’s knowledge of the recording.

This appeal arises from an underinsured motorist arbitration between respondent Mehrangiz Vafi and her insurer, appellant Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual). Based on Vafi’s automobile policy, the arbitration was limited to determining the damages that Vafi could recover from the underinsured motorist. The arbitration expressly omitted from consideration the scope of Liberty Mutual’s coverage under the policy. The arbitrator issued an award in favor of Vafi for $335,983.42. Thereafter, Liberty Mutual tendered a check to Vafi for $271,335.66 to cover her UIM claim. Liberty Mutual arrived at that amount by deducting from the arbitration award offset credits for a third-party settlement that Vafi had reached with the underinsured motorist’s insurer ($50,000), and medical expenses Liberty Mutual had paid under Vafi’s medical payment coverage ($14,647.76).

The juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over three-year-old E.H. after sustaining allegations that J.H. (Father) committed acts of domestic violence against K.R. (Mother). The court later terminated jurisdiction and awarded Mother sole legal and physical custody of E.H. Father appeals and we are asked to decide whether the juvenile court’s decision to grant Mother sole legal custody was an abuse of discretion, particularly in light of Father’s partial compliance with his case plan.

Defendant Freddy Ronald Amurrio, a Bolivian national who lacks meaningful ties to his country of birth, has been a lawful resident of the United States since he was young. His three children are American citizens. In September 2000, Amurrio pled guilty to drunk driving and transportation of hallucinogenic mushrooms. He received probation. More than a decade later, while returning to the United States from a soccer tournament in Mexico, immigration authorities discovered the conviction and initiated removal proceedings against him. In 2020, Amurrio filed a motion to vacate his conviction and withdraw his plea, arguing he did not understand that his guilty plea would subject him to mandatory deportation, and he would not have pled guilty if he had. The trial court denied the motion, and Amurrio appeals. We reverse the court’s order and remand with directions.

A jury found defendant and appellant Ronald Conley (defendant) guilty of first degree murder and several counts of premeditated attempted murder for his participation in a gang-related drive-by shooting. The jury also found true a drive-by shooting special circumstance allegation (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(21)), and the trial court accordingly sentenced defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
Many years after his conviction, defendant petitioned for resentencing under section 1170.95. Without first appointing counsel for defendant, the trial court denied the petition. The court found defendant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because the jury, in finding the drive-by shooting special circumstance true, necessarily determined defendant harbored express malice in committing the murder.

The City of Commerce (the City) denied several commercial cannabis licenses to From The Earth, LLC after From The Earth refused to participate in an alleged extortion and kickback scheme operated by a cannabis lobbyist who was colluding with City officials. From The Earth sued alleging the City violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying From The Earth’s license application on pretextual grounds while approving cannabis licenses for other similar applicants. The City filed a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (an anti-SLAPP motion) arguing that “communicative activity constituting a conspiracy” by the City in connection with a public issue qualified as “protected activity” under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied the motion finding From The Earth’s suit did not arise from protected activity. The City timely appealed. We affirm.