CA Unpub Decisions

Ron Cuellar sued Corona South Hills Community Church (South Hills) for negligence and premises liability after he tripped and seriously injured himself when walking away from an inflated bounce house set up on the church lawn next to, and partially obstructing, large pipes required by the Burbank Fire Department for possible fire emergencies. The trial court granted South Hills’s motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in its favor, ruling Cuellar had failed to raise a triable issue of fact showing that South Hills had a duty to warn or remedy the open and obvious condition of the pipes or that the danger to Cuellar posed by the pipes was foreseeable under the circumstances. We reverse.

Thomas D. Williamson and Sue Shreeve appeal from an order granting the special motion to strike (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16; anti-SLAPP statute) filed by cross-defendants Katherine Black Garcia and Christopher, Henry, and Laura Black (collectively, the Black parties). After Thomas and Sue arranged for the sale of real property owned by corporate entities held by four family trusts without notice to the Black parties, three of the Black parties (Katherine, Christopher, and Henry; collectively, the Black plaintiffs), in their capacity as co-trustees of one of the four trusts, sued Thomas and Sue for breach of fiduciary duty. Thomas and Sue cross-complained against the Black parties, alleging causes of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage and declaratory relief. The Black parties filed a special motion to strike the cross-complaint, which the trial court granted.

Jodie Bullock petitioned for a civil harassment restraining order against Nicole Anderson pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. The trial court dismissed the petition without prejudice and awarded attorneys’ fees to Anderson. On appeal, Bullock challenges only the attorneys’ fees award. We reverse the trial court’s order awarding attorneys’ fees to Anderson.

Damon DelCambre, convicted in 2003 of first degree murder with a true finding the murder had been committed during the course of a 1994 bank robbery, appeals the superior court’s denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 without issuing an order to show cause and holding an evidentiary hearing to determine his eligibility for relief. We agree the superior court erred in holding DelCambre’s petition was precluded as a matter of law by the jury’s felony-murder special-circumstance finding, made more than a decade before the Supreme Court’s identification in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark) of the factors properly considered to assess whether a defendant had been a major participant in an underlying serious felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.

Planet Clair LLC appeals the judgment entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend American Honda Motor Co., Inc.’s demurrer to Planet Clair’s complaint for breach of express and implied warranties pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code, § 1790 et seq.) (Song-Beverly Act or Act). We reverse.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Hayden O. Allagoa of first degree premeditated murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) [count 1]) and assault with a semi-automatic firearm (§ 254, subd. (b) [count 3]). The jury found true firearm allegations associated with each count (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d) [count 1]; § 12022.5, subd. (a)).
The trial court Imposed a sentence of 25 years to life in count 1, and struck the attached firearm enhancement in the interest of justice (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d)). It imposed a concurrent sentence of 10 years in count 3, consisting of the middle term of six years for assault with a semi-automatic firearm and four years for the associated firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).

Eva Daley was convicted in 2013 of the second degree murder of 13-year-old Jose Cano following a jury trial at which the prosecutor argued Cano’s murder was the natural and probable consequence of a gang-related assault enabled by Daley. In January 2019 Daley petitioned for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. After appointing counsel for Daley and receiving briefs from the People and Daley’s attorney, the superior court denied the petition, finding “a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that [Daley] acted with implied malice and/or a reckless disregard for human life and would be guilty of second degree murder.” As Daley and the Attorney General agree, the superior court erred, and the matter is properly remanded for the court to issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Daley is guilty of murder under current law.

Plaintiff California Bail Agents Association signed defendant Dhillon Law Group Inc.’s retainer agreement, which included an arbitration clause for any fee dispute arising out of the agreement. After plaintiff filed its operative complaint for a single breach of contract claim based on defendant allegedly overcharging for legal services, defendant moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the agreement. The trial court denied the motion, finding the arbitration clause was unconscionable because it failed to provide an accurate statement of the law governing attorney-client fee disputes as well as outlining the costs associated with private arbitration. We conclude the arbitration clause is not procedurally unconscionable and therefore we need not address substantive unconscionability. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration.

Nicolas Manos appeals from a judgment following his conviction for first degree murder of his girlfriend. Manos contends (1) there is insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support the conviction; (2) the evidence is also insufficient to support a conviction for uncharged second degree murder; and (3) the trial court failed to give a required instruction on heat of passion. We affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Emran Khuwaja (appellant) appeals from the trial court’s orders awarding defendants and respondents Hussain Ladak, Erum Ladak, Shahbano Ladak, and Salima Ladak (collectively, respondents) attorney fees as the prevailing parties under Family Code section 6344. Appellant contends the fee awards must be reversed because they were issued without “notice and a hearing” as required by section 6344, subdivision (a), and because there was no evidence to support a determination, as required under subdivision (b), that respondents were unable to pay their own fees. We affirm the trial court’s orders.

In February 2021 , the Alameda County District Attorney filed a felony complaint, alleging defendant Joe Marcos Gomes committed second-degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211 ), together with sentencing enhancement allegations of twelve prior felony convictions.
In April, Gomes pleaded no contest to being an accessary after the fact (§ 32) in exchange for a sentence of sixteen months. While the prosecutor initially noted the sentence would be served in “state prison,” defense counsel corrected him by explaining that Gomes would actually serve his sentence in county jail. In its later recitation of the terms of the plea agreement, the court confirmed that defendant would be serving his sentence in “the local prison at Santa Rita.” The charged count and sentence enhancement allegations were dismissed. In May, the trial court sentenced Gomes to the agreed term but stated he would serve his sentence in state prison.

In these dependency proceedings, R.T. (Mother) appeals from six-month review orders in which the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction as to her two younger children, S.T. and K.T., custody of whom was awarded to their father, and continued reunification services with respect to her two older children, M.H. and E.H., who remained in out-of-home placements. Mother appeals from these orders solely to preserve the challenges she raised in her previous appeal (A161819) from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders and the appointment of a guardian ad litem for Mother. After Mother filed her notices of appeal in this matter, we issued our opinion affirming the previous orders. (In re M.H. (Nov. 19, 2021, A161819) [nonpub. opn.] 2021 WL 5409869 (M.H.).) Because our opinion has been certified as final, and because Mother raises no other challenge to the orders at issue in the appeal now before us, we shall affirm.

Plaintiff GreenLink Financial, LLC (GreenLink) sued defendant Freedom Debt Relief, LLC (Freedom or FDR), seeking to invalidate purported non-compete provisions in a business agreement between the parties. Freedom moved to dismiss the action on the ground of inconvenient forum, as the agreement requires any disputes to be litigated in Arizona under Arizona law.
While the motion was pending, the California Supreme Court decided Ixchel Pharma, LLC v. Biogen, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1130 (Ixchel). The trial court subsequently granted Freedom’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the parties’ choice of law and choice of forum should be enforced because Arizona law (allowing reasonable non-compete provisions) is not contrary to a fundamental policy of California. In so doing, the trial court relied on Ixchel for the proposition that California has “long applied a reasonableness standard to contractual restraints on business operations and commercial dealings.” (Id. at p. 1159.)

On July 24, 2018, the Monterey County Department of Social and Employment Services (Department) filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) relative to a boy, A.G. (the minor), who was then four years old. S.B. (mother) is the minor’s mother. The minor was placed into protective custody after mother, twice in successive days, drove a car under the influence with the minor as her passenger. The Department alleged that mother had a “severe” ongoing substance abuse problem that prevented her from adequately caring for the minor. The juvenile court declared the minor a dependent child, and he was placed in out-of-home foster care. Mother received family reunification services for 13 months; they were terminated in September 2019.
The initial selection and implementation hearing pursuant to section 366.26 (366.26 hearing) occurred in January 2020.