CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa Clara County, Vanessa A. Zecher, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Solomon Wollack, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Donna M. Provenzano, and Victoria Ratnikova, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Defendant Andrew Zumini, on trial for the first degree murder of his father, sought to introduce evidence of his father’s history of threats and violence toward Zumini and others. The trial court excluded this evidence on the ground that it was irrelevant to Zumini’s claims that he acted in self-defense or the heat of passion when he killed his father. After deliberating for several days, the jury convicted Zumini of first degree murder and also found true the allegation that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death. |
Plaintiffs Thomas and Donna Anderson (the Andersons) appeal an order partially denying their motion to tax certain costs listed in defendants Way West, Inc. (Way West) and Russell Strom’s memorandum of costs. The Andersons claim that the trial court erred in taxing only $2,581.15 of $5,523.11 in costs related to taking the deposition of a deponent named Mark Smith. The Andersons maintain that the Smith deposition is not a legally recoverable cost in this case because the deposition was taken in another case. The Andersons maintain that this is so even though the parties stipulated that the Smith deposition could be used in this case. The Andersons also contend that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to tax $2,032.78 in service of process costs related to defendants’ attempt to take Smith’s deposition in this case because, according to the Andersons, those costs were “unreasonable and unnecessary.”
|
Defendant Michael Elefante Fernandez appeals from a jury verdict finding him guilty of oral copulation and digital penetration with a child 10 years or younger and lewd and lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14. Defendant claims the trial court committed prejudicial error when it ruled the People could introduce his prior felony conviction under Vehicle Code section 10851 for impeachment purposes. We conclude any error was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm.
|
Defendant Sterling Lamont Avery was in a relationship with Jessica Mathis for about 18 months before they broke up. Mathis began dating Aaron Ramsey–the victim in this case–after the breakup, and Ramsey soon moved in with Mathis. About a month later, Ramsey was shot and killed by a man at a gas station. Mathis, who witnessed the killing, did not identify the killer at the preliminary hearing but at trial identified defendant as the perpetrator.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) with an enhancement for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm, causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 50 years to life. |
A jury found defendant Sean Michael McGeough guilty of first degree murder of his sister. The trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior uncharged attack on a former girlfriend. We affirm the trial court’s decision.
|
This appeal presents us with several unusual questions. Suppose a trial court issues an order in a limited civil case that purports to dismiss a related unlimited civil case. In that event, has the unlimited civil case actually been dismissed? Suppose further that one of the parties seeks to appeal the trial court’s purported dismissal. Would the appeal be from a dismissal of the unlimited civil case or from a decision in the limited civil case? The distinction matters because appeals in limited civil cases, unlike appeals in unlimited civil cases, are subject to shorter timelines and must be filed with the superior court’s appellate division rather than the court of appeal.
Under this set of facts, we conclude that no case has actually been dismissed, as a trial court’s decision in one case cannot dismiss a distinct case not before the court. |
Accredited Surety and Casualty Company, Inc. (Accredited) posted a $75,000 bail bond for the release of Jesus Perez in People v. Jesus Perez, Tehama County Superior Court Case No. 17CR-001544. The trial court increased the amount of the bail to $165,000 after the People added two more counts and a firearm-use allegation to the complaint, and Perez was remanded to the custody of the sheriff. Accredited then executed a bail bond in the amount of $90,000 for Perez (the difference between the previously posted $75,000 bail bond and the new bail amount of $165,000), securing Perez’s release from custody. The two bonds were declared forfeited when Perez did not appear at a trial readiness conference.
Accredited appeals from the portion of the trial court’s order denying its motion to vacate forfeiture and exonerate the $90,000 bond and the subsequently entered summary judgment. |
The juvenile court issued custody and visitation orders at termination of dependency proceedings awarding Victor S.’s former wife, Leticia R., sole legal and physical custody of their four children and restricting Victor to monitored visitation. On appeal Victor contends his lack of participation in a drug program with testing was an insufficient basis to modify a 2017 family law order providing for joint legal and physical custody. We affirm.
|
Plaintiff William Parrish has a money judgment against defendant Michael J. Avenatti. He appeals a post-judgment order of the superior court denying his motion for an order to recover stock certificates previously issued to Avenatti. Another judgment creditor, Lisa Storie-Avenatti (Storie) obtained a judgment lien prior to Parrish’s judgment lien. The trial court ruled Storie’s lien was prior to Parish’s lien. We affirm.
|
Joi Hiraishi appeals from the judgment after the trial court sustained a demurrer to her complaint against Kim Stephenson and Penelope DeLeon (collectively, Respondents) without granting leave to amend. She contends the court erred when it concluded that she failed to state claims for: (1) gender harassment against Stephenson, and (2) aiding and abetting against DeLeon. We affirm.
|
Jennifer Franco appeals from an order of dismissal after the trial court granted Nicholas Barajas’s and Drew Brown’s motions to dismiss for failure to serve them with the summons and complaint within two years pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 583.420, subdivision (a)(1). Franco contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motions to dismiss. We affirm.
|
Eduardo Aguilera appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 for his prior convictions of attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter. He contends the trial court erred in concluding section 1170.95 does not apply to his attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter convictions. Due to an intervening change in the law, the prosecution concedes the statute now applies to those crimes. However, the prosecution argues that the denial of defendant’s petition should nonetheless be affirmed as the record establishes he is not eligible for relief as a matter of law. We disagree and reverse.
|
This appeal involves a dispute arising from two commercial leases for properties formerly occupied by Art Works Studio & Classroom, LLC (Art Works) and Coffee + Food, LLC (collectively appellants). Appellants appeal from an order entered after the trial court partially granted a special motion to strike (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, “anti-SLAPP” statute) filed by defendants and respondents Massco Investments, Inc. (Massco) and Larchmont Place, LLC (Larchmont). While this appeal was pending final judgments were entered against appellants in unlawful detainer actions filed by Larchmont. Each of the causes of action struck by the trial court (and indeed every cause of action) in the operative complaint is premised on appellants having an ongoing possessory interest in the properties.
|
Four seniors at Simi Valley High School (SVHS), including the class valedictorian and salutatorian, were suspended from school for three days and had their graduation privileges revoked for drinking alcohol or using marijuana during Prom Night. The students (collectively “plaintiffs”) brought this action for damages against the Simi Valley Unified School District (District), Principal Dean May and Assistant Principal Brian Cox for violation of their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (section 1983).) They claim May and Cox violated their procedural due process rights by providing inadequate notice of the charges against them and depriving them of a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
May and Cox moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions, concluding plaintiffs had failed to raise a triable issue of material fact as to their liability for the alleged due process violations or supervisory liability claims. |
Actions
Category Stats
Listings: 77268
Regular: 77268
Last listing added: 06:28:2023
Regular: 77268
Last listing added: 06:28:2023