CA Unpub Decisions

Hemosure, Inc. appeals from a judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of Med Tech/Med Care, LLC (Med Tech). Hemosure contends the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his powers when he failed to issue a “reasoned award” as requested by the parties under the American Arbitration Association’s (AAA) Commercial Arbitration Rules. We affirm.

Derek Steven McCormack pled no contest to arson of an inhabited dwelling and admitted an enhancement that the fire was set during the Governor’s declaration of a state of emergency (§§ 451, subd. (b), 454, subd. (b)). In April 2021, the trial court sentenced McCormack to nine years in state prison pursuant to the negotiated disposition. The court imposed a $312 presentence report fee pursuant to former section 1203.1b.
McCormack raises two claims on appeal. First, he argues the abstract of judgment erroneously omits the state of emergency enhancement attached to the arson conviction. Second, he argues the presentence report fee must be stricken in light of Assembly Bill No. 1869 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) which, as relevant here, makes the unpaid balance of that fee unenforceable and uncollectible as of July 1, 2021, and requires that any portion of the judgment imposing such a fee be vacated. (§ 1465.9, subd. (a); People v. Clark (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 248, 259–260.)

In this dependency action, M.B. (Mother) appeals: (1) the juvenile court’s denial of her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition arguing that the Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) failed to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to locate Mother, and (2) the court’s finding that visitation with Mother would be detrimental to her son, A.M. (Minor). We reverse with regard to the visitation finding and otherwise affirm.

Plaintiff Haiqing Qiu filed a lawsuit against defendants Dignity Community Care (Dignity) doing business as Saint Francis Memorial Hospital and the City and County of San Francisco (City). The lawsuit related to the death of his mother, and Qiu alleged “a malpractice wrongful death compensation case.” Qiu represented himself. He also informed the trial court he does not understand English and he first wrote the complaint in Chinese and then it was translated into English.
The City filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the trial court granted the City’s motion without leave to amend on December 3, 2019. Dignity moved for terminating sanctions based on discovery violations, and the trial court granted Dignity’s motion and entered a judgment of dismissal on December 19, 2019.

Plaintiff Gianna Galletta appeals a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding a vehicle manufactured by defendant FCA US LLC (FCA) and sold to her by defendant Putnam Chrysler Jeep Dodge (Putnam) to have been unmerchantable, but also finding she suffered no compensable damages. She contends that the evidence compels a monetary award in her favor and that the trial court misinstructed the jury. We shall affirm the judgment.

Ms. Su was employed by Broadcom and was terminated in March 2017.
Following her termination, Ms. Su began contacting and harassing some of Broadcom’s employees. In 2017, Ms. Su entered the Broadcom office in San Jose and tried to meet with certain employees without an appointment. Ms. Su left after being told the employees were unavailable. She returned several months later asking to meet with another employee. Broadcom security informed Ms. Su that if she would like to meet with employees, she would need to do so outside of the office. Ms. Su returned to the Broadcom office a third time in 2017 and was escorted out of the building by security. Less than a week later, Ms. Su returned to the Broadcom office and waited on the sidewalk in front of the building to talk to employees. In 2018, Ms. Su loitered on the sidewalk in front of the Broadcom office waiting for employees to leave the building on two days in October, four days in November and eight days in December.

This is the third appeal arising out of the dissolution of appellant David E. Critzer’s marriage to respondent Margaret L. Critzer. David, who is proceeding in pro per, appeals from an amended status-only judgment, which he maintains erroneously omits indemnification conditions ordered by the trial court. He also seeks to challenge several qualified domestic relations orders (QDRO), which were entered close in time to the amended status-only judgment. As to the amended status-only judgment, we find no prejudicial error and affirm. As to the QDROs, from which David failed to appeal, we conclude we lack appellate jurisdiction to entertain David’s challenge thereto.

In this case, a local church has disaffiliated itself from a larger, general church with which it had been affiliated. Both the local church, on the one side, and the general church and the diocese wherein the local church is located, on the other, claim ownership of the property on which the local church building stands.
The diocese, as plaintiff, and the general church, as intervener, sought a declaration from the trial court that all property held by or for the local church belongs to them. After a bench trial, the court entered a judgment in favor of the diocese and general church from which the local church appeals.

Abrand Salazar Bravo was convicted of numerous crimes after he used an assault weapon to threaten two people. On appeal, he challenges his assault-related convictions, contending the evidence was legally insufficient because there was no credible evidence the weapon was loaded with ammunition. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Appellant Jesus Gonzalez Trujillo was convicted by jury of two counts of forcible lewd and lascivious acts against a child 14 years or younger (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 2 & 6) against two separate victims, and one count of lewd and lascivious acts against a child 14 years or younger (§ 288, subd. (a); count 3) against a third victim. The jury also found true as to all counts that appellant committed the offenses against multiple victims (§ 667.61, subds. (b) & (e)(4)). Appellant was sentenced to consecutive indeterminate terms of 15 years to life on each count, for an aggregate term of 45 years to life.
On appeal, appellant argues his convictions on counts 2 and 3 must be reversed because the trial court erred by admitting statements that he made to law enforcement and by excluding expert testimony on false confessions.

Eric and Brian Lane initiated this probate action in 2017 after the death of their father, Patrick Lane. Patrick created a living trust to hold his property and transfer it to the trust beneficiaries upon his death. He owned two assault weapons that were surrendered to the Colton Police Department (the Department) sometime after his death. The trial court issued an order to the Department to show cause why the assault weapons should not be released to the trust beneficiaries, including Eric. After briefing and argument from the parties, the court ruled that the Department was not required to release the assault weapons. Eric appeals, arguing that the court erred by failing to order the release of the weapons. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Fabian Yepez Posadas of two counts of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 1 & 2); first degree burglary (§ 459; count 3), three counts of false imprisonment (§ 236; counts 4, 5 & 6), three counts of making criminal threats (§ 422; counts 7, 8 & 9), and three counts of intimidating a witness by force (§ 136.1, subd. (c); counts 10, 11 & 12). The jury found true that defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) during the commission of all the offenses and that another person other than an accomplice was present in the residence (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)) during the commission of the burglary. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 53 years, eight months in prison.

Defendant and appellant, Jesus Plancarte was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. He argues the trial court erroneously admitted his statement confessing to the murder because it was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. He also argues the trial court erred by denying his request for a continuance of the trial to retain new counsel and that his sentence is unconstitutional.
We conclude the trial court erred by admitting defendant’s confession and that the error was prejudicial. We therefore reverse the judgment and need not address defendant’s other arguments.

In 2010, a Riverside jury found Franchune Dyuel Epps guilty of the first degree murders of Milton Chavez and Marvin Gabriel (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). It returned true findings on multiple-murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and robbery-murder (id., subd. (a)(17)(A)) special-circumstance allegations associated with the murder charges, and Epps was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole.
In 2019, Epps filed a petition to have her murder convictions vacated and to be resentenced under section 1170.95. The trial court summarily denied the resentencing petition on grounds that Epps’s record of conviction precluded her from making a prima facie case for relief. In particular, it found Epps was not entitled to resentencing, as a matter of law, due to the true multiple-murder special-circumstance findings.