CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted Timothy John Cook of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), and found true an allegation that in the commission of the murder he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, to wit a knife or sharp object (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). Timothy separately admitted he had suffered two serious felony convictions (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, and 1192.7, subd. (c)) and two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 668, and 1170.12).
The court sentenced Timothy to 56 years to life in prison as follows:
15 years to life on the second degree murder charge, tripled to 45 years under the “Three Strikes” law, five years each for the two serious felony strikes, and a one-year enhancement for the weapon use allegation. The court struck a prior prison term enhancement.

Defendant Tycory Travon Hempstead was convicted of battery on an intimate partner and robbery and the trial court sentenced him consecutively for each of these offenses. Defendant contends his sentence for battery must be stayed because his commission of battery and robbery shared the sole purpose of obtaining the victim’s money. We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.

After a jury found defendant William Rene Valverde guilty of numerous sexual offenses against his daughter, L., and his girlfriend’s daughter, R., the trial court sentenced him to 139 years to life. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred by (1) excluding evidence that R.’s mother gave her condoms and instructions on their usage; and (2) permitting improper expert testimony on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). Finding no merit to the first contention and the second argument to be forfeited, we will affirm.

Defendant Lai Fou Saechao and his nephew David Saechao entered the residence of Guofang Wang. When Wang surprised them, they killed him. A jury convicted defendant of first degree felony murder (murder committed during a burglary) and the trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole.
Defendant now contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain a first degree murder conviction based on a felony-murder theory, (2) the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the elements of theft, the intended felony supporting the predicate felony of burglary, and (3) imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of parole is unlawful in this case because the same facts used to find defendant guilty of felony murder were also used to find true the felony-murder special circumstance.

This case and others involving Adil Hiramanek and family members were originally filed in Santa Clara County Superior Court. Following initial proceedings in the Sixth Appellate District, various appeals, including this one, were transferred to this district. We will refer to the Hiramanek family members by their first names for clarity. Adil was designated a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order under Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7. (See In re Marriage of Hiramanek (Aug. 23, 2012, H035887) [nonpub. opn.].)
The Estate of Roda Hiramanek (Estate), through her son Adil in his capacity as personal representative of the Estate, appeals an order imposing sanctions of $10,000 against Roda in a dissolution action involving the marriage of Adil and Kamal Hiramanek.

Salvador Ramirez challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5. His appointed attorney filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, in which no issues were raised. We affirm.
Just after 10:00 p.m. on November 4, 2019, Azusa Police Officer Brandon Hildebrandt observed Ramirez turn right from the lane designated for vehicles travelling straight through a Y-intersection. Two other lanes allowed for right turns at that intersection but Ramirez was not in either of those lanes. Ramirez ran a red light when he entered the intersection.
Hildebrandt initiated a traffic stop. Ramirez provided the requested driver’s license and proof of insurance but stated he did not have the car registration because it was registered to his brother.

In March 2021, the juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over five-year-old Elijah G., finding the child at risk because appellant-father Eric G. had sexually abused him, because Father had sexually abused Elijah’s teenage half-sister Brianna (who was not Father’s daughter), and because the children’s mother (non-party R.E.) had failed to protect Elijah from Father. The court subsequently removed Elijah from both parents’ custody. On appeal, Father argues the jurisdictional finding must be reversed because: (a) substantial evidence did not support the finding that he sexually abused Elijah; and (b) the court did not find Elijah was at risk from Father’s abuse of Brianna, and in any case, such a finding was unsupported by substantial evidence. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) disagrees.

Defendant Robert Sanford (defendant) was convicted of a
single count of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) in 2004. The trial
court found true allegations that defendant sustained four prior
serious felony convictions (§ 667(a)(1)), served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5(b)), and sustained four prior felony convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667(b)-(i), 1170.12). The trial court struck three of defendant’s prior strike convictions in the interest of justice pursuant to section 1385 and sentenced defendant to serve 30 years in prison.
In February 2021, defendant filed what he styled as a motion to correct an unauthorized sentence. The motion argued he should be accruing conduct credits during his time in custody at a 50 percent rate. The trial court denied the motion on March 1, 2021, finding it was without legal basis.

Conforming to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), Anthony Contreras’s counsel filed an opening brief containing a statement of facts but raising no issues. Counsel asks this court to review the record independently and to determine whether any arguable issues exist on appeal. Counsel advised Contreras he had 30 days to file a supplemental brief. Contreras did not do so.
We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the entire record. We find no arguable issues exist. We affirm. Statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
On June 9, 2018, Contreras entered an El Super grocery store in Lynwood with his cousin, Edward Ceja, and one other person. Surveillance video from the store shows the three exchanged words with Francisco Rivera inside the store.
Contreras and his companions left the store and got into Contreras’s car.

In 1996, the Los Angeles County District Attorney charged defendant and appellant Hector Orozco (defendant) and two co-defendants with robbery and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon causing great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant was found guilty of robbery and one of the assault with a deadly weapon counts. The trial court found true allegations defendant had served prison terms for three prior felony convictions, and sentenced him to six years in prison. Another panel of this court affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion. (People v. Rodarte (Mar. 20, 1998, No. B107475) [nonpub. opn.].)
In October 2020, defendant moved to vacate his conviction and sentence pursuant to section 1473.7(a)(2), citing newly discovered evidence.

Y.L. (mother) and D.Z. (father) (collectively parents) have eight children together, all of whom are dependents of the juvenile court. In this appeal, mother and father challenge only the juvenile court’s order removing their oldest child, W.Z. (son), from their physical custody. Mother and father do not challenge the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings related either to son or his seven siblings. The egregious facts of this case constitute substantial evidence and amply support the juvenile court’s removal order as to son. We affirm.

In these consolidated appeals, mother B.V. filed notices of appeal from two postdisposition orders suspending her visitation with her son, C.L. Mother’s only contention on appeal is that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) did not comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.), because the Department never asked C.L.’s father whether he has any Indian ancestry. Because the Department lost contact with father, and mother’s parental rights have not been terminated, we conclude that reversal is not required. We affirm the orders, but remand with instructions that the Department comply with ICWA’s inquiry requirements if father is located.

Appellant Phillip Norris Thompson appeals from the denial of his petition under Penal Code section 1170.95 (Section 1170.95) to vacate his first degree murder conviction. At appellant’s 1999 trial, it was undisputed that the perpetrators of the murder also committed a robbery, which was not charged. The jury was instructed on two theories of first degree murder: (1) felony murder, premised on the robbery; and (2) premeditated and deliberate murder. The jury was also instructed on a robbery-murder special circumstance allegation, which -- unlike felony murder at the time -- required findings that appellant at least was a major participant in the robbery and acted with reckless indifference to human life. The jury convicted appellant of first degree murder, but found the robbery-murder special circumstance allegation untrue. We affirmed in a prior, unpublished opinion.

Plaintiff and appellant Jose Flores appeals from a judgment of dismissal in favor of defendants and respondents Mario A. Meallet, M.D., and A Center For Vision Care (the Center) in this medical malpractice action. The trial court granted a motion in limine to preclude Flores from introducing any expert opinion testimony at trial, because Flores failed to designate an expert in compliance with the discovery procedures. Without expert testimony, Flores could not prove his claims, and his case was dismissed.
On appeal, Flores contends that the trial court erred by not permitting Flores to elicit expert witness testimony from defendant Meallet at trial, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.310, subdivision (a).