CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Ronald Farley appeals from the court’s postjudgment order denying his petition for presentence custody credits. The sole issue raised by appellant concerns the judgment of sentence imposed for a violation of probation. He contends only that the trial court erred by imposing a $900 restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4) at the violation sentencing when it had previously imposed a $300 restitution fine at the time of sentencing for the underlying offense. Finding that we do not have jurisdiction because appellant failed to timely appeal the judgment and, further, that this appeal is not cognizable under section 1237.2, we dismiss the appeal.

In 2001, appellant Manuel Silva Angeles (appellant) pleaded no contest to felony possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550) and misdemeanor driving with a blood-alcohol content of 0.08 percent or greater (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)) and was placed on probation.
Appellant was not a citizen of the United States. At the time of his plea, according to postconviction declarations filed by his immigration attorney, appellant was “the derivative beneficiary” of a visa petition filed in 1992 by his father, and the petition had been “approved” but was “pending.”
Appellant declared that he became the subject to removal proceedings in 2014.

Following a jury trial, defendant Gabino Castrejon was convicted of two counts of forcible rape of a child over the age of 14, and one count of a lewd act with a child under the age of 14. Defendant now contends the trial court committed prejudicial and/or constitutional error when it failed to instruct the jury on the lesser crime of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor, as defined by Penal Code section 261.5. Defendant further notes the sentencing minute order and the abstract of judgment both reflect an incorrect number of local conduct credits. While we agree there are errors in the abstract of judgment and the minute order, we do not agree defendant was harmed by the lack of an instruction for unlawful sexual intercourse. We remand for a correction of the errors related to sentencing and affirm in all other respects.

O.P. (father) appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding and dispositional order regarding his infant daughter. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b), unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code.) Father argues the court’s jurisdictional finding that he failed to protect his daughter from the danger posed by the maternal uncle and his partner lacks evidentiary support because, by the time the department filed the dependency petition, he and his daughter did not live with the uncle. He also argues that because the defined risk of harm was already eliminated by the time of the jurisdictional finding, the court’s dispositional order was an abuse of discretion. We agree and therefore reverse the jurisdictional finding and dispositional order. Dependency jurisdiction must be based on current, not past, risk of harm. (In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1022 (J.N.).)

Defendant and appellant, Dominic Daniel Rebosio caused a fatal automobile accident. Codefendant Robert Gybsbert DeJager, Jr. assisted Rebosio in fleeing from the accident scene. Rebosio and DeJager (defendants) were tried together but separately appeal the judgment. They join in each other’s arguments on appeal, to the extent they apply.
Rebosio appeals from judgment entered following jury convictions for gross vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(1); count 1) and hit and run resulting in death (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2); count 2). In a bifurcated trial, the jury also found true allegations that Rebosio had a prior conviction for a serious felony (Pen. Code, § 667, subd (a)(1)) and a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667 & 1170.12). The court sentenced Rebosio to 19 years in prison.

Defendant and appellant April Lorraine Watson filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95, which the court denied. On appeal, defendant contended the court erred in summarily denying her petition without proceeding to an evidentiary hearing. On September 18, 2020, we issued an opinion affirming the court’s order.
On December 1, 2021, the California Supreme Court transferred the matter back to us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971-972 (Lewis). On December 6, 2021, we vacated our opinion and permitted the filing of supplemental briefs.
In her supplemental brief, defendant contends the court erred in summarily denying her petition without proceeding to an evidentiary hearing. The People concede that defendant made a prima facie case, and the matter should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing. We agree.

Oleg Michajlenko filed a first amended complaint against defendants Terramar Retail Centers LLC (Terramar) and Seaport Village Operating Company LLC alleging that he “was seriously injured when he tripped and . . . fell,” on property owned and/or managed by defendants. Michajlenko brought negligence and premises liability causes of action against both defendants.
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in which they argued that Michajlenko would be unable to establish either: (1) the existence of a dangerous condition on their property, or (2) that they had actual or constructive notice of any such condition, as would be required for Michajlenko to prove his claims. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, Michajlenko claims that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Evan Morgan Schlenvogt asked this court to conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error in defendant’s favor, we affirm.

Appellant A.D. (mother) appeals from juvenile court orders under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 terminating her parental rights as to two of her children and freeing them for adoption. Mother requests remand for consideration of In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.), which was decided after the hearing at issue here, but concedes she did not raise the beneficial parental relationship exception to the statutory preference for adoption in the juvenile court. She contends her trial counsel was ineffective in failing to raise and argue the exception.
We will affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

C.G. (mother) and M.T. (father; collectively referred to as parents) each appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights and freeing the minors, S.T. and V.T., for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) The parents jointly contend the juvenile court erred when it found the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption did not apply to mother (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)). Father additionally argues that the court erred in granting a section 388 petition suspending his in-person visits with the minors.
We will affirm the juvenile court’s order granting the section 388 petition regarding father’s visitation, but reverse its orders terminating mother’s and father’s parental rights and remand for a new hearing on termination of parental rights.

Defendant David Swank Prince threw a rock at Thomas S., striking him in the head. A jury found defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon.
On appeal, defendant asserts the trial court committed prejudicial evidentiary error in precluding him from presenting a responding deputy’s body camera footage or, alternatively, a defense investigator’s testimony describing that footage. Defendant also asserts the court abused its discretion in preventing him from recalling Thomas to examine him about that footage. Under a separate heading, defendant asserts the same evidentiary rulings violated his constitutional right to present a defense.
We conclude that any error in precluding the subject evidence was harmless. We further conclude the trial court’s evidentiary rulings did not violate defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense.
We affirm.

Defendant Pablo Ruvalcaba appeals from a postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. As we will explain, we agree the trial court erred. We reverse the order and remand for a new hearing on the petition.

Defendant Jeremy Nance appeals from the trial court’s order extending his period of commitment to the Department of State Hospitals until May 9, 2021, under Penal Code section 1026.5. Defendant contends the trial court violated his rights to equal protection and due process by instructing the jury that it was his burden to prove that medication made him no longer dangerous to others. Defendant has forfeited this claim by failing to raise it in the trial court. Defendant’s remaining claim that the trial improperly allowed brief testimony about CONREP, a conditional release program, is without merit. We will affirm the trial court’s order.

Defendant and appellant Eric Bryant appeals from the order denying his petition for vacatur and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95.
In 1992 defendant and codefendant Michael Black were charged with two counts of willful, deliberate, premeditated attempted murder in violation of Penal Code sections 664 and 187, subdivision (a). The information also alleged that in the commission of both crimes a principal was armed with a firearm within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a)(1). After a jury trial, defendant and Black were found guilty of both counts of attempted murder as charged. The jury found true that a principal had been armed with a firearm. The trial court sentenced defendant on each count to prison for life plus one year for the firearm enhancement and stayed the sentence on count 2. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. (See People v. Black (Nov. 3, 1993, B069290) [nonpub. opn.].)