CA Unpub Decisions

This is an appeal from judgment after a jury convicted defendant Gabriel Cardin-Heredia of voluntary manslaughter and found true the allegation that he personally used a deadly weapon (a knife) when committing the crime. The trial court sentenced him to an 11-year upper term sentence for manslaughter plus one additional year for knife use. Defendant challenges the judgment on the grounds that the trial court erred by giving CALCRIM No. 362, the standard jury instruction on consciousness of guilt based on a false statement. Defendant also seeks resentencing based on ameliorative changes to our determinate sentencing law (Pen. Code, § 1170) effective January 1, 2022, that limit trial courts’ discretion to impose the upper term. We remand the matter for resentencing under the newly amended version of section 1170 but otherwise affirm the judgment.

In 2005, a jury convicted defendant Alex Jesse Rosales of felony murder and found true a felony-murder special circumstance allegation. Rosales now appeals from the denial of his Penal Code section 1170.95 petition for failure to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief. On appeal, Rosales’s appointed counsel initially filed a brief that raised no issues pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, and Rosales filed a supplemental brief on his own behalf. We requested supplemental briefing as to the issues Rosales raised, namely: whether the trial court erred in concluding that the jury’s felony-murder special circumstance finding precluded Rosales from making a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief and whether the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to appoint counsel or obtain briefing before denying the petition. We shall reverse and remand with directions.

We resolve this case by memorandum opinion under California Standards of Judicial Administration, Title 8, Standard 8.1. (See also People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 853–855.)
Sergey Firsov petitioned for a civil harassment restraining order against Constantin Zhukovsky. The record does not contain the petition or any detail regarding the basis for it. According to Firsov’s opening brief, he applied for the restraining order because Zhukovsky wrote a letter to the presiding judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court containing confidential information Firsov did not want disclosed. Firsov represented himself in the trial court and does so here. He appeals an order denying his motion to disqualify opposing counsel.

Representing himself, appellant Prasad Shankar appeals trial court orders that increased his monthly child support payments. Shankar raises a variety of claims, most of which challenge the trial court’s factual conclusions. Respondent Monterey County Department of Child Support Services (the Department) asserts that only one order (the July 2, 2020 order) is properly before us, and Shankar has not shown reversible error. For the reasons explained below, we agree and affirm the order.

We resolve this case by memorandum opinion under California Standards of Judicial Administration, Title 8, Standard 8.1. (See also People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 853–855.)
This is one of two appeals arising from Sergey Firsov’s unsuccessful civil harassment restraining order petition against Constantin Zhukovsky. In the other appeal (case No. H048544), he challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to disqualify opposing counsel. Here he appeals an award of attorney fees that followed his voluntary dismissal of the action.
Firsov represented himself in the trial court, as he does on appeal. His application for a restraining order alleged he is entitled to the requested order because Zhukovsky is an attorney who agreed to represent him but later refused. He also alleged Zhukovsky improperly disclosed confidential information about him. Zhukovsky, through counsel, filed a response denying he ever agreed to represent Firsov and denying ever having possessed, let

We resolve this case by memorandum opinion under California Standards of Judicial Administration, Title 8, Standard 8.1. (See also People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 853–855.)
Sergey Firsov is the plaintiff in a lawsuit against Yevgeniy Babichev and several other defendants. The record does not detail the facts of the underlying case, but they are not necessary to resolving this appeal.
Firsov, representing himself here as he did in the trial court, appeals the order denying his “motions to void” anti-SLAPP motions filed by two of the defendants. Defendants Yevgeniy Babichev and Luba Chernov each moved under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 to strike plaintiff’s complaint as strategic litigation against public participation.

In 2021, the trial court summarily denied defendant Tien Hsiang Mo’s petition for resentencing. (Pen. Code, § 1170.95.) The court found “there is not a prima facie showing and the petitioner is not entitled to relief.”
Defendant filed an appeal. Defendant’s appointed appellate counsel filed an opening brief raising no arguable issues. (See People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Defendant did not file a supplemental brief.
In the interests of justice, this court has independently reviewed the record and found no arguable issues. (See People v. Flores (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 266, 269.) Thus, we affirm the order of the trial court denying the section 1170.95 petition.

In this juvenile dependency proceeding involving one minor (the child),
C. D. (mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to the child pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, placing the child for adoption and approving a permanent plan of adoption by the maternal grandmother. Mother contends respondent Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) and the juvenile court failed to comply with their duty of inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law (§ 224 et seq.), meaning there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding ICWA does not apply. Because the record is silent as to compliance with certain aspects of the ICWA inquiry duty, we agree.

Appellant Marquis Carey and two associates robbed a marijuana dispensary while armed with handguns. As they entered the dispensary, each provided his California driver’s license (CDL) to the dispensary’s security guard, who entered their names and personal information into a computer.
After the robbery, the security guard provided the robbers’ identifying information to police investigators, who were able to retrieve the robbers’ driver’s license photographs from the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). That same day, the security guard identified Carey from his DMV photograph. Carey was charged with and convicted of several counts of second degree robbery, among other crimes.

Eugene V. Zech filed a lawsuit against his former client, Alicia Marie Richards, to recover sums due for legal representation in her marital dissolution action. After a three-day trial, the jury found in Zech’s favor and awarded $70,263.40 (attorney fees, costs, and prejudgment interest).
On appeal, Richards asserts the judgment must be reversed for the following reasons: (1) the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the court abused its discretion by not permitting Richards to file a cross-complaint; (3) the court erred by granting Zech’s motion in limine to exclude evidence; (4) the verdict is not supported by substantial evidence; and (5) the court improperly instructed the jury. We conclude these contentions lack merit, and we affirm the judgment.

W.B. appeals from an order adjudging him a developmentally disabled person who is a danger to himself and/or others and committing him to the custody of the State Department of Developmental Services at the Kern Regional Center. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6500.) He contends that the jury’s findings of dangerousness and serious difficulty controlling his dangerousness due to his developmental disabilities were not supported by substantial evidence. Kern Regional Center disagrees. We affirm.

Appellant and defendant Ervin Antonio Velasquez pleaded guilty to second degree murder and admitted the personal use of a firearm, pursuant to a negotiated disposition where he was sentenced to 15 years to life plus 10 years. He subsequently filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95, requested appointment of counsel, and asserted he was not the actual killer and had been convicted under the theories of felony murder and/or natural and probable consequences. The court did not appoint counsel, found appellant failed to state a prima facie case for relief, and denied the petition.

Appellant and defendant Oscar Garcia Reyes pleaded guilty to second degree murder in 2016 and was sentenced to 15 years to life. In 2019, appellant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 and alleged his murder conviction was based on the felony-murder rule and/or the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and he was entitled to relief because he was not the actual killer. The court denied the petition.
On appeal, his appellate counsel has filed a brief, which summarizes the facts with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We affirm.

Plaintiffs and appellants Veronica R. Rivera, Ignacio Hernandez Ponce, and Sarah M. Arias, sued defendants, Devon Cody Gouvion, and Gouvion’s employer, respondent TransAm Trucking, Inc. (TransAm), for personal injuries plaintiffs allegedly sustained during a motor vehicle accident with Gouvion on May 29, 2015. The complaint alleges that Gouvion, while driving TransAm’s tractor trailer truck on Foothill Boulevard in Fontana, made an unsafe lane change and sideswiped Rivera’s vehicle. Rivera was driving, and Ponce and Arias were passengers in Rivera’s vehicle.