CA Unpub Decisions

In March 1990, a jury convicted Marty Dominguez of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187) and found true an allegation that Dominguez was armed with a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense (§ 12022, subd. (a)). The court sentenced Dominguez to prison for 21 years to life.
Dominguez appealed, and we affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion, People v. Dominguez, December 16, 1991, D012153 (Dominguez I).
In January 2019, Dominguez filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95, which permits a defendant convicted of murder under a felony-murder theory or the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition for the conviction to be vacated and resentenced. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).) The superior court found that Dominguez did not make a prima facie showing that he was entitled to relief and denied the petition.

Karma Dillard brought this action against her current employer, Government Employees Insurance Co. (GEICO), alleging a variety of causes of action under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.), including failure to engage in the interactive process and failure to accommodate. The trial court granted GEICO’s motion for summary judgment, and Dillard appeals the ensuing judgment.
Although the operative complaint contained seven causes of action, Dillard’s appeal is only directed at three claims: failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, and punitive damages. Because we conclude disputed issues of material fact exist as to those claims, we reverse the judgment and remand this matter to the trial court, with instructions to enter an order denying GEICO’s motion for summary judgment consistent with this opinion.

In 2014, defendant Kenny Lee Ellis was sentenced to 15 years in prison for attempted murder. When he recently sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, the trial court summarily denied his petition on the basis that the provision does not apply to the crime of attempted murder. Although that was true when the trial court made its ruling in 2021, as of January 1, 2022, section 1170.95 now applies to defendants who were convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Senate Bill No. 775 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2).) In light of these changes, we will reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

Ka.P. (mother) and T.S. (father) appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating their parental rights and ordering a permanent plan of adoption for the minor, K.P. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother contends: (1) her claims arising from the jurisdiction and disposition proceedings are cognizable on appeal because the juvenile court failed to provide the writ advisement required by section 366.26, subdivision (l); (2) the juvenile court erred in failing to serve notice of the jurisdictional hearing upon mother by personal service or certified mail in compliance with section 291, subdivision (e)(1); and (3) despite her counsel’s failure to object to the inadequate notice, her claim is not forfeited or, in the alternative, her counsel was ineffective. The Glenn County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) concedes that the notice was improperly served, but contends the error was harmless and counsel was not ineffective in failing to object.

Following a jury trial, defendant Roger Nicholas Montue was convicted of two child molestation charges (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1)) and as to each count, the court found true a One Strike law prior conviction (§ 667.61) and a prior serious felony conviction enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)). (People v. Montue (Oct. 30, 2020, C087029) [nonpub. opn.].) The court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 100 years, plus a determinate term of 10 years. On appeal, we affirmed the convictions but concluded under People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946, defendant did not receive adequate notice the One Strike law would apply to both counts. Accordingly, we struck the One Strike sentence on count two and remanded the matter for resentencing on that count.

After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of a patdown search, defendant Jason Patrick Houser pled no contest to possession for sale of a controlled substance. Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying the motion because the search was neither supported by reasonable suspicion nor lawful in its scope.
Although we acknowledge that under a slightly different factual scenario our decision could well be different, on these specific facts we uphold the search and affirm the judgment.

Michael Callas appeals from an order directing his former wife, Amanda Moman, to pay him $4,844 per month in child support. Michael asserts: (1) the trial court prejudicially abused its discretion by awarding child support in an amount lower than the amount established by the formula set forth in the child support guideline because substantial evidence does not support a departure from the guideline amount and required findings were not made; and (2) the trial court also prejudicially abused its discretion by declining to award additional attorney’s fees to Michael without making required findings.

Defendant Tony Ray Dougherty was found guilty of two counts of forcible rape of one of his stepdaughters, and with committing lewd and lascivious acts on another stepdaughter. The court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of 225 years to life in state prison, plus a determinate term of 15 years.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred by permitting expert testimony on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). He argues the testimony should have been subjected to Kelly/Frye scrutiny, and that admitting it without a Kelly/Frye hearing violated his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. Even if a Kelly/Frye hearing was not required, defendant asserts the trial court abused its discretion because the expert essentially vouched for the victims’ testimony.
We conclude the trial court properly admitted the CSAAS evidence without subjecting the expert’s testimony to Kelly/Frye scrutiny. We shall affirm the judgment.

Defendant Kenneth McClish appeals from a postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 as to his convictions for second degree murder and attempted murder. Defendant contends the trial court erred in finding him ineligible for relief as a matter of law. Based, in part, on new legislation that applies retroactively to defendant’s case, the People concur that defendant is entitled to reversal and remand for further proceedings on both convictions. As we shall explain, we agree with the parties.

Appellant obtained a domestic violence restraining order against respondent, her husband at the time, with whom she shares a minor child. Appellant later filed a request to renew the order. (Fam. Code, § 6345.) After a contested hearing at which both appellant and respondent testified, the trial court denied appellant’s request to renew the order. On appeal, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by applying the wrong standards when considering her request. We affirm.

Richard Lauckhart filed a petition for writ of mandate against Yolo County, asserting that the levy of a water fee violated Proposition 218 because it was not presented to the voters. After taking judicial notice of official documents, the trial court granted Yolo County’s demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment of dismissal.
Lauckhart now contends the trial court erred in (1) taking judicial notice of facts contained in the official documents, and (2) denying leave to amend the petition. Finding no error, we will affirm the judgment.

Prior to the dissolution of the State Department of Mental Health, Marcella Crisan worked as the sole financial officer in charge of the Forensic Conditional Release Program (CONREP) for that department. State audits conducted between 2008 and 2010 revealed that the State Department of Mental Health routinely ran multimillion dollar budget deficits. In 2011, Governor Brown signed legislation dismantling the State Department of Mental Health and transferring some services to counties, some to other state departments, and the remainder to a new State Department of State Hospitals (Department). Crisan’s program was transferred to the newly created Department. The Department’s deputy director, Cynthia Rodriguez, determined that the most effective way to transition the assumed services to a new budget methodology was to require all fiscal employees to work in person at its headquarters in Sacramento so that they could interact with each other and vendors during the transition period.

Brett Evans Howard appeals the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), false personation of another (§ 529, subd. (a)(3)), giving false information to a police officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a)), escape from arrest (§ 836.6, subd. (b)), and resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). Appellant was sentenced to two years and eight months in state prison.
In November 2020, appellant stole a power tool from Home Depot and escaped police custody after his arrest. Following a two-hour search that included multiple units, a helicopter, drones, and a SWAT team, a K-9 officer located appellant hiding in an avocado tree in an orchard behind the police station.
We appointed counsel to represent appellant in this appeal. After an examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief that raises no arguable issues. On November 29, 2021, we notified appellant by mail that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues he

In 2016 a jury convicted Kevone Earl of multiple crimes, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. He appealed, and we reversed with directions for a new trial. (People v. Dixon et al. (Apr. 10, 2019, B277759) [nonpub. opn.].)
On remand, the People made Earl a plea offer that, in exchange for Earl pleading guilty or no contest to voluntary manslaughter and admitting he used a firearm in the commission of the crime, the court would sentence Earl to a prison term of 25 years. In explaining the terms of the proposed agreement, the trial court told Earl he would have to pay victim restitution in the amount of $5,000. Earl objected and asked for a restitution hearing. The court said it would impose the restitution amount and have a hearing “afterwards.”