CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Bryan Carranza Toro of infliction of corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition. (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a).) The trial court placed him on felony probation for a period of three years.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) his term of probation should be reduced to two years pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 1950 (Assem. Bill 1950); and (2) the probation condition requiring him to report any law enforcement contacts within 48 hours is constitutionally vague and overbroad. We agree that the probation condition is vague and overbroad and remand the matter for modification consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

In 2009, Richard Barnes (decedent Richard) executed a will (2009 will), leaving property to his wife, objector and appellant Celestine Barnes (objector Celestine), and to his daughter from a previous marriage, petitioner and respondent Joann Barnes Williams (petitioner Joann). In 2011, decedent Richard and objector Celestine created a pour-over will and revocable living trust (collectively, 2011 trust), which had the effect of disinheriting petitioner Joann. They restated the trust in 2014 (2014 Trust), without any significant changes to petitioner Joann or objector Celestine’s interests. Following decedent Richard’s death in 2016, petitioner Joann filed a petition pursuant to Probate Code section 17200 et seq., seeking to determine the validity of the trusts and alleging that decedent Richard suffered from progressive mental decline as the result of dementia and either lacked capacity to execute the trusts or did so as the result of undue influence.

Defendant and appellant Jeremy Wayne Hawkins appeals from the November 8, 2019 order of the superior court, dismissing his petition for resentencing on his 1998 conviction for attempted premeditated murder. (Pen. Code, § 1170.95) In an unpublished decision, we affirmed the order dismissing defendant’s petition on the ground that persons convicted of attempted murder were not entitled to relief under section 1170.95. (People v. Hawkins (Mar. 23, 2021, E074651) [nonpub. opn.].)
The Supreme Court granted review on June 9, 2021, and while review was pending, the Legislature enacted and the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 775 into law. (Senate Bill 775) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.). Senate Bill 775 amended section 1170.95 to clarify, among other things, that persons convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine are eligible for resentencing under the statute. (Id. at §§ 1-2.)

Henry Aguila and R. Gutierrez (plaintiffs) entered into a written agreement to sublease commercial kitchen space from Industrial Catering, Inc. In 2016, plaintiffs filed a civil action alleging various contract and tort claims against Industrial Catering, Inc. (Industrial) and its individual owners, William L. Wade, II, and Elba Raquel Castaneda (collectively Industrial defendants). Plaintiff also subsequently named as defendants the owner of the property, the Vahe Karapetian Trust, and its trustee, Vahe Karapetian (Karapetian defendants). The Industrial defendants filed a cross-complaint against plaintiffs and named an additional cross-defendant, A. Gutierrez, as a party to the action.

In 1992, petitioner Harley Herbert Cross was convicted of (among other things) first degree murder, with a robbery-murder special circumstance. In 2019, he filed a petition for resentencing under the then-recently amended version of the felony-murder statute. (See § 1170.95.) The trial court denied the petition; it ruled that the robbery-murder special circumstance finding conclusively established that he was not eligible for relief.
Petitioner contends that this was error. Under a published opinion of this court, the trial court’s ruling was correct. Hence, we will affirm.

In 2003, defendants Francisco and Salomon Vallejo were convicted of two counts of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664 & 187, subd. (a)) with premeditation, and one count of discharging a firearm from a vehicle (§ 12034, subd. (c)), in addition to true findings on allegations that the crimes were committed for the benefit of a street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)), various gun discharge enhancements (§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (d), & (e)(1)) and a hate crime enhancement (§ 422.75, subd. (c)). They were each sentenced to an aggregate term of 50 years to life, and their convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. In 2019, following enactment of section 1170.95 pursuant to passage of Senate Bill No. 1437, each defendant filed a petition seeking resentencing. Both petitions were dismissed on eligibility grounds, and both defendants appealed.

Appellants Blasco Real Estate, Inc. and Ron Blasco (Blasco) sued FCA US, LLC (Chrysler) for fraudulent concealment of problems with the Totally Integrated Power Module (TIPM) component of the 2011 Dodge Durango that Blasco purchased in June 2011. He also brought a claim under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Song-Beverly Act), Civil Code section 1790 et seq. (the “lemon law” statute) based on Chrysler’s refusal to refund the purchase price when it became evident the car had substantial defects. He sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and a civil penalty available under the Song-Beverly Act for willful refusal to refund the purchase price.

A jury convicted Martin Anthony Urena of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187; count 1) and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1); count 2). It found true allegations that he personally discharged a firearm during the commission of the murder (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The court separately found that Urena had suffered a prior serious felony conviction that qualified as a violent or serious felony (§ 667, subds. (a), and (b)-(i)). It sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of 62 years eight months to life as follows: for count 1, 15 years to life, doubled under section 667, subdivision (e)(1) to 30 years to life, plus an enhancement of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement. On count 2, the court imposed a consecutive term of 16 months, doubled to 32 months for the strike prior, plus a five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1).

On July 10, 2019, Henderson filed a petition under Penal Code section 1170.95 and Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch.1015) (Senate Bill 1437) to have two attempted murder convictions vacated. The superior court concluded Henderson was ineligible for relief because his convictions are not for felony murder. Henderson appealed, contending section 1170.95 applied to his convictions for attempted murder. We affirmed the denial of the petition, relying on a body of case law that held section 1170.95 and Senate Bill 1437 did not apply to cases such as Henderson’s. (People v. Henderson (Nov. 13, 2020, D076878) [nonpub. opn.].)
Henderson petitioned for review, and the Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case to this court to reconsider in light of the newly enacted Senate Bill No. 775 (Stats. 2021, ch. 551) (Senate Bill 775), which became effective January 1, 2022.

Appointed counsel for defendant Jerry Arthur Springer has asked this court to conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error in defendant’s favor, we affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Jon Frederick Kelley III has asked this court to conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

During a bout of road rage, defendant Jesse Dean Messer fired multiple rounds from a semiautomatic handgun into an occupied vehicle. (People v. Messer (Oct. 9, 2020, C086503) [nonpub. opn.].) A jury found defendant guilty of two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, two counts of shooting at an occupied vehicle, and two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. (Ibid.) Following defendant’s initial appeal, we remanded the matter for resentencing under newly enacted legislation applicable to him but affirmed in all other respects. (Ibid.) On appeal after remand, defendant argues: (1) the case must be remanded to the trial court for resentencing under amended Penal Code section 654; (2) the order to pay the cost of preparing the probation report must be stricken as it is no longer authorized; and (3) the abstract of judgment must be amended to reflect the correct date of sentencing and number of custody credits following defendant’s sentencing.

Plaintiff Cameron Lane is a correctional officer employed by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department). His responsibilities as the armory sergeant at the California Institute for Women (CIW) involved overseeing the operation and maintenance of the armory. After an investigation of the armory revealed that multiple items were not properly stored, there were no inventory logs for various items, and numerous items were missing, the Department found plaintiff culpable of four counts of misconduct (e.g., incompetence, inexcusable neglect of duty) and reduced his salary by 10 percent for 18 qualifying pay periods as a penalty for his misconduct. Plaintiff appealed the penalty imposed by the Department, and following an administrative hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a proposed decision upholding the penalty. Thereafter, the State Personnel Board (Board) adopted the ALJ’s proposed decision.

At the age of 23, defendant Lamon Edward Jackson attempted to shoot his friend during an argument outside defendant’s house. After serving two decades of a life sentence for attempted murder with the personal use of a firearm, defendant filed a motion in the trial court for a Franklin proceeding in order to gather evidence for use in a subsequent youth offender parole hearing regarding youth-related factors at the time of the offense. The trial court denied the motion, finding that (1) due to the passage of time, a Franklin proceeding was unlikely to produce fruitful evidence, (2) defendant had an opportunity at a parole hearing in 2019 to present youth-related evidence to the Board of Parole Hearings (parole board), and (3) defendant would have another opportunity at his next scheduled parole hearing in 2024.
Defendant now contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Franklin motion. Finding no abuse of discretion, we will affirm the trial court’s order.