CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found defendant Rafael Antonio Garcia guilty of crimes against three women including kidnapping with intent to commit rape or sexual penetration, forcible sexual penetration, and attempted rape. On appeal he contends (1) the trial court erred in excluding certain defense evidence, including that a victim had made a false rape claim; (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte on the lesser included offense of simple kidnapping; (3) the trial court failed to instruct or secure verdicts on the “One Strike” penalty provision; (4) the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte provide the jury with a unanimity instruction; and (5) the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the term imposed on count 12. Additionally, defendant (6) asks us to review the in camera hearing held pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess); and (7) maintains the above errors were cumulatively prejudicial.

Codefendants Antuan Jermale Stinson and Harold Miles were convicted of the murder and attempted robbery of T.L. (the father), the attempted murder of T.L.’s son (the son), and the killing of T.L.’s dog (the dog).
On appeal, Stinson and Miles jointly argue that (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument; (2) the trial court erred in declining to declare a mistrial based on juror misconduct; and (3) the trial court erred in denying their challenge to the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenge to dismiss a juror.

A gathering of three acquaintances devolved into a robbery, beating and kidnapping. Myron Hughes planned to rent a room from defendant Brian Reed Brunson; defendant Lewis Angel Rhodes was another prospective tenant. After an evening of drinking and drugs, an altercation ensued with Brunson and Rhodes overpowering Hughes. The duo put Hughes in a car intending to dump his body somewhere, but had second thoughts and instead took him to the hospital. The defendants later claimed Hughes tried to rob them. A jury found defendants guilty of torture, kidnapping, robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, dissuading a witness, criminal threats, false imprisonment, sale of methamphetamine, and possession of methamphetamine. Defendants appeal, contending evidentiary and sentencing error.

Defendant William Pasillas Rosas appeals from the trial court’s summary denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. Relying on the jury instructions given at trial and our prior opinion in People v. Rosas (Aug. 15, 2011, B223322) [nonpub. opn.] (Rosas I), the court found that defendant was not entitled to relief under section 1170.95 as a matter of law for any of his convictions, including one count of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), and three counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)). (See People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 [recent legislative changes to sections 188 and 189, and the addition of section 1170.95, was intended “‘to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer’” or “‘did not act with the intent to kill’” in the commission of a murder or underlying felony].)

Appellant Dallas Ray Wright appeals from a postjudgment order denying his Penal Code section 1170.95 petition. The trial court found Wright ineligible for relief as a matter of law because he was convicted of attempted murder, not murder, and we affirmed its order. Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775), which amended section 1170.95 to provide relief to eligible defendants convicted of attempted murder. Our Supreme Court has transferred the matter back to us with directions to vacate our prior decision and reconsider the cause in light of Senate Bill 775. We agree with the parties that amended section 1170.95 applies retroactively to Wright. We therefore vacate our previous opinion, reverse the trial court’s denial of Wright’s petition, and remand for further proceedings.

The juvenile court found that A.H. (father) sexually abused his seven-year-old daughter (the child), and thereafter issued orders terminating visitation with her and granting sole legal and physical custody to M.B. (mother). On appeal from the original no-visitation order, father contends: the court issued the order without notice in violation of his due process and statutory rights; there was insufficient evidence to support it; the order improperly shifted to him the burden of showing a right to visitation; and it was not the least restrictive means by which to safeguard the child. In his appeal from the subsequent exit orders, father maintains that the no-visitation exit order must be reversed because it was based on the original order and that the court abused its discretion when it ordered sole legal custody to mother. We affirm.

Plaintiff Morris McQueen, a California Corporation, sued defendants Zhen Guang Huang, Yue Pi Yu, and Tommy Y. Wong for breach of a residential real estate purchase agreement. These parties have litigated in federal court, the superior court, and in arbitration, which led to the order confirming an arbitration award from which plaintiff now appeals.
The arbitrator found in favor of defendants. The trial court granted defendants’ petition to confirm the arbitration award. Plaintiff appeals, arguing the arbitrator exceeded his powers (an argument never raised in the trial court) and the award was procured by “undue means.” Defendants have moved for sanctions, arguing the appeal is frivolous. We affirm the order enforcing the arbitration award, and grant the motion for sanctions jointly and severally against plaintiff and its counsel, awarding sanctions of $38,411.50.

By information filed August 2017, defendant Aric Aaron Astorga was charged for the first-degree murder of Luciano Rubio by personally and intentionally discharging a firearm causing great bodily injury and death. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d).) The information also alleged that defendant committed the murder for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by gang members within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C).
In August 2019, a jury convicted defendant as charged, and found the firearm and gang allegations true. Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life for murder, plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement. The court imposed a minimum parole eligibility date of 15 years under the gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4)), and imposed various fines and fees.

After participating in a gang-related drive-by shooting, appellant Kevaughn Harris was convicted of one count of murder and three counts of attempted murder. In affirming his convictions, we noted he had been the driver, but did not address the underlying theories of liability or otherwise clarify his role in the shooting. (People v. Harris (Aug. 15, 2006, No. B181957) Cal.App.Unpub. LEXIS 7115.) Years later, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1437) imposed new limits on two theories of murder liability, viz., the natural and probable consequences doctrine and the felony murder rule. SB 1437 also enacted Penal Code section 1170.95 (Section 1170.95), creating a procedure for defendants convicted of murder under these newly limited theories to petition for postconviction relief. Appellant filed a petition under Section 1170.95 for relief from his four convictions, and requested the appointment of counsel.

In the course of investigating certain robberies that took place in San Francisco in 2015, the police obtained five search warrants for defendant La Carl Martez Dow’s car, residence, and phone. Dow was later arrested and charged with robbery and attempted robbery. Dow moved (1) to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrants and (2) for a hearing under Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154 (Franks). Both motions were denied, following which Dow pleaded guilty to the robbery count and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. Dow appeals, contending that the motions were denied in error. We disagree, and we affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Andanna Ibe of conspiracy to commit murder and attempted murder of a woman and her 11-month-old child. Ibe argues on appeal that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress a statement made in a post-arrest interview. She claims the statement was obtained in violation of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
Ibe also contends that we should remand for resentencing due to a recent statutory amendment to Penal Code section 654. The statute previously required an act or omission punishable in different ways by different laws to be punished under the law that provided for the longest potential term of imprisonment. Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 518) amended section 654 to afford trial courts the discretion to punish the act or omission under any of the applicable laws.

Defendants Gabriel Mosby and Leroy Deon Wilson were convicted of multiple counts of robbery and false imprisonment arising out an armed bank robbery. In these consolidated appeals, each contends that the evidence is insufficient to show he aided and abetted the crimes and that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to sever their trials from each other. Mosby further challenges two evidentiary rulings, and Wilson contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to strike his prior convictions. We shall affirm the judgments as to both defendants.

In August 2014, Antonia Shed was a passenger on a bus operated by the Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA) and suffered an injury to her foot when the coach’s driver activated the wheelchair ramp. Shed filed a complaint against OCTA for negligence and other claims. Following a bench trial, the court found OCTA failed to exercise reasonable care and Shed was injured as a result. However, the court entered judgment in favor of OCTA because Shed failed to prove damages. Shed presented no evidence of economic damages but argued she was entitled to noneconomic damages for long-term pain and suffering. The trial court rejected this argument because Shed’s evidence failed to show any continuing injury or pain and suffering attributable to the incident on the bus. Shed contends the judgment must be reversed because she presented “reasonable evidence of her pain and suffering.” We disagree and affirm the judgment.

David Elias appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion to rescind a settlement agreement and its order denying his petition to enforce a no contest clause. As explained below, Elias has failed to show any prejudicial error. Accordingly, we affirm.