CA Unpub Decisions

The People charged Gildardo Hernandez (defendant) with (among other conduct) felony receipt of a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d). (Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) The vehicle in question was over 30 years old. Prior to trial, defendant requested a special instruction that the prosecution needed to prove the vehicle’s value exceeded $950 to support a felony conviction under section 496d, subdivision (a). Defendant asked for this instruction in light of the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act’s (Proposition 47) reduction of certain theft crimes not exceeding $950 to misdemeanors.

N.N. (father) appeals from a juvenile court’s order finding that he was an alleged father, rather than a presumed father. We affirm.

A felony complaint charged defendant and appellant Raymond Michael Hewitt and codefendant C.M. with first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459, count 1), and defendant, C.M., and codefendant S.F. with receiving stolen property exceeding $950 in value (§ 496, subd. (a), count 2). Defendant entered a plea agreement and pled guilty to count 2, in exchange for a two-year term in state prison and the dismissal of count 1. Following a restitution hearing, a trial court ordered defendant and C.M. to pay $30,547 in restitution jointly and severally.
On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in ordering him to pay victim restitution jointly and severally since he only pled guilty to receiving stolen property, and there was no evidence connecting his crime to the victim’s economic loss. The People concede the error, and we agree and reverse the restitution order as to defendant. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

On January 18, 2019, Jorge Eric Lorenzo pled no contest to false imprisonment and misdemeanor child abuse. (Pen. Code, §§ 236, 273a, subd. (b), unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code.) Under the terms of his plea agreement, the court sentenced him to three years, composed of the upper term of three years for false imprisonment and a 180-day term for the misdemeanor to be served concurrently. The court then suspended the sentence and granted Lorenzo four years’ formal probation. The court imposed various fines and fees, including a $450 restitution fine and a matching probation revocation restitution fine. The court also imposed a probation supervision fee of $29 per month.

In 2009, Danny Lawrence Thompson pleaded guilty to eight counts of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), admitted the truth of eight associated firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), and pleaded guilty to one count of first degree burglary (§ 460, subd. (a)). Thompson also admitted suffering a serious felony prior (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and multiple “strike” priors (§ 667, subd. (d)). The trial court dismissed all but one of Thompson’s “strike” priors. It sentenced Thompson to a total determinate term of 40 years four months, along with several additional determinate terms that would run concurrently.

Defendant Jose Gonzalez appeals the denial of his Penal Code section 1170.95 petition. He argues the superior court incorrectly analyzed his claim and should have weighed the evidence as an independent trier of fact under section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(3). He further argues that substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that he could still be convicted of murder despite the change in the law. The People agree with defendant that the court erred in undertaking a sufficiency of the evidence review but contend that the error was harmless because defendant was ineligible for relief.
We agree with the parties that the trial judge applied an incorrect standard based on a now-vacated appellate decision. We find the error is not harmless and will reverse the order denying the petition and remand for a new hearing.

Diane Rosemarie Weggeland appeals from a postjudgment order modifying a 2015 judgment that required her former husband, respondent Joseph Patrick Weggeland, to pay her spousal support. We affirm.

Robert Quincy Thomas (defendant) appeals the order of the superior court denying his motion for a sentence modification, which the trial court construed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal, and after examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues and asking this court to follow the procedures set forth in People v. Serrano (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 496. Defendant filed a supplemental brief, in propria persona.

The juvenile court ordered two-year-old R.R. removed from his parents. In doing so, the juvenile court found that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply because there was no reason to believe R.R. was of Indian heritage through his mother’s parentage. Father Randy R. (Father) contends the juvenile court erred in making this finding. We disagree and affirm.

Mother appeals from the juvenile court’s order removing her daughter N.T. from her physical custody under Welfare and Institutions Code section 387. Mother challenges the court’s finding that its earlier disposition placing N.T. in parents’ joint custody was ineffective in protecting the child, and—to prevent substantial harm to N.T.—it was necessary to remove her from mother’s care. The juvenile court has since terminated its jurisdiction and entered a final juvenile custody order granting sole physical custody of N.T. to father and giving mother monitored visitation rights. Because mother never appealed from those orders, there is no effective relief we can grant her. We thus dismiss the appeal as moot.

Defendant and appellant Patricia Marie Valencia appeals the denial of her pretrial motion for mental health diversion from her criminal prosecution. She ultimately pleaded no contest to several of the charges against her and received a probationary sentence. She appeals the judgment of conviction, challenging only the trial court’s denial of diversion. We conclude the trial court abused its discretion and conditionally reverse the judgment.

Rudy Marroquin, Jr. (defendant) argues that the trial court erred in summarily denying his petition for resentencing on his second degree murder conviction under Penal Code section 1170.95. We agree that the summary denial was inappropriate, and remand for an evidentiary hearing on that conviction.

Defendant and appellant Jose Trinidad Ramirez (defendant) appeals from both the denial of his petition filed pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 (B309519) and from the trial court’s order declining to exercise its discretion under section 12022.53, subdivision (h) (B311700). Finding that the trial court erred by concluding defendant had not made a prima facie showing of eligibility under section 1170.95, we reverse and remand that order with directions. Finding no abuse of discretion in its ruling under section 12022.53, subdivision (h), we affirm that order.

In a prior opinion regarding this appeal from the denial of a petition for relief under Penal Code section 1170.95, we concluded appellant Rashon Tremain McDaniels was ineligible for relief as a matter of law, and therefore affirmed. Our Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back to this court, with directions that we vacate our prior decision and reconsider the cause in light of Senate Bill No. 775 (Reg. Sess. 2021-2022) (SB 775). After reconsidering the cause, we conclude that appellant remains ineligible for relief as a matter of law. We therefore affirm.