CA Unpub Decisions

Isaac Garcia (defendant), who was convicted of two counts of attempted murder and other crimes in 2015, appeals from the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. In an unpublished opinion issued on March 25, 2021, we affirmed that denial solely on the ground that section 1170.95 did not accord relief to persons convicted of attempted murder. (People v. Garcia (Mar. 25, 2021, B304788) (Garcia II).) Defendant filed a petition for review by the California Supreme Court, which was held along with numerous other similar cases. While this case has been pending, our Legislature enacted and the Governor signed into law Senate Bill No. 775 (Senate Bill 775). (Stats. 2021, ch. 551.) Senate Bill 775 amended section 1170.95 to expand eligibility for resentencing to persons convicted of attempted murder.

The trial court entered summary judgment against a surety for the amount of a forfeited bail bond. The surety argues that the judgment is void because it was not file stamped with a date. This argument was squarely rejected in People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 405 (Financial Casualty 2021). We agree with Financial Casualty 2021, and accordingly affirm the trial court’s order denying the surety’s motion to set aside the summary judgment.

Davaughn Love (defendant), who was convicted of attempted murder and other crimes in 2016, appeals from the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. In a partially published opinion issued on October 1, 2020, we affirmed that denial solely on the ground that section 1170.95 did not accord relief to persons convicted of attempted murder. (People v. Love (Oct. 1, 2020, B302892) (Love).) Defendant filed a petition for review by the California Supreme Court, which was held along with numerous similar cases. While this case has been pending, our Legislature enacted and the Governor signed into law Senate Bill No. 775 (Senate Bill 775). (Stats. 2021, ch. 551.) Senate Bill 775 amended section 1170.95 to expand eligibility for resentencing to persons convicted of attempted murder.

Appellant Sergio Ortiz was convicted of second degree murder in 1998. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189.) We affirmed the judgment of conviction in an unpublished opinion. (People v. Garcia et al. (July 23, 2001, B126854) (Garcia).) In 2019 appellant filed a petition to vacate his murder conviction and obtain resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95, which was added to the Penal Code by Senate Bill No. 1437 (S.B. 1437). (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) The trial court denied the petition because he had failed to make a prima facie showing that he could not be convicted of murder under current law.
In 2021 we affirmed the trial court’s order in an unpublished opinion. (People v. Ortiz (Mar. 17, 2021, B300776.) We concluded that appellant was not entitled to section 1170.95 relief because substantial evidence in the record of conviction shows that, under current law, he could be convicted of murder based on an implied malice theory.

In 1998 appellant was convicted of second degree murder after a jury trial. We affirmed the judgment of conviction in an unpublished opinion. (People v. Garcia et al. (July 23, 2001, B126854) (Garcia I).) In 2019 appellant filed a petition to vacate his murder conviction pursuant to a new statute, Penal Code section 1170.95.
The trial court denied the petition, and appellant appealed. We affirmed the trial court’s order in a published opinion that was subsequently ordered depublished by the California Supreme Court. (People v. Garcia (2020) 271 Cal.Rptr.3d 206, previously published at 57 Cal.App.5th 100 (Garcia II).) We concluded that appellant was not entitled to section 1170.95 relief because substantial evidence in the record of conviction shows that, under current law, he could be convicted of murder based on theories of implied malice and direct aiding and abetting.

In 2002, Andres Santana was convicted of two counts of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and two counts of robbery (§ 211). The jury found true the special circumstance allegations that Santana committed the murders while engaged in a robbery (§ 190.2, subds. (a)(17)(A), (d)), for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), which resulted in multiple murders (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). The trial court sentenced Santana to life without the possibility of parole plus 10 years for the gang enhancement. (People v. Santana (Apr. 11, 2005, B167415) [nonpub. opn.].)

Appellant Debra Dolch is the conservator of the estate of Thea Bacon, who passed away in January 2021. Dolch is also the trustee of the Thea Bacon Living Trust (Thea’s Personal Trust). Thea was a lifetime beneficiary of a testamentary trust (Trust) established by Thea’s husband, Frank Rogers Bacon, Jr. Dolch appeals from the denial of her petition to remove the cotrustees (Prob. Code, § 15642) of the Trust, MUFG Union Bank, N.A. (Union Bank), and Mark Brodka (collectively, Trustees), for failure to fund litigation seeking to recover Thea’s sizeable personal assets from accused elder abuser James Sykes. Dolch contends the trial court erred by ruling on her petition without an evidentiary hearing, finding she lacked standing to pursue the petition due to Thea’s death and determining the Trustees had not abused their discretion in refusing to fund the ongoing litigation. We affirm for lack of standing. Accordingly, we do not reach the merits of Dolch’s petition.

Conrad D., appearing in propria persona, appeals an order renewing a domestic violence restraining order protecting his ex-wife Dana D. under Family Code section 6345, subdivision (a). Conrad, who was represented by counsel in the trial court, contends that the trial court improperly limited his ability to present witnesses and demonstrated an impermissible bias towards his attorney at the hearing. We find no error and affirm the order.

Defendant Miles Joseph Pasion Seegmiller pleaded no contest to attempted murder and second degree robbery, arising out of his shooting and robbing a victim. (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a), 212.5, subd. (c).) On appeal, Seegmiller argues the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence — incriminating statements, a firearm, and passcode information for his cellphone — obtained when police officers detained and pat searched him shortly after the shooting. According to Seegmiller, officers lacked a reasonable suspicion of his involvement in criminal activity necessary to detain and pat search him. We disagree and affirm.

Plaintiff Adriana J. Quintero sued defendant Steven A. Weinkauf for stalking, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and domestic violence. The jury found in favor of Quintero on her stalking, IIED, and domestic violence claims, awarding her compensatory and punitive damages. Judgment was entered in Quintero’s favor for $1.3 million. The trial court then awarded Quintero approximately $850,000 in attorney fees and $60,000 in costs. A supplemental judgment was entered in Quintero’s favor for a total of $2.2 million.
In this consolidated appeal, Weinkauf claims that reversal of the judgment is required due to numerous evidentiary, instructional, and other errors. He also claims that reversal of the judgment requires reversal of the supplemental judgment, as Quintero would no longer be the prevailing party entitled to attorney fees and costs. We affirm.

A jury found defendant Michael Edwards guilty of possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count 1), possession of heroin for sale (§ 11351; count 2), and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia (§ 11364, subd. (a); count 3). The trial court sentenced defendant to four years in county jail, imposing the upper term on count 2.
On appeal, defendant initially contended that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses to counts 1 and 2, namely, simple possession of methamphetamine (§ 11377, subd. (a)) and simple possession of heroin (§ 11350, subd. (a)). The Attorney General contended that the trial court did not err because there was no evidence to warrant the instruction.

Defendant was committed to a state hospital after he was found not guilty of murder by reason of insanity. Following a year as a supervised outpatient, defendant petitioned the trial court for an unconditional release from his commitment on grounds that his sanity had been legally restored. He appeals from the denial of that request, arguing that the trial court relied on irrelevant and insufficient evidence. Finding no abuse of discretion or due process violation, we will affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Fidadelfo Ortiz of second degree murder for shooting the driver of an automobile after a minor traffic incident. For this crime, the trial court sentenced Ortiz to 15 years to life in prison, plus 20 years consecutive for using a firearm. In a separate case, Ortiz pleaded no contest to assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court imposed a four-year sentence, concurrent to Ortiz’s murder-conviction sentence.

Om Garg, representing himself, appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted the summary judgment motion of respondent Toll Brothers, Inc. Garg claimed that Toll Brothers owed him $70,000 as a commission on a house bought by his daughter in a Toll Brothers development. The agreement to pay a commission was, however, contingent on Garg’s possession of a valid real estate license at the time of execution. It is undisputed that Garg’s real estate license had expired and that he did not renew it until a few months later.
The trial court granted Toll Brothers’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that Garg’s failure to have a valid license automatically terminated the agreement. Garg’s arguments that Toll Brothers waived the requirement or that it subsequently ratified the agreement were unavailing.