CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Robert Lee Moberly appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition to recall his sentence and to be resentenced pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.91. Moberly contends the trial court (1) employed the wrong standard when finding he had not made the requisite showing for relief under the statute and (2) erred by noting it would not resentence Moberly even if it had found he had met his burden under the statute. We affirm.

Defendant Marcus Leon Linthecome appeals from an order revoking his parole for criminally threatening his parole agent. Linthecome argues that the record does not contain substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that he violated Penal Code section 422 (undesignated statutory references are to this code). We disagree and affirm.

D.G. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to her daughter at the hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends the court applied an incorrect legal standard in determining the parental-benefit exception to adoption did not apply. Specifically, she contends the court improperly focused on whether Mother held a parental role and had overcome the protective issues that led to dependency, factors which have been disapproved by the California Supreme Court in In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.). Mother also contends reversal is required because the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) failed to comply with the inquiry requirements under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)

After he was declared a ward of the court and placed on probation for a misdemeanor offense, 15-year-old T.W.—an Emerald Hills Blood gang member—and two other minors murdered Ishi Hampton. T.W. was charged with first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 182, subd. (a)(1).) The murder and conspiracy to commit murder were alleged to have been committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and it was further alleged that at least one principal used a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)). After the murder, but before he was apprehended, T.W. was alleged to have committed two robberies.

Defendant Marcellious Dewayne Tucker appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. He argues that the trial court erred when it denied his petition at the prima facie stage after finding that the record of conviction contained substantial evidence that could theoretically support a murder conviction under current law. We agree the trial court erred in denying defendant’s petition and will remand the case for further proceedings.

Defendant Chan Saeteurn appeals the trial court’s denial of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (CDCR) recommendation under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) (section 1170(d)(1)), that the trial court consider recalling defendant’s sentence and resentencing him due to his rehabilitative efforts in prison. He contends the trial court violated his right to due process by declining to recall defendant’s sentence without providing notice and a hearing. After the parties submitted briefing, defendant was released from CDCR custody, and the Governor signed Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assem. Bill No. 1540) into law. (Stats. 2021, ch. 719 §§ 1-7). We requested supplemental briefing on the effect, if any, of these changed circumstances on this appeal. Defendant now asserts that his release from incarceration and the passage of Assem. Bill No. 1540 “mooted [his] previously requested relief,” but asks that we nonetheless issue an opinion r

Defendant Cheryl Jean Vaughn appeals from the trial court’s order denying her petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. Defendant contends the trial court erred in summarily denying her petition after determining she failed to establish a prima facie case under the provisions of the statute. She contends the trial court should have issued an order to show cause and allowed her petition to proceed for full consideration on its merits. We will affirm.

Appellant M.A. Bernard filed an action in the trial court challenging the No Place Like Home Act (the NPLH Act) as adopted by Assembly Bill Nos. 1618 (AB 1618) and 1628 (AB 1628) (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) in 2016.

Arbry Frank Glover appeals a post-judgment order denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (a). The resentencing petition concerns his October 31, 2014, conviction of felony assault with a deadly weapon with a finding of a prior strike conviction. (§§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) Glover appealed his conviction. In an unpublished opinion, we reversed and remanded for resentencing. (People v. Glover (May 4, 2016, B257085).) At the March 2, 2017, resentencing, the trial court sentenced Glover to a prison term of 13 years.

On March 2, 2001, a jury found Jesus Medrano guilty of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), petty theft with a prior (Pen. Code, § 666), and two counts of first degree residential burglary (§ 459). The jury found true several special allegations, including that Medrano had sustained multiple prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i) & 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court sentenced Medrano to 55 years to life in prison: a third strike, consecutive sentence of 25 years to life for each burglary count, plus a consecutive term of five years for the prior serious felony enhancement. The court imposed concurrent terms for the other offenses. The court ordered Medrano to pay a $5,000 restitution fine. (Former § 1202.4, subd. (b).) Medrano appealed, and this court affirmed the judgment in 2002. (People v. Medrano (May 29, 2002, B151317) [nonpub. opn.].)

A.M. (mother) appeals from an order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights concerning her child, G.M. On appeal, she challenges the order summarily denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition, which sought reinstatement of her family reunification services. We find no abuse of discretion, and thus affirm.

In this dependency case (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300 et seq.), Mary C. (Mother) challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings against her under section 300, subdivision (b) that she failed to protect her daughters M.J. and T.J. (then eight and five years old) from their father’s conduct (inadequate supervision of the children and engaging in domestic violence with Mother). While this appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction and issued a final custody order, awarding joint legal and physical custody to Mother and Father, with the children to reside primarily with Mother. Mother has not appealed from the order terminating jurisdiction or the final custody order, and her time to do so has expired. As explained below, her appeal challenging the jurisdictional findings is moot based on these subsequent orders, which she has not challenged. Mother has advanced no specific, nonspeculative reason for us to

Defendant Collin Robert Davis, found guilty by a jury in 2008 of one count of second degree murder and three counts of premeditated attempted murder, challenges the trial court’s denial of his petition to be resentenced pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95.

Plaintiff, cross-defendant, and appellant SJO Investments, LLC, (SJO) challenges the trial court order denying its motion to strike portions of the first amended cross-complaint (FACC) filed against it by defendants, cross-complainants, and respondents Michael Wayne Riedel and Cheryl Jean Riedel (the Riedels) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, California’s anti-SLAPP statute. Because the challenged causes of action do not fall within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute, we affirm the trial court’s order.