CA Unpub Decisions

In 2014, defendant Markell Thomas and a codefendant were charged with murder, attempted murder, and 11 counts of robbery, with gang and gun enhancements. The following year, after agreeing to testify against his codefendant, Thomas pled guilty to one count of manslaughter and two counts of robbery. In 2019, after the Legislature amended the law of accomplice liability for felony murder, Thomas petitioned for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court denied the petition because section 1170.95 applied only to defendants convicted of murder. While Thomas’s appeal was pending, however, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 775 (2020–2021 Reg. Sess.) (S.B. 775), which amended section 1170.95 to apply to defendants, like Thomas, who had been charged with murder or attempted murder but convicted of manslaughter. The People concede, and we agree, that Thomas may be eligible for relief under the amended statute. We therefore reverse and remand for further p

OS Pacific, LLC (tenant) appeals from a judgment in favor of Trio Pasadena, LLC (landlord) involving the renewal of a commercial lease. In a separate appeal, tenant challenges the posttrial award of attorney fees and costs to landlord. We consolidated the two appeals for argument and decision. We modify the costs award by taxing the fees for landlord’s expert witness but otherwise affirm the judgment.

In 2012, appellant James Soto, a founding member of the Mexican Mafia, was released from prison. In 2013, he began threatening Timothy Cullen to obtain money from Cullen’s marijuana dispensary business. In 2019, a jury convicted Soto of one count of extortion by threat or force in violation of Penal Code sections 519 and 520 and found true the allegation that the offense was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4) . The true finding on this allegation extended the statute of limitations on the underlying offense, which would have otherwise expired.

Defendant and appellant Enrique Medina appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. Due to an intervening change in the law, the Attorney General agrees the denial must be reversed as to the attempted murder count and the matter remanded. We agree.

Thirty-seven years ago, appellant Carlos Castro was charged along with three other men in the robbery-murder of Arturo Hernandez-Guerrero. In 1983, he pled guilty to second degree murder. In 2019, he filed a petition to vacate that conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court found appellant made a prima facie case that he was entitled to relief, issued an order to show cause, and then, following a hearing which the court limited solely to argument by the prosecutor and defense counsel, denied the petition. The trial court found the “record of conviction” established appellant was a major participant in the robbery of the victim and knowingly engaged in criminal activities which he knew carried a great risk of death.

Ryan Patrick Jensen appeals the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of two counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211 ) and three counts of grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a).) Jensen contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to replace his appointed counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). Jensen also contends insufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict on one of his theft counts.

After suffering burns at a backyard graduation party held at a friend’s home, Jonathan Santizo (plaintiff) brought a premises liability tort claim against Maria Huerta (Maria), the owner and landlord of the property where the party was held, and her brother, Elvis Huerta (Elvis) (collectively, defendants), who helped manage the property. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, reasoning plaintiff’s injuries were not foreseeable as a matter of law and were not caused by defendants. We are asked to decide whether the grant of summary judgment should be reversed for reasons procedural (an asserted error in granting judgment on a ground not raised in defendants’ moving papers) or substantive (the existence of a material dispute of fact concerning whether defendants owed plaintiff a duty of care).

Gabriel Green appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Daniel Suzuki, M.D., and San Marino Psychiatric Associates (SMPA), in which Dr. Suzuki is a partner. Green brought claims for professional negligence, abuse and neglect of a dependent adult, and intentional infliction of emotional distress alleging Dr. Suzuki and SMPA failed to provide adequate care to Green while he was involuntarily committed to the Aurora Las Encinas Hospital (LEH) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150. The trial court concluded Dr. Suzuki and SMPA carried their burden to show Dr. Suzuki’s treatment of Green was within the standard of care and did not cause Green’s injuries. Green submitted no evidence in opposition, and the court granted the summary judgment motion, finding Green failed to meet his burden to raise a triable issue of fact.

Defendant Tommy Channoi sexually molested two of his female relatives, then 7-year-old S. in 2008 and then 12-year-old C. in 2011. He was charged with five felonies, two against S. and three against C. A jury convicted him of one count of lewd acts against S. and one count of lewd acts against C., and it found true the allegations that he committed sex offenses against multiple victims and that the victims were under 14 years old. The jury could not return a verdict on the three other counts, and the trial court declared a mistrial on them. Channoi was sentenced to 40 years to life in prison.

Mother L.R. (Mother) appeals a judgment declaring her minor children dependents of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) and removing them from her custody. Mother contends the jurisdictional findings and dispositional order are not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

This is the second appeal we have considered in this matter. The following facts are derived from our nonpublished opinion in the first appeal, In re Marriage of Luu & Avritch (Jun. 29, 2021, A161935) (Luu I): Tessa Luu and Peter Avritch entered into a marital settlement agreement (MSA) in 2017. As part of the parties’ judgment of dissolution (judgment), Luu was awarded an online business run by the parties, which was operating on certain servers (the R510 and R410 servers) claimed by Avritch as his separate property. On December 17, 2019, Avritch informed Luu he planned to reclaim the R510 and R410 servers for his own personal purposes. He advised Luu to either arrange for an alternative server setup or offered an option for her to purchase the servers. Avritch ultimately took control of the R510 and R410 servers in mid-January 2020. Luu filed two ex parte motions alleging Avritch breached the terms of the MSA, which caused the online business’s websites to fail. While the trial c

Defendant Kimberly Ann Yale was convicted on her plea of guilty to being an accessory after the fact to a felony robbery and was placed on probation. (Pen. Code, § 32.) One of the probation conditions required her to submit to warrantless searches of her electronic devices.

After numerous sustained juvenile petitions, probation violations, and adult arrests, the juvenile court terminated defendant D.F.’s status as a non-minor dependent and set aside its placement order. Counsel for D.F. filed an opening brief asking that this court conduct an independent review of the record for arguable issues—i.e., those that are not frivolous, pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Counsel also informed D.F. that he had the right to file a supplemental brief on his own behalf, but he declined to do so. Because this appeal is not a first appeal from a criminal conviction, and because defendant has failed to file a supplemental brief requesting our independent review of any issues, we will dismiss the appeal.

Gregory A. (Minor) appeals a dispositional order entered after he admitted one count of voluntary manslaughter and a firearm enhancement. He contends the matter must be remanded for a new dispositional hearing because the juvenile court misunderstood the scope of its discretion when setting a maximum term of confinement. The Attorney General concedes this point, and we agree the matter must be remanded to allow the court to exercise its discretion under the correct legal standards.