CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
This recall from the California Supreme Court appeal involves the denial of Defendant’s postjudgment motion. Therefore, the statement of facts from the underlying case is not pertinent to this appeal and is omitted. A detailed statement of facts is included in People v. Noordman (Aug. 16, 2006, E038123) [nonpub. opn.].
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This is defendant’s second appeal challenging the trial court’s decision to treat his Montana convictions as strikes. In his first appeal, we reversed the court’s true finding on those convictions and remanded with instructions to review the record of conviction to determine what facts were necessarily found or admitted at the prior proceeding. (People v. Kimball (Mar. 6, 2019, E068330) [nonpub. opn.] (Kimball I).) On remand, the sentencing court again found the Montana convictions are strikes. We again reverse the court’s true findings as to defendant’s two alleged strike priors arising out of his convictions in Montana. In all other respects, we affirm.
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“A youth offender parole hearing is a hearing by the Board of Parole Hearings for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger . . . at the time of the controlling offense.” (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (a).) If defendant and appellant Rithy Chhuon were eligible for the youth offender parole hearing program, he would qualify for such a hearing in 2028. (§ 3051, subd. (b)(2).)
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A jury convicted appellant Eduardo Arizmendez of committing lewd and lascivious acts on his stepson’s best friend and attempting to commit a lewd and lascivious act by force or fear on the friend’s brother when both boys were under 14 years old. The trial judge, Riverside County Superior Court Judge Samuel Diaz, Jr., sentenced him to 20 years in state prison.
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Defendant and appellant, Isaiah Davilon Lee Howard, filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4), which the trial court dismissed. On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in dismissing his petition on the grounds that section 1170.95 did not apply to those convicted of attempted murder. On April 13, 2021, we issued an opinion affirming the court’s order.
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Keith and Patricia Jones bought an undeveloped parcel of land on an unpaved road and built a house on it. The Joneses obtained title insurance for the parcel from Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company, which provided coverage if the parcel lacked a “right of access.” After the house was nearly completed, the Joneses’ construction company told them that their house was “landlocked,” meaning there was no easement to connect the house to utilities or a public road.
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Plaintiff and respondent Peter Preovolos, sued defendants and appellants Athanasios (Thanasi) Preovolos and his law firm Preovolos Lewin ALC (Preovolos Lewin), for malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty for Thanasi’s alleged conduct in, among other things, failing to disclose conflicts of interest and taking actions harming Peter while simultaneously representing him. Thereafter, Peter applied ex parte for a temporary restraining order, asserting in part that Thanasi in his capacity as corporate counsel to certain family businesses endeavored to oust Peter from board positions and withhold income from him. The trial court in the malpractice action issued an order that enjoins Thanasi and Preovolos Lewin from “providing legal assistance, legal counsel, legal representation, or legal advice to anyone adverse to [Peter] in and out of court.”
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Objector and appellant Athansios (Thanasi) K. Preovolos, an attorney, appeals from an order disqualifying his law firm Preovolos Lewin ALC (Preovolos Lewin) from representing Thanasi in connection with a probate petition filed by Thanasi’s father, plaintiff and respondent Peter E. Preovolos. Peter’s petition sought, among other things, to invalidate an irrevocable trust and postmarital agreement drafted by Thanasi and Preovolos Lewin that Peter and his former wife Litsa had entered into as a consequence of Peter’s infidelity. In its disqualification order, the probate court ruled it was undisputed that Thanasi and Preovolos Lewin had represented Peter for many years in various matters and continued to legally represent Peter’s businesses; Thanasi drafted documents that prompted creation of the documents Peter sought to invalidate in probate court; and Thanasi was a trust beneficiary and “trust protector” to the irrevocable trust and to a family trust, which Thanasi had amen
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Jefferson Sison appeals an order summarily denying his petition to vacate his first degree murder conviction under Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court found he was not entitled to relief, as a matter of law, because the jury returned a true finding on a robbery-murder special circumstance with the murder conviction. The jury’s finding on the special circumstance was made before the California Supreme Court’s decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), which clarified the meaning of the terms “major participant” and “reckless indifference to human life” necessary to support such felony-murder special-circumstance findings. (Banks, at pp. 797–798, 803; Clark, at pp. 608–624.)
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Steven Donald Wiener (Steve ) appeals from an order quashing service of summons on the named non-California defendants in his lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction. In his lawsuit, Steve alleged he formed a partnership with his father, Donald Joseph Wiener Coss (Donald), in the 1980s to purchase land in Mexico, where his father lived. Steve alleged Christine Louise Wiener (Christine), Donald’s daughter from another marriage, and Raphael Gama Perez (Gama), Donald’s lawyer in Mexico, conspired with Donald to defraud him of his interest in the Mexico real estate investments. At the time of the alleged fraud, Steve claimed Donald was living in California.
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Father, Dennis S., appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating dependency jurisdiction, awarding mother sole legal and physical custody of the minors, issuing a no-contact order, and denying visitation with the minors. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 364, 395; further unspecified statutory references are to this code.) He contends there is not sufficient evidence to support the no-contact order denying him visitation. We agree and reverse the order.
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J.P., biological father of minor N.P. (father), appeals from the juvenile court’s orders denying him presumed father status and reunification services as to N.P. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 361.5, 395; statutory section citations that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Father contends he met the criteria for presumed father status under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), and the presumption of paternity was not rebutted. He further argues that even if he was correctly designated only a biological father, the court abused its discretion when it denied him reunification services. We affirm the juvenile court’s orders.
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