CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Brandon Watson, the father in this move-away case (Father), challenges the family court’s order awarding primary custody of his now three-year-old daughter A. to respondent Farrah Bray (Mother) in conjunction with a family move to North Carolina. As is increasingly common, both parties in this family law appeal are self-represented, and we fully appreciate the significant challenges self-represented litigants face in both the trial and appellate courts. These challenges are only compounded by the anxieties and frustrations inherent in a move-away request, where most often there is no “happy” solution. Parents who could otherwise share the custody and companionship of their child while living in the same community cannot both have the same “frequent and continuing contact” with their child when they live on opposite coasts. (See Fam. Code, § 3040, subd. (a)(1).)

James Mendoza sued his landlord, Marilyn Gramse, for refusing to repair allegedly substandard conditions in her home (where he rented a room) and retaliating against him when he complained. Gramse responded with a cross-complaint alleging elder abuse and breach of the parties’ lease. Filing an anti-SLAPP motion, Mendoza claimed Gramse’s cross-claims were based on his protected prelitigation statements and conduct, including his threat to sue Gramse. Denying the motion, the trial court concluded that properly construed, Gramse’s cross-claims against Mendoza were based solely on unprotected activity. Rejecting Mendoza’s contentions on appeal, we agree with the trial court and conclude Mendoza did not meet his moving burden to show that Gramse’s causes of action arose out of activity that the anti-SLAPP statute protects. Accordingly, we affirm.

S.L. is the mother of fifteen-year old G.L. C.D. is G.L.’s father. Over the years, S.L. has repeatedly accused C.D. of physically and sexually abusing G.L. There is no evidence in the record indicating that any agency or court has ever found any of the accusations to be true.

Defendant Juan Gonzalez appeals from the denial of a postconviction motion to correct his custody credits. Appointed counsel for defendant has asked this court to conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm.

Defendant Carlos Daniel Rodriguez, Jr., appeals from his conviction for two counts of robbery with weapons enhancements. Defendant contends the trial court erred under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 by denying his motion arguing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse prospective juror F.Y. based on his race. Defendant also claims the court abused its discretion by admitting evidence related to his arrest and his gang membership.

Defendants Hector Lorenzo Caballero and Damian Luis Flores appeal from their convictions of murder committed to benefit a gang, conspiracy to shoot at an inhabited dwelling, and conspiracy to intimidate a witness. They raise numerous claims of error: prejudice from remarks made by a judge before trial, improper gang expert testimony, insufficiency of the evidence, instructional errors, improper answer to a jury question, and juror misconduct. They also ask us to remand for the trial court to exercise its recently-granted discretion to strike firearm and serious felony prior conviction enhancements and to convene a hearing on their ability to pay fines and fees imposed on them.

The sole issue on this appeal is whether the juvenile court made an adequate record of its communications with the Washington State juvenile court under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA; Fam. Code, § 3400 et seq.) before asserting jurisdiction over A.L., the child of father, Clifton L., who is incarcerated.

Cesar Garcia shot Ricardo Mejia as the two drove in separate vehicles on the eastbound 210 freeway on February 27, 2008. A jury convicted Garcia of attempted premeditated murder during which he discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury, discharge of a firearm with gross negligence, and assault with a firearm while personally using a firearm.

Frank Joe Reyna appeals from the order denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. He contends the trial court erred when it summarily denied his petition without issuing an order to show cause. We agree and reverse.

Michael Isodor Wallravin appeals from the judgment after the jury found him guilty of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and attempted second degree robbery (§§ 664/211) and found true allegations that he was previously convicted of a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)) and two prior strikes (§§ 667, subds. (d) & (e), 1170.12, subds. (b) & (c)). The trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life in state prison.

A jury convicted Hanif Saladin Abdullah of first degree burglary and the trial court sentenced him, in part under the “Three Strikes” law, to 35 years to life. Abdullah petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.91, which allows certain veterans who were convicted of a felony to request resentencing if, as a result of their service, they suffer from substance abuse or other enumerated problems. The trial court denied the petition and Abdullah appealed. Because section 1170.91 does not permit resentencing where, as here, the petitioner was sentenced for an indeterminate term imposed under the Three Strikes law, we affirm.

Plaintiff Damien Perez appeals after the trial court granted summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of defendant Nicholas Langerica. On appeal, plaintiff does not contest the merits of summary judgment. Rather, he argues that Langerica should not have been allowed to answer plaintiff’s first amended complaint because Langerica was defaulted on the original complaint fifteen months earlier. We affirm the trial court’s decision denying plaintiff’s motion to strike Langerica’s answer, concluding plaintiff’s first amended complaint contained a material change and effectively vacated the default.

Nancy R. Kress (wife) appeals a postjudgment order reducing the spousal support obligation of Robert L. Kress (husband) from $5,250 per month, pursuant to their stipulated judgment of dissolution, to $3,750 per month, pursuant to his request for an order (RFO) to modify spousal support.

Plaintiff and appellant Ernesto Alvarado (Alvarado) appeals from a summary judgment granted in favor of defendant and respondent Dean Wilson (Wilson), a physician assistant who treated Alvarado while hospitalized. The key issue we are asked to decide is whether the trial court erred in sustaining an objection to a portion of an expert declaration opining that the malpractice of various personnel who treated Alvarado while in the hospital caused his vision loss. We also consider whether there is a dispute of material fact requiring trial on Alvarado’s separate claim for medical battery.