CA Unpub Decisions

In 2012, a jury convicted petitioner Sanson Noe Andrade of the first degree murder of Tommy H. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), count 1) and the attempted first degree murder of Randy H. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, 664, count 2). On count 1, the jury found true the special circumstance that petitioner committed the murder while an active participant in a criminal street gang and with an intent to kill (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)). For the offense of murder, the trial court sentenced petitioner to a term of life in prison without the possibility of parole. For attempted murder, the court imposed a consecutive sentence of life with the possibility of parole. (People v. Andrade (Oct. 31, 2014, F065468 [nonpub. opn.] (Andrade).)

After trial, a jury convicted Jack Wayne Hill II of two counts of felony vandalism. Hill appealed his conviction. His attorney filed a brief informing this court they were unable to identify any errors and asking us to perform an independent review of the record. Based on our independent review of the record, we find no error and affirm.

In 2009, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Raul Eduardo Delcid of premeditated murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1), premediated attempted murder (§§ 664/187 subd. (a); count 2), and active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 3). About 10 years later, in 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. The trial court granted the petition as to the murder conviction, but denied the petition as to the attempted murder, which was the correct result at the time, and in a prior nonpublished opinion, People v. Delcid (Oct. 12, 2021, E076476) (Delcid II), we affirmed the trial court’s order. But the Legislature since has passed and the Governor has signed Senate Bill No. 775 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775), which took effect on January 1, 2022. Senate Bill 775 amends section 1170.95 in various ways, and the most significant for our purposes is an amendment that expressly permits defendants convicted

A jury convicted Jesus Alvarez of sale of a controlled substance (Health and Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)). In a bifurcated trial, the jury found true Alvarez suffered a prior conviction under section 11352, within the meaning of Penal Code section 1203.07, subdivision (a)(11); the jury also found true an alleged strike prior conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (b)-(i)).

This is an appeal from an order denying appellant’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. The petition was denied by the trial court because appellant had been convicted of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser offense of the charge of murder. At the time of the ruling, the law appeared to support the trial court’s conclusion, but during the pendency of this appeal, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 775 (Stats. 2021, ch. 551) (Senate Bill 775), which makes clear that persons who plead guilty to manslaughter can be eligible for resentencing. As a result of the legislative clarification, the Attorney General properly concedes the order must be reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing.

J.S., the minor’s mother, appeals from the juvenile court’s orders exercising dependency jurisdiction and removing the minor from her custody. She argues the Sacramento County Department of Child, Family and Adult Services (the Department) failed to comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (the ICWA) because the Department did not adequately inquire into mother’s claim of possible Choctaw heritage. (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2.) We will affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

The Golden 1 Credit Union (Golden 1) appeals from denial of its motion to compel arbitration of a putative class action challenging the assessment and collection of insufficient fund fees. Golden 1 contends the superior court erred in determining that it failed to show that Dwaine Burgardt received notice of an arbitration provision Golden 1 introduced in 2019. When Burgardt opened an account with Golden 1 in 2013, he signed an application that included his agreement to Golden 1’s terms and conditions but did not mention arbitration or that Golden 1 could unilaterally amend the terms and conditions. We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to compel arbitration.

Defendant Richard Antonio Hundley appeals from a postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. He argues the trial court erred by declining to issue an order to show cause because the court looked beyond his declaration that he met the requirements of section 1170.95. He further argues the trial court erred by determining he was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law based on the jury’s felony-murder special circumstance finding. We disagree and affirm.

Defendant Richard Antonio Hundley appeals from a postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. He argues the trial court erred by declining to issue an order to show cause because the court looked beyond his declaration that he met the requirements of section 1170.95. He further argues the trial court erred by determining he was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law based on the jury’s felony-murder special circumstance finding. We disagree and affirm.

Defendant Richard Antonio Hundley appeals from a postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. He argues the trial court erred by declining to issue an order to show cause because the court looked beyond his declaration that he met the requirements of section 1170.95. He further argues the trial court erred by determining he was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law based on the jury’s felony-murder special circumstance finding. We disagree and affirm.

Defendant Richard Antonio Hundley appeals from a postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. He argues the trial court erred by declining to issue an order to show cause because the court looked beyond his declaration that he met the requirements of section 1170.95. He further argues the trial court erred by determining he was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law based on the jury’s felony-murder special circumstance finding. We disagree and affirm.

“In 2016, voters approved Proposition 57, the ‘Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016.’ Proposition 57 amended the California Constitution to grant early parole consideration to persons convicted of a nonviolent felony offense. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 32, subd. (a)(1).)” (In re Kavanaugh (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 320, 334 (Kavanaugh).) Proposition 57 also directed the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to adopt regulations in furtherance of its provisions. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 32, subd. (b); Kavanaugh at p. 334.) CDCR promulgated separate regulations for prisoners serving determinate and indeterminate sentences. (Kavanaugh, at pp. 334, 336 & fn. 3; see also Pen. Code, § 3040 et seq. and associated regulations [applicable to indeterminately sentenced prisoners]; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 2449.1, 2449.3-2449.7, 3490-3493 [applicable to determinately sentenced prisoners].) The regulations for prisoners serving indeterminate sentences are not at issue

A jury convicted defendant Irvin Dashawn Jenkins of robbery and carjacking stemming from an incident at an oil change shop. Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court erred in excluding expert testimony on the percentage of “false” identifications in cases where the defendant was exonerated by DNA evidence, instructional error, improper exclusion of defendant’s statement to sheriff’s deputies, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant also argues this matter must be remanded to permit the trial court to consider whether it should exercise discretion to strike or dismiss the prior serious felony conviction enhancement imposed under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a), a discretion afforded by Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), enacted after defendant’s sentencing. He further contends that, due to changes enacted by Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), the court should strike the one-year enhancement imposed pursuant to Pena

Plaintiff Karie Hirons (Hirons) appeals a judgment in favor of defendant U.S. Bank National Association (U.S. Bank). The court ordered judgment in favor of U.S. Bank after sustaining U.S. Bank’s demurrer with leave to amend, and Hirons did not amend the complaint. We conclude that the trial court properly sustained the demurrer as to each of Hirons’s causes of action. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.