CA Unpub Decisions

“In his reply brief, Smith argues the SPB lacked jurisdiction and violated his due process rights. Smith forfeited these arguments by failing to raise them in his opening brief. (See City of Palo Alto v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1271, 1318 [city forfeited argument that agency lacked jurisdiction by raising the issue only in its reply brief]; H.N. & Frances C. Berger Foundation v. City of Escondido (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1, 15 [party forfeited due process argument raised for first time in reply brief].)”

Defendant and appellant, LaKeith LeRoy McCoy, appeals from the November 22, 2019 order of the superior court, denying his petition for resentencing on his 2009 conviction for the attempted premeditated murder of Anthony Thompson under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Pen. Code, § 1170.95) In an unpublished decision, we affirmed the order denying McCoy’s petition on the ground that persons convicted of attempted murder were not entitled to relief under section 1170.95. (People v. McCoy (Jan. 11, 2021, E074238) [non pub. opn.] (McCoy II).)

A jury found defendant Agustin Cruz guilty of one count of arson. (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (d).) The trial court sentenced him to two years in prison, but deemed the sentence satisfied by custody and conduct credits. On appeal, Cruz contends the trial court erred by excluding evidence of his mental condition to negate the mental state required to commit arson, which requires proof that a person “willfully and maliciously” started a fire. (§ 451.) He acknowledges the California Supreme Court held in People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76 (Atkins) that arson is a general intent crime, and that section 28 excludes evidence of an offender’s mental condition to negate general intent. He maintains, however, that Atkins is either wrongly decided or distinguishable, and that excluding evidence of his mental condition violated his due process right to present a complete defense. For reasons we will explain, we find Atkins applicable and binding, and find no due process violation. Accordi

In Santa Clara County Superior Court case No. C1652157, a jury
convicted Axel Gary Stinson of one felony count of inflicting corporal injury on his partner and mother of his child. (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a).) In a bifurcated trial, the trial court found true allegations that he suffered a prior conviction for robbery (§ 211), a serious and violent felony as defined in sections 667.5, subdivision (c) and 1192.7, subdivision (c). At the time of the incident in case No. C1652157, Stinson was on probation in Santa Clara County case No. C1506969 for convictions of felony robbery (§§ 211/212.5) and misdemeanor criminal threats (§ 422.2). Two months before Stinson’s sentencing hearing, the Legislature enacted sections 1001.35 and 1001.36, putting in place a discretionary pretrial diversion program for individuals with qualifying mental disorders. (Stats. 2018, ch. 34, § 24; see People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 625 (Frahs II).) At Stinson’s sentencing, the court denied his

Brandon Christopher Ritter appeals a judgment convicting him of second degree murder and driving under the influence of a drug after he crashed his truck into a line of stopped cars, killing a driver of one of the cars and breaking the back of another. Ritter claims the trial court prejudicially erred by refusing to instruct the jury on unconsciousness and involuntary manslaughter and by precluding his counsel from arguing he was guilty of manslaughter rather than murder. He also claims the prosecutor committed misconduct by trivializing the reasonable doubt standard of proof during closing argument. We disagree with Ritter and affirm the judgment.

Appointed counsel for defendant Denise Ann Hernandez has filed an opening brief in defendant’s consolidated case on appeal, setting forth the facts of the case and asking this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) After reviewing the entire record, we affirm the judgment.

K.P. (mother) and D.P. (father), parents of the minors (parents), appeal from the juvenile court’s orders denying mother’s petitions to change the court’s order terminating her reunification services and thereafter terminating both of their parental rights, freeing the minors for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 388, 395.) We will affirm the juvenile court’s order denying mother’s section 388 petitions but reverse its orders terminating parents’ parental rights.

Defendant Anthony Martinez appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. He contends his conviction for attempted murder should have been eligible for relief under section 1170.95. In an unpublished opinion, we affirmed the trial court’s order. (People v. Martinez (July 6, 2021, C092554) [nonpub. opn.].) The Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back to us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of Senate Bill No. 775. On transfer, the People now concede, and we agree, defendant is eligible for resentencing on his attempted murder conviction. Accordingly, we will reverse and remand with instructions to the trial court to appoint counsel and issue an order to show cause for further proceedings under section 1170.95.

Defendant Shannon Shorter appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. Defendant contends the trial court erred in relying on a special circumstance finding to conclude no prima facie showing had been made. He further argues the trial court erred in relying on the record of conviction and our prior opinion in this matter in denying his petition. We conclude there was no error and affirm the order.

Can a court, in an action for traditional mandamus and declaratory relief, in effect order the state and local water boards to comply with the law as it pertains to water permits under the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act (Wat. Code, § 13000 et seq. (Porter-Cologne Act))? In this case, the answer is no.

Defendant Cherfapu Tony Vue was convicted after a jury trial of 10 counts of sexually molesting two minor victims, his nieces. He was sentenced to 12 years plus 90 years to life. On appeal, he contends his statements to the police should have been suppressed because they were obtained in violation of Miranda and because they were involuntary.

J.F. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders at a six-month review hearing concerning her three children, all of whom had previously been declared dependents of the court and removed from her care. Mother contends the Department of Children and Family Services (Department) did not adequately comply with its duty of further inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) regarding her eldest daughter. We affirm.

A jury convicted Tom Love Vinson of first degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and two counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced Vinson to 130 years to life plus a determinate term of 25 years six months.

Joseph P. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating jurisdiction over his children and granting sole physical custody to their mother, and monitored visitation to father. On appeal, father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his request for unmonitored visitation. We affirm.