CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant was in a dating relationship with A.M. With A.M. as a passenger, defendant drove into the parking lot of an apartment complex in Davis. Seventeen-year-old R.S. and his mother L.D. were in the parking lot and saw defendant and A.M. in the car. Defendant was punching and hitting A.M., mainly on her head, as he screamed and yelled at her. Defendant also head-butted A.M. and pulled her by the hair. A.M. was awake but seemed tired and unresponsive. She opened the passenger door and put her foot out, getting her foot stuck in the door when defendant tried to pull her in.
R.S. and L.D. yelled at defendant to let A.M. out of the car. Defendant pointed his finger at R.S. and L.D. through the open passenger window and told them to “mind your own business,” “shut up about this,” and “don’t tell anyone.” Defendant also used some racist language against L.D., who was wearing a head scarf. Defendant’s conduct scared R.S. and L.D.

Defendant and Virginia Perriera were married and shared a young daughter together. They had a tumultuous, on-again off-again relationship. They lived together in an RV park next to the victim, Darren Jopp. Defendant eventually moved out of the RV park. By July 2018, Virginia was dating Jopp. Jopp sometimes watched her daughter, whom he treated like his own child.
On July 3, 2018, defendant and Virginia had several profanity-laced phone calls during which defendant expressed his anger over Virginia hanging out with Jopp, and about how their daughter loved Jopp and not defendant. Defendant told Virginia he was heartbroken, and was “gonna go crazy . . . .”
On July 4, 2018, defendant and Virginia took their daughter to a family friend’s house to watch the fireworks. They left separately around 11:00 p.m. Sometime around then, Virginia called defendant several times, and he cursed at her to stop calling him.

D.J. (mother) appeals from orders terminating her parental rights to her children, L.M. and J.M., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, contending that the termination orders should be conditionally reversed and remanded for compliance with the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California statutes (Welf. & Inst. Code § 224 et seq.). No interested party filed a respondent’s brief; instead, counsel for mother, minors, and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed a joint application and stipulation for conditional affirmance and remand to the juvenile court for compliance with ICWA and the issuance of an immediate remand.
This case involves reversible error because the parties agree, and we concur, there was noncompliance with the inquiry requirements of ICWA and related California provisions.

In 2003, Vega resided in a trailer in Rosemead with his father, grandmother, and father’s cousin, Mario Olivarria. (People v. Vega (Feb. 25, 2005, B172317) [nonpub. opn.] [2005 Cal.App.Lexis 1662 at p. *2].) Vega carried a five-inch fixed-blade knife. (Ibid.) On November 23, 2002, Vega and Olivarria argued. (Id. at p. *3.) Following the argument, Vega stabbed Olivarria, who suffered 18 stab wounds. (Ibid.) On December 7, 2002, Olivarria died of complications from the wounds. (Ibid.)
On May 27, 2003, the District Attorney charged Vega with murdering Olivarria. On November 3, 2003, the jury found Vega guilty of second degree murder and found true the allegation that Vega personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). On December 29, 2003, the trial court sentenced Vega to 15 years to life in prison with an additional year for the personal use of a dangerous and deadly weapon, totaling 16 years.

In February 2002, Hill was convicted of several crimes including forcible rape, forcible sexual penetration, and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. The court imposed an aggregate sentence of 110 years. Additionally, the court imposed a restitution fine of $10,000 (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b)), a parole revocation restitution fine of $10,000 (§ 1202.45), and a fine of $300 to the victims of sex crime fund (§ 290.3, subd. (a)).
On September 17, 2021, Hill filed a post-judgment “motion to dismiss restitution order by the court pursuant to Assembly Bill 1869” seeking to vacate his restitution fines. Hill argued that pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 1869, which added section 1465.9 to the Penal Code, these restitution fines were now unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines must be vacated.

Appellant seeks to enforce a non-existent agreement to purchase property at 3970 Victoria Lane in Thousand Oaks (the Property), valued around $30,000,000; his check is for $800. The Hilltop Trust (Trust) originally purchased the Property in July of 2019. J. Peter Wakeman served as trustee at the time of the deal and appeared as such on the grant deed.
Appellant alleges he sent Wakeman a “written offer” to purchase the Property in June of 2020. He then ran a legal notice in the Ventura County Star newspaper stating: “ACT IN PAIS, bonded negotiable instrument(s) shall convey property, APN: 6900340035 as a purchase of Yachim Ben-Yashar’el. Value and consideration shall be evidenced upon legal acceptance of instrument(s). Ad #4222742.” The same day, appellant mailed a cashier’s check for $800 to Wakeman’s office. The check named Renell Jones as remitter and referred only to “Ventura County Star Ad #4222742.”

In July 2021, appellant Andre Brown was charged with one count of attempted carjacking and one count of second degree robbery. In August 2021, at the preliminary hearing, the victim testified: (1) in committing the charged offenses, appellant pushed the victim to the ground, put his (appellant’s) foot on the victim’s shoulder, and threatened the victim; and (2) the victim had seen appellant around his (the victim’s) neighborhood around two times before. At the conclusion of the hearing, at the prosecutor’s request, the trial court issued a prejudgment protective order under section 136.2, designating the victim as the protected person and prohibiting appellant from, inter alia, having contact with the victim during the pendency of the proceedings.
Two weeks later, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the prejudgment protective order.

Lee filed this lawsuit in March 2020. According to his operative, second amended complaint, Lee founded Gold Coast—a collection of companies that “dealt with marijuana and marijuana-related products”—with Aaron Taylor. Lee later recruited two other partners, Neema Samari-Kermani and Jeff Buchman, to help run the businesses. Between July 2014 and October 2015 Selan provided Gold Coast with legal services, which included reviewing contracts and obtaining licenses. Selan also “occasionally advised [Lee] on an individual basis about personal matters unrelated” to Gold Coast, even though Lee never signed, in his individual capacity, a retainer agreement with Selan.
Lee asserted three causes of action against Selan: legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract. Each cause of action arose from the same two sets of allegations.

On January 3, 2020, Llerena filed the operative motor vehicle negligence form complaint against Birney. The form complaint stated that “[t]he following causes of action are attached and the statements above apply to each . . . : [¶] a. Motor Vehicle [¶] b. General Negligence.” No attachment was provided with Llerena’s form complaint, and no factual allegations were provided. Birney timely filed an answer to Llerena’s complaint.
On September 15, 2020, Birney propounded to Llerena a set of requests for admissions. When Llerena did not respond, Birney sent Llerena a meet and confer letter informing Llerena that she would file a discovery motion if Llerena did not provide complete and verified responses by November 30, 2020. In response the same day, Llerena’s counsel, Martin Jerisat, stated that no responses could be provided “as the clients are not cooperating.” Jerisat also stated that he would soon file a motion to be relieved as counsel.

Youssef worked in the County’s Department of Public Social Services from 1998 until 2004, when his employment ended. He filed suit against the County, alleging wrongful termination, retaliation, and discrimination. In 2006, the parties reached a settlement agreement under which the County agreed to classify Youssef’s termination as a “voluntary resignation.” In addition, the agreement provided that, “[i]f there is any inquiry by any potential employer . . . [t]he only information the County will give for references will be the date of . . . Youssef’s employment . . . the position that he held . . . [a]nd rate of pay.”
In 2010, Youssef again filed suit against the County for breach of contract, among other claims, alleging that the County had failed to reclassify his termination in its computer systems, had told prospective employers that he had been suspended and terminated, and had posted information regarding his termination on the internet.

On July 19, 2017, plaintiff was riding a crowded MTA bus, seated next to a window behind the wheelchair section where a rider in a wheelchair was located. When the bus pulled over at plaintiff’s stop, an automated announcement informed passengers to use the rear exit for their safety and watch their step exiting the bus. At this stop, a wheelchair passenger also decided to disembark. When the driver opened the doors, two teenagers attempted to board the bus before the wheelchair passenger disembarked. The driver signaled to the teenagers to stay off the bus and wait (as was customary when a wheelchair was exiting). At this time, plaintiff stood up and began moving to the front of the bus. Just a few feet from the front of the bus and about seven or eight seconds after the bus stopped, plaintiff tripped over what she believed was the wheelchair’s wheel and fell to the floor, breaking her arm.

In 2017, Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau (Bureau) filed a petition alleging minor child, A.D., suffered or was at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness because P.M. (mother) had a history of serious substance abuse that interfered with her ability to parent. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b)(1); subsequent statutory references are to this code.) The Bureau asked mother and D.D. (father) whether A.D. had any Indian heritage — an inquiry required under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.),
a statute establishing minimum standards that state courts must follow before removing an Indian child from their family. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); § 224.1, subds. (a)–(b); In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 287.) Both denied A.D. had Indian heritage. On that basis, the Bureau’s social worker reported A.D. had no known Indian ancestry.

In 1981, Foster violently lured a woman named Susan whom he met at a bar to his residence and raped her for two and a half hours, while strangling her into a state of unconsciousness multiple times, gouging her body with his fingers, biting her breasts, striking her face and threatening to kill her. He was 23 years old at the time. In a negotiated disposition, he pled guilty to one count of oral copulation under former Penal Code section 288a, subd. (c). Thereafter, he was committed to Atascadero State Hospital under the former Mentally Disordered Sex Offender (MDSO) Law (former Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6300-6330). His commitment was extended every two years thereafter, sometimes with his consent and other times on the petition of the district attorney.
Foster was released in 2004 after a jury found he no longer qualified as an MDO. He soon stopped taking the medications he had been prescribed, causing an increase in auditory hallucinations.

On April 27, 2009, the Monterey County District Attorney filed an amended information against Aragon and three codefendants (Roman Gasca, Samuel Aragon, and Mike Martinez). Aragon was charged with two counts of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a); counts 1 & 2), two counts of attempted first degree murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); counts 3 & 4), one count of street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 5), one count of gang conspiracy to commit a crime injurious to the public (§ 182.5; count 6), and one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246; count 7). In addition, the information charged Aragon with gang allegations (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) in connection with counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7.
Shortly before Aragon’s trial was scheduled to begin, on July 22, 2010, Aragon elected (over the objection of his counsel and without a plea agreement) to plead guilty to all the counts and allegations.