CA Unpub Decisions

Petitioner Benjamin M., Sr., (father), in propria persona, seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested 12-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (f)) terminating his reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing for April 6, 2022, as to his now nine-year-old son, Benjamin M., Jr., (the child). The child’s mother S.M. (mother) is deceased. Father seeks a writ directing the juvenile court to return the child to his custody, and he requests a stay of the section 366.26 hearing pending our review of his writ petition. We conclude father’s petition fails to comport with the procedural requirements of rule 8.452 regarding extraordinary writ petitions and dismiss the petition.

Appointed counsel for defendant José Mendoza asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. Defendant did not respond. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm.

Elizabeth Carranza, the plaintiff in this medical malpractice action, sought to hold an anesthesiology practice group vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of an anesthesiologist hired by the group. The anesthesiologist had provided anesthesia care to Carranza during a prior surgical procedure, in the course of which Carranza suffered cardiac arrest. The question in the proceeding below was whether the anesthesiologist was an employee of the anesthesiology practice group, whereby vicarious liability would attach, or an independent contractor, whereby vicarious liability would be precluded. After the issue was tried in a bifurcated bench trial, the trial court ruled the anesthesiologist was an independent contractor. The court’s ruling resulted in judgment for the anesthesiology practice group. Carranza appealed. We affirm.

In 1988, appellant and defendant Ismael Rosas Arevalo was convicted, after a jury trial, of second degree murder and sentenced to 15 years to life.
In 2020, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 and alleged his murder conviction was based on the felony-murder rule and/or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The superior court denied the petition.
On appeal, his appellate counsel has filed a brief which summarizes the facts with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We affirm.

In 1997, appellant and defendant Jesse Manuel Villa was convicted after a jury trial of first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), and the jury found true the prior conviction allegations. He was sentenced to the third strike term of 25 years to life.
In 2020, defendant filed a petition for resentencing based on People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059 (Delgado) and asserted there was insufficient evidence that his prior convictions for assault with a deadly weapon were serious felonies and strikes. The superior court denied the petition.
On appeal, his appellate counsel has filed a brief which summarizes the facts with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Monty Campbell and defendant and respondent Adam L. Landais are embroiled in a dispute involving property lines, common walls and trespassing. Campbell filed a “Request for Elder or Dependent Adult Abuse Restraining Order[]” (the Request) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.03 of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (§ 15600 et seq.; Elder Abuse Act) against Landais. The trial court tentatively ruled that the Request was not to be granted as there was not a sufficient showing this was an elder abuse case. A four-day trial was held and the trial court denied the Request on September 3, 2020.
Campbell makes 15 claims on appeal as follows: (1) subject court ruling on October 16, 2019, presumption of being valid fails when it refused him, an elder, the right to provide evidence and testimony; (2) the court ruling on September 3, 2020, presumption of being correct fails based on several rulings at trial including not allowing h

Plaintiff and appellant Gregory F. Resendez appeals the grant of the demurrer filed by respondents and defendants Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC (Bayview) and Bank of New York Mellon, as Trustee for Certificate holders CWALT, Inc., Alternative Loan Trust 2006-6CB, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-6CB (BONY; collectively Lenders), and dismissal of his second amended complaint (SAC) without leave to amend.
Resendez filed his SAC against Lenders in connection with the default on a loan for his property located in Romoland. He alleged in the SAC two causes of action against Lenders for violations of the Homeowner Bill of Rights (Civ. Code, §§ 2920 et. seq.) (HBOR), one cause of action for negligence, and one cause of action for a violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, unfair competition law (UCL). The trial court granted Lenders’ demurrer to the SAC and dismissed without leave to amend. Resendez contends on appeal that the trial court erred by dismissing

In 2016, defendant Christopher Sly pleaded guilty to one count of attempted murder. On February 29, 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to former Penal Code section 1170.95 in the trial court based on the changes made to the murder statutes (petition) pursuant to Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f), effective Jan. 1, 2019) (SB 1437). The petition was summarily denied by the trial court without a hearing finding that SB 1437 and former section 1170.95 were not applicable to attempted murder.
Defendant appealed the denial of his petition to this court. In an unpublished opinion People v. Sly (Dec. 2, 2020, E073972) [nonpub. opn.] (Opinion) we ruled that defendant was ineligible for sentencing under former section 1170.95 because he had pleaded guilty to attempted murder, not murder, and that attempted murder was not included in the statute. Defendant filed a petition for review, which was granted. While the case was pending review in the C

S.W. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights and ordering her son, K.W., be placed for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) She contends the juvenile court erred when it found that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) did not apply because the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) violated its initial duty of inquiry pursuant to section 224.2, subdivision (b), by not asking the reporting party, the paternal grandmother, and the maternal grandmother whether K.W. has Indian ancestry. The Agency contends that it conducted a sufficient inquiry. To support its contention that additional inquiry is unnecessary, the Agency requests that we augment the record to include prior juvenile court records involving the same parents and K.W.’s sibling, D.H. As we shall discuss, we deny the augmentation request, conclude that the Agency conducted an insufficient initial inquiry, and conditionally reverse the

Appointed counsel for defendant Armand Ignatius Dickinson filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) After examining the record, we find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant and affirm the judgment.

To put K.C.’s contention in context, we take judicial notice of the record in her related pending appeal, case No. C093887, from orders issued by the juvenile court in Siskiyou County prior to transfer of the case to Butte County. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
Mother had an extensive child welfare history and reportedly did not feel she could provide for the minor. Because K.C. was willing to care for the minor, mother stated she intended for the minor to live with K.C. and the half-brother D.C. K.C. arrived at the hospital shortly after the minor was born and was permitted to take the minor pursuant to a safety plan prohibiting D.C. from living in the family home due to his substance abuse, mental health concerns, and criminal history. The probate court in Siskiyou County subsequently issued an ex parte order appointing K.C. the temporary guardian of the minor, but a social worker informed K.C. that the Siskiyou County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) would not support K

In June 2020, plaintiff Tamara Salas filed a petition for a civil harassment restraining order (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6) against defendant Quinn for harassing conduct alleged to have occurred over several months beginning in March 2020. Salas alleged that she was harassed because Quinn believed Salas had an extramarital affair with Quinn’s then-boyfriend.
The court held a contested evidentiary hearing on the restraining order on July 20, 2020. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the petition and issued a restraining order using Judicial Council form CH-130. Quinn appealed from the order.

Shortly after her birth, the juvenile court took dependency jurisdiction of A.M. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 after K.K. (mother) tested positive for methamphetamine during a prenatal screening. Appellant V.M. (father) challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the allegation that he failed to protect A.M. from mother’s drug abuse while pregnant, which was the sole allegation involving him, and also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the physical removal of A.M. from his custody and care. He further argues the juvenile court failed to consider reasonable alternatives to removal.
While father’s appeal was pending, respondent Sacramento County Department of Child, Family and Adult Services (Department) notified this court that dependency jurisdiction over A.M. had been terminated. We requested supplemental briefing from the parties on what effect, if any, the order terminating dependency jurisdiction has on the pending appeal. The parti

In this juvenile dependency case, the court found jurisdiction over A.B.’s (mother) two young children, Angel and Angelina (the minors), under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). The allegations related mainly to mother’s abuse of methamphetamine and her failure to reunify with her three older children due to her drug use. One allegation related to two instances of domestic violence between mother and her male companion while they were using methamphetamine. The court later ordered both minors removed from mother based solely on the domestic violence allegation and she challenges those orders here.
Prior to the dispositional hearing, mother successfully completed a four-month inpatient drug rehabilitation program, a six-month outpatient program, and participated in numerous classes, group sessions, and individual counseling. She also tested negative for all substances for approximately one year. Both she and her male companion took courses dealing w