CA Unpub Decisions

writ of mandate under CEQA challenging approval of a condominium project proposed by real parties in interest Peak Capital and The Bedford Group (Peak/Bedford). UHA was successful on one part of its challenge, in that the superior court issued a writ of mandate and ordered the County of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (collectively, the County) to withdraw approval of the project and complete a limited environmental impact report (EIR) with respect to traffic impacts. The superior court rejected UHA’s additional CEQA challenges, including those involving air quality, hazardous waste, and aesthetics.
The court then granted UHA’s motion for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, and awarded UHA fees of $118,089.00. Peak/Bedford appeals that award, asserting that (1) UHA is not entitled to fees because it neither enforced an important right affecting the public interest nor conferred a significant benefit on a large class of persons, an

Plaintiff and appellant California Capital Insurance Company (CCI) brought an action for equitable contribution against defendant and respondent Truck Insurance Exchange (Truck), alleging that Truck failed to participate in the defense of its insured in underlying litigation. Truck moved for summary judgment, contending that its insurance policy provided excess rather than primary coverage and therefore no contribution was required. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in Truck’s favor.
On appeal, CCI argues that the excess-only provision in Truck’s policy operated as an escape clause, allowing Truck to avoid paying for the coverage it promised, and therefore the trial court should have refused to enforce it. CCI also contends that Truck had a duty to defend its insured because of the potential that some of the allegations in the underlying litigation would trigger liability that was covered under Truck’s policy but not CCI’s. We agree with the trial court that s

In 2008, defendant Jose Napoleon Beteta was convicted of first degree murder, with a special circumstance that the murder was committed during the course of a robbery. He was 25 years old at the time of the offense, and he was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). His conviction has long been final, and it is not at issue in the cause before us. (See People v. Beteta (Apr. 29, 2009, A121059) [nonpub. opn].)
What is at issue is whether the trial court correctly determined that Beteta was not entitled to a “Franklin proceeding,” which allows young offenders to develop a post-judgment record for use in future parole hearings. (See People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 284.) Under existing law, offenders who have LWOP sentences and who were over the age of 18 at the time of their offense will not become eligible for parole. (See § 3051, subd. (h).) But offenders who have LWOP sentences and who were 18 or younger at the time of their offense will become eligi

Defendant Juan Pantoja filed a motion to suppress evidence of a firearm found on his person when he was patted down during a traffic stop. The trial court granted defendant’s motion and then dismissed the case. The District Attorney appeals.
We affirm.

Defendants/cross-complainants Francis and Carol Odinma (the Odinmas) appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiffs/cross-defendants Saleem Mahmood and Yasmeen Fatima (the Mahmoods) after the trial court granted the Mahmoods’ motion for judgment on the pleadings with regard to their complaint and the Odinmas’ cross-complaint. The court ruled the Odinmas’ claims for judicial foreclosure and declaratory relief were barred by the doctrine of res judicata and the so-called “one action rule” (Code Civ. Proc., § 726) due to a prior judgment entered against the Odinmas in an adversarial proceeding they filed in bankruptcy court against the Mahmoods’ predecessors in interest. We affirm.

Soon after the owner of properties held in trust died, his children began litigating disputes related to the disposition of trust assets. In an earlier unlawful detainer proceeding brought against appellants (one of the owner’s sons and his partner), they presented a lease that they purportedly entered into with the father before he died. The trial court in that proceeding ruled in their favor.
This action was brought by respondent trustee (one of the owner’s daughters) to resolve several trust issues, and appellants maintained that the validity of the lease could not be challenged under principles of collateral estoppel. The trial court disagreed, later found the lease to be a forgery, and ruled in respondent’s favor. The court also allowed respondent to charge her brother’s share of the trust for the legal costs incurred in litigating the validity of the lease.
We affirm. Appellants have failed to establish the elements of collateral estoppel, and the doctrine’s application

Esther Bell Twine created a 2001 trust of which Mazzetta Campbell was the sole surviving beneficiary and a December 2015 trust of which Michael Nash was a beneficiary. Michael appeals from a probate court judgment confirming the validity of the 2001 trust and declaring the December 2015 trust void due to lack of capacity and undue influence. He argues the probate court’s finding regarding Twine’s mental capacity was flawed in several respects. He also argues the court erred in ruling that all Twine’s bank accounts were assets of the 2001 trust.
Michael has not shown any error in the court’s ruling that Twine was subject to undue influence when she created the December 2015 trust. That ruling is sufficient to support the judgment’s invalidation of the December 2015 trust, so we will affirm that aspect of the judgment. But we agree that the probate court erred in ruling that all of Twine’s accounts were assets of the 2001 trust, so we will modify that portion of the judgment

Lynard Adam Craig (Craig) appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) for driving a pickup truck at several children. He contends the court’s instruction on assault with a deadly weapon was erroneous, because the instruction may have allowed the jury to conclude incorrectly that the truck was an inherently deadly weapon. He also contends the court should have instructed on the lesser-included offense of simple assault and should have given an unanimity instruction. Lastly, he argues that the matter should be remanded to the trial court to determine his ability to pay court-ordered fines and fees. We will affirm the judgment.

Jose I. (father) appeals the juvenile court’s orders exerting jurisdiction over his two young children and removing them from his custody. Because the juvenile court’s orders are supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.

Brothers Isaac Musighi (Isaac) and Parviz “Daniel” Mossighi (Daniel) arbitrated the dissolution of their wholesale diamond business, and the trial court confirmed that arbitration award in a $9 million judgment for Daniel. The brothers thereafter reached a settlement resolving disputes related to Isaac’s refusal to comply with the judgment. Still unhappy with the results of the arbitration, Isaac petitioned the trial court to compel 50 assorted claims to a new arbitration on the basis that the settlement agreement included an arbitration clause. The trial court denied the petition. Because the claims Isaac has identified on appeal are barred by res judicata, not encompassed within the scope of the arbitration clause, or cannot be arbitrated because the preselected arbitrator has a conflict of interest, the trial court was correct in denying the petition.

In 1998, defendant Bryan Christopher Vaca was convicted by jury of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187) and attempted murder (§§ 664, subd. (a), 187). The jury also found true allegations that he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon in the commission of each offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). In a second phase of the trial, the jury found that defendant was legally sane when he committed the offenses. Defendant was sentenced to 24 years to life in prison. This court affirmed the judgment on direct appeal. (People v. Vaca (August 9, 2000, H019100) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under a prior version of section 1170.95, which allowed individuals convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition the superior court to vacate the conviction based on changes in the law. After appointing defendant counsel and receiving briefing from the parties, the trial court denied the petition.
Defenda

After the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from a probation search of his home, data extracted from cell phones found at the residence, and digital recordings of phone calls defendant placed as a county jail inmate, defendant pleaded no contest to pimping. Defendant challenges the trial court’s suppression ruling as it relates to the probation search and the jail phone calls. He argues that the probation search was unduly prolonged and harassing, and the disclosure and retention of the jail calls violated California’s Electronic Communications Privacy Act.
We find the probation search of defendant’s home to be reasonable and that the jail lawfully obtained and retained the electronic recordings of defendant’s phone calls. However, the district attorney’s prolonged retention of any jail call recordings that had not warned of disclosure to that office violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act’s 90-day retention limit. The trial co

A jury convicted defendant William A. Pisano of one count of assault on a peace officer with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (c).) The court sentenced defendant to the lower term of three years in state prison.
Defendant raises five issues on appeal. First, he seeks independent review of the court’s Pitchess ruling with respect to several officers’ records. Second, he contends the court violated his rights to a speedy trial by granting two continuances without good cause. Third, he argues there was insufficient evidence of assault on a peace officer with a deadly weapon. Fourth, he claims the court erred by denying his motion to reduce the felony conviction to a misdemeanor. Finally, he contends the court erred by imposing various fines and fees.
We agree in part with defendant’s latter contention. The court’s minute order and abstract of judgment include certain fees not orally imposed at the sentencing hearing. We accordingly remand and direct the court to correct

Kyle Patrick Ryan appeals from the trial court’s entry of judgment after a jury verdict finding him guilty of the forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2); count 2) of Kendra C. in 2018. The evidence showed Ryan drove past Kendra following Cinco de Mayo festivities in Huntington Beach, saw that she was intoxicated, circled back, and guided her into his vehicle according to video surveillance footage. The jury also convicted Ryan of forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)(A); count 4), false imprisonment by menace, violence, fraud or deceit (§§ 236; 237, subd. (a); count 5), and of two lesser included offenses on other counts. Specifically, the jury found Ryan guilty of false imprisonment on count 1 as a lesser included offense of kidnapping to commit a sex offense and, on count 3, of simple battery (§ 242) as a lesser included offense of sodomy by force. The trial court sentenced Ryan to an aggregate prison term of 16 years and 8 months.
On appeal, Ryan contends the