CA Unpub Decisions

Jerry Harbin was convicted of voluntary manslaughter following a plea. The Legislature subsequently enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437), which altered liability for murder under the theories of felony murder and natural and probable consequences. The bill also established a procedure, under newly enacted Penal Code section 1170.95, for eligible defendants to petition for recall and resentencing. Harbin filed a petition for relief, and the trial court denied it on the basis that section 1170.95 does not apply to defendants convicted of voluntary manslaughter.
Harbin appealed from the order denying his section 1170.95 petition, and his appellate counsel filed a brief asking this court to conduct an independent review of the record for arguable issues. Harbin was informed he could file a supplemental brief but did not do so. We agree with the trial court that section 1170.95 does not afford relief to defendants convicted of voluntary manslaughter,

Defendant Tracy Williams, who was charged with murder but pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter, appeals an order denying her Penal Code section 1170.95 petition for resentencing. The trial court erred by finding section 1170.95 unconstitutional. However, because a conviction for voluntary manslaughter is ineligible for resentencing under section 1170.95, we affirm.

This appeal stems from teacher Jonathan Green’s allegations that several Cajon Valley Unified School District employees, including Superintendent David Miyashiro, harassed him and discriminated against him on the basis of his age and disability. Green initiated his lawsuit after being transferred to a different school in the wake of nearly a dozen students reporting that they saw him watching pornography on his computer during class. Although Green’s action named several defendants, this appeal involves only the summary adjudication of his claims against Miyashiro. Despite procedural errors committed in the trial court, we affirm the judgment because it reached the correct result.

ABS REO Trust II (ABS) appeals from an order denying its motion to correct/vacate the portion of a prior quiet title judgment adjudicating the rights of a defaulting party (Clarion Mortgage Capital, Inc. (Clarion)) despite that Clarion had not been served with the operative amended complaint and the court did not hold a hearing on the plaintiff’s claims against Clarion.
We conclude the court erred in denying ABS’s motion. ABS had standing to bring this motion and it met its burden to show the prior judgment was void as to Clarion. We reverse the order and remand with directions for the court to grant ABS’s motion and strike the portions of the prior judgment relating to Clarion.

Manfred Schockner appeals from a postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. No arguable issues were identified by Schockner’s appointed appellate counsel after her review of the record. We also have identified no arguable issues after our own independent review of the record and analysis of the contentions presented by Schockner in a supplemental brief. We affirm.

I.G. appeals the juvenile court’s order sustaining allegations of two counts of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2) ) and two counts of shooting at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) He claims the evidence was insufficient to support one of the two counts of assault with a firearm. We conclude substantial evidence supported the court’s finding. Affirmed.

William Earl Wilson was convicted following a jury trial of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)). In his initial appeal we held the trial court had applied an incorrect standard in denying Wilson’s motion for a new trial and remanded the matter with directions to rehear the motion. (People v. Wilson (May 13, 2019, B285594) [nonpub. opn.].) On remand the trial court again denied Wilson’s motion. No arguable issues have been identified following review of the record by Wilson’s appointed appellate counsel or our own independent review. We affirm.

In an act of revenge following the shooting of their fellow gang member, defendants and appellants Ricardo Mixon (Mixon), Deshun Armstead (Armstead), and Daniel Hill (Hill) went into rival gang territory and shot and killed two innocent victims. Following a jury trial, defendants were each convicted of two counts of first degree premeditated murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). As to each defendant and both counts, the jury found true the allegations that defendants had committed multiple murders (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)); the murders were gang-related (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)); and that a principal discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)). The jury further found true the allegation that Mixon personally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).
Armstead and Mixon were each sentenced to 70 years to life in state prison plus two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). Hill was sentenced to 50 years to life in st

William L. Roy appeals from a judgment of dismissal after the trial court granted attorney Jeanne M. Fitzgerald’s motion for summary judgment on Roy’s quiet title action against her. Roy’s complaint arose after Fitzgerald, on behalf of her client, filed with the Orange County Recorder’s office a certified copy of a spousal support modification order in favor of Roy’s ex-wife, Virginia Raeanne Roy. Roy regarded the filing as a slander on “any property he owns” in the county, including his Fullerton residence (the Property). In recording the order, Fitzgerald, a member of the bar, identified herself as an “Attorney at Law.” Roy did not sue Fitzgerald for slander of title or any other purported wrongdoing; instead, he styled his action as a “Complaint to Quiet Title,” in which he asserted that Fitzgerald “claims an interest adverse to Plaintiff [in] the Property, as the recording party of an ‘Order on Order to Show Cause Re Modification’ . . . .” After the pa

Defendant Anthony Michael Rivera sexually abused his step-granddaughter, Jane Doe No. 1, for years. When she was 10 years old, she realized he was also molesting her five-year-old sister, Jane Doe No. 2, and reported the abuse. A jury subsequently convicted defendant of: one count of sexual intercourse with Jane Doe No. 1 (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a); count 1); three counts of oral copulation with Jane Doe No. 1 (§ 288.7, subd. (b); counts 2, 3 & 4) and one count with Jane Doe No. 2 (count 8); two counts of sexual penetration with Jane Doe No. 1 (§ 288.7, subd. (b); counts 5 & 6) and one count with Jane Doe No. 2 (count 9). Defendant was also convicted of committing a lewd act on Jane Doe No. 1 (§ 288.7, subd. (a); count 7) and Jane Doe No. 2 (count 10), and the jury found defendant committed each lewd act offense on more than one victim (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (e)).
The court sentenced defendant to state prison for a total term of 80 years to life, comprised of two terms of 25

C.A. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights as to her children, then 12-year-old J.A. and then two-year-old A.A. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26). Mother contends the Kings County Human Services Agency (agency) failed to comply with inquiry provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) The agency concedes there were inadvertent omissions in the ICWA inquiry and notice that it intends to remedy and does not oppose remand for the limited purpose of ensuring proper compliance with ICWA. We agree with the parties and conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights and remand for proceedings to ensure ICWA compliance.

In this juvenile dependency case, Crystal D., mother of A.O., appeals the juvenile court’s order made at the six-month status review hearing, asserting the court’s finding that reasonable services were provided to her was not supported by sufficient evidence (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (e)(8)). Finding no error, we affirm.

Appellant Miriam U. (mother) appealed from the juvenile court’s August 4, 2020 order terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to her now
12-year-old son, Luis U. After reviewing the juvenile court record, mother’s
court-appointed counsel informed this court she could find no arguable issues to raise on mother’s behalf. This court granted mother leave to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844 (Phoenix H.).)
Mother filed a letter but failed to address the termination findings or orders or set forth a good cause showing that any arguable issue of reversible error arose from the section 366.26 hearing. (Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) Consequently, we dismiss the appeal.

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