CA Unpub Decisions

Appointed counsel for appellant Salvador Carrillo Leon asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Leon was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. This court did not receive a supplemental brief from him. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to Leon, we affirm.

Appellant Charter Communications, Inc. (Charter) contends the trial court erroneously denied its motion to compel arbitration of this employment discrimination dispute. The court sustained objections to Charter’s evidence addressing the formation of the arbitration agreement and then determined Charter failed to prove the parties agreed to arbitration. Charter contends the court’s failure to consider its evidence violated the interpretation of Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1330 adopted in Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060 (Espejo). We agree.
In Espejo, the appellate court concluded a party seeking to compel arbitration may meet its initial burden of showing an agreement to arbitrate simply by attaching a copy of the purported agreement to its motion. Here, Charter satisfied that initial burden by attaching a copy of the purported agreement to a declaration submitted with its motion

Defendant Chris Ferreira appeals from a postjudgment order denying his petition for dismissal pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.42. His appointed counsel asked this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief but did not file one. We conclude defendant is not entitled to Wende review and dismiss the appeal as abandoned.

After his arbitration case was dismissed with prejudice, plaintiff Allen Thompson, Jr. petitioned the superior court, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1288, to vacate the arbitrator’s ruling. The superior court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition because Thompson’s petition was filed well outside the 100-day period to timely petition under section 1288. Thompson now appeals, asking this court to vacate the arbitrator’s ruling.
We affirm.

“Defendant [Michael Santillan Lopez] went to trial on charges of willful, deliberate and premeditated attempted murder of a peace officer (§§ 664 & 187, subd. (a)), assault on a peace officer with a semi-automatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (d)(2)), evading a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)), carrying a loaded firearm (§ 12031, subd. (a)(1)), and possession of ammunition (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1)). The following gang and weapon enhancements were also alleged: as to counts one through three, defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), and a principal personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b) [&] (e)(1)); as to count three, defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b) [&] § 12022.5, subds. (a) [&] (d)); as to count seven, defendant was an active participant in a street gang (§ 12031, subd. (a)(2)(C)); and as to counts one through eight, the offens

Francisco R. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction over his daughter Ashley R. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1), as well as the subsequent dispositional order removing her from Father. The juvenile court found that Father’s substance abuse created a substantial risk of serious physical harm to Ashley. Father denies that his substance use rises to the level of abuse necessary to exert jurisdiction and remove Ashley from his care. He also argues that the removal order was improper because the Department of Child and Family Services (the Department) did not make or document any reasonable efforts to prevent removal, and the juvenile court did not consider other available means that could have protected Ashley.
We affirm the juvenile court’s orders. The record, which includes Father’s admission of regular methamphetamine use for at least two years, supports the juvenile court’s finding that Father had a substance ab

Adrian F. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction over his two sons, Ivan F. and Miguel F. (collectively, the children), under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(2), as well as the subsequent dispositional order removing both children from Father and ordering Father to complete reunification services. The juvenile court found that Father’s history of alcohol and substance abuse problems created a substantial risk of serious physical or emotional harm to the children, and that Father needed to complete a series of drug treatment programs to reunify with the children. Father denies any present or prior history of alcohol or substance abuse, and contends the evidence is insufficient to support these findings. Father also argues that the removal order should be vacated, claiming that the juvenile court removed the children pursuant to a statute that does not apply to Father as a noncustodial parent. Finally, Father challenges the ord

In this dependency case (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300), Ronnie R. (Father) challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jurisdictional finding against him—that is marijuana abuse placed his four-year-old son and seven-year-old daughter at risk of serious physical harm, damage, danger, and failure to protect. We conclude Father’s challenge to the jurisdictional finding against him is not justiciable because, even if we were to reverse the finding, jurisdiction over Father’s children would continue based on the unchallenged jurisdictional findings against L.V., the children’s mother (Mother), and there is no effectual relief we can order for Father, as explained below. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

Defendant Brown Automotive, Inc. appeals from an order denying its petition to compel arbitration of this employment-related action filed by its former employee, plaintiff Brianna Sanchez. In denying Brown Automotive’s petition, the trial court concluded the arbitration agreement Sanchez signed prior to commencement of her employment with Brown Automotive was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. While we agree the preemployment arbitration agreement Sanchez signed is procedurally unconscionable, we conclude it is not substantively unconscionable. Because both procedural and substantive unconscionability are necessary to invalidate the arbitration agreement, we reverse the trial court’s order denying the petition to compel arbitration and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Rupert Mila Roe purports to appeal from an order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus, a nonappealable order. (Robinson v. Lewis (2020) 9 Cal.5th 883, 895; In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 767, fn. 7; Cox v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 855, 858.) Accordingly, Roe’s appeal must be dismissed.
Even were we to deem this matter an appeal from a nonstatutory motion for modification of sentence in the superior court or a new petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court, Roe’s contention his 2007 sentence as a third strike offender should be modified in light of recently enacted Penal Code section 1016.8 is devoid of merit.

Appellant Henry L., the noncustodial presumed father of dependent child T.D., appeals the juvenile court’s denial of his request to move T.D. to Arizona under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC). (Fam. Code, § 7900 et seq.) The court found that T.D. is likely to reunify with his custodial parent, E.D. (Mother), and moving T.D. from California would prevent reunification. Moreover, the record does not show that a relative requested placement of T.D. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.3, subd. (a).) We see no abuse of discretion and affirm.

In a dispute involving several defendants, the plaintiffs alleged that one of the defendants, Devon Wheeler, sought a permit from the City of Los Angeles that should not be granted. Another defendant, Suresh C. Jain; Suresh & Usha Jain Living Trust 2003; and Pico 12300, LLC (collectively Jain), moved to strike the allegation as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), arguing that because plaintiffs alleged elsewhere in the complaint that all defendants conspired to interfere with the plaintiffs’ business, this particular allegation constituted a strategic claim against the moving defendants’ public participation. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the plaintiffs asserted no claim against the moving defendant based on the allegation. We agree and affirm.

A jury convicted LC Barnes of attempted second degree robbery. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of six years in state prison. On appeal, Barnes contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss his prior qualifying conviction under the Three Strikes Law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12 ), which doubled his sentence. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and thus, we affirm.

Denzel Smith, Kirby Dearlle Allen, and Deshon Markeist Wright (collectively Defendants) took over $400 and a gold chain necklace from a man at gunpoint. A jury convicted them of second degree robbery. They jointly appeal the conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying a motion for new trial based on juror misconduct. Because Defendants failed to present credible evidence of any misconduct, we affirm.