CA Unpub Decisions

Evelyn D. (mother) appeals two of four jurisdictional findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (c), and a disposition order requiring therapeutic visitation with her son L.C. (minor). The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) and minor both contend that mother’s appeal of the jurisdictional findings is not justiciable, and that the visitation orders are within the court’s discretion. We decline to review the portion of mother’s appeal challenging the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings, and we affirm the court’s order for therapeutic visitation.

Wilson C. appeals from the juvenile court’s orders declaring his son Ivan C. (age 10) and daughter K.C. (age seven) dependents and removing them from his custody. We affirm the juvenile court orders.

Respondents Alternate Health Corp. and Alternate Health USA, Inc. (collectively, Alternate) held a license for a sublingual (under the tongue) dissolving tablet for delivering marijuana-derived compounds. Appellant Vivera Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Vivera) claimed that the license was restricted to nutraceutical (nonpharmaceutical) products, a claim Alternate disputed. The parties sought relief in the trial court to resolve the dispute. After a bench trial, the trial court agreed with Alternate, that its license gave Alternate the rights to nutraceutical and pharmaceutical applications. Vivera appeals and contends that the trial court erred in interpretating the agreement. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Ashley Shawnice Lowe challenges the trial court’s denial of his petition under Penal Code section 1170.95 for resentencing on his murder conviction. He argues that the trial court erred by finding that he had failed to make a prima facie case that he was entitled to relief. The Attorney General concedes Lowe is correct. We agree and reverse because the record of Lowe’s conviction does not show as a matter of law that he is ineligible for relief under the statute.

Plaintiff Craig and Carrie Ventura Corner, LLC, (landlord) appeals from a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant and respondent Joz Knowz, Inc. (tenant). The trial court ruled that the 3-day notice landlord served on tenant to initiate unlawful detainer proceedings failed to identify adequately the person to whom tenant should pay the late rent, as required by statute.
We conclude the 3-day notice was ambiguous, and could be read to identify at least two possible recipients for the unpaid rent, without making clear which was the correct recipient. It therefore did not strictly comply with the notice requirements of the unlawful detainer statutes, which were intended to prevent tenant confusion by setting forth clear rules regarding payment of rent. Accordingly, we affirm.

J.M. appeals from an order denying his postjudgment request to modify custody and visitation for his then 14-year-old son and an order denying his request for a statement of decision. Finding no error, we affirm the orders.

Osman Rolando Galicia Juarez appeals the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of two counts of sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child 10 years old or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a); counts 4 & 7), two counts of oral copulation or sexual penetration with a child 10 years old or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b); counts 5 & 8), and three counts of a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 3, 6, & 9). The trial court sentenced appellant to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life on counts 4 and 7, plus concurrent terms on the remaining counts of conviction, for a total term of 50 years to life in state prison.
Appellant was 18 years old when he committed multiple nonviolent sex offenses against his half-sister beginning when she was nine. At sentencing, the trial court ruled that because of the nature of his offenses, appellant is ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051. Appellant contends the cour

Defendant and respondent California Institute of Technology (Caltech) manages the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) pursuant to a contract with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In 2014, plaintiff and appellant David Lillie (Lillie), who at that time was an employee of ManTech International Corporation (ManTech), worked at JPL in accordance with a contractual arrangement between Caltech and ManTech. Lillie claims that Caltech personnel provided him with access to a third-party government contractor’s proprietary data to facilitate his completion of assigned tasks. According to Lillie, he later discovered that he lacked authorization to access this data and that Caltech personnel had attempted to conceal Lillie’s use of the data.
Lillie claims to have reported these events to Caltech’s Ethics Department, and that he later relayed them to Congresswoman Judy Chu’s office. ManTech subsequently terminated Lillie’s employment. Next, at a meeting arranged by Co

The Brown Act (Gov. Code, § 54950 et seq.) requires public agencies to hold public meetings, with certain exceptions. During a closed session, a school board decided to proceed with the dismissal of teacher Junnie Verceles. Verceles petitioned for a writ of mandate, claiming the board violated his rights under the Brown Act. The school district demurred, and the trial court sustained the demurrer. The Brown Act’s personnel exception means the board was not obliged to open this meeting to the public. We affirm.

After Elijah D. pleaded no contest to one count of second-degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)) and one count of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c)) pursuant to a supplemental wardship petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, the juvenile court committed the minor in the Youth Offender Treatment Program (YOTP), a locked program operated locally within the juvenile hall.
On appeal, Elijah challenges his commitment to YOTP as an abuse of the juvenile court’s discretion, reasoning there is no evidence this commitment would be of probable benefit to him or that less restrictive placement would be ineffective or inappropriate. The minor also contends the juvenile court miscalculated his custody credits. We affirm the YOTP commitment but hold that the minor is entitled to credit for all actual time spent in custody—254 days rather than the 195 days awarded by the juvenile court.

Defendant Andrew Ceballos was convicted of second degree murder and assault with a semiautomatic firearm after he fired eight shots through the closed door of a crowded bedroom, killing one of the five people inside. Defendant appealed, and in August 2018, we affirmed the judgment of conviction. But, based on a change in the law, we remanded the case “for the sole purpose of allowing the trial court to exercise its discretion under subdivision (h) of [Penal Code] section 12022.53” whether to strike the
25-year enhancement imposed for personal use of a firearm.
Prior to resentencing, defendant filed a sentencing memorandum that raised additional claims attacking his sentence, claims not even responded to in the People’s opposition memorandum. The trial court declined to strike the enhancement. And as to defendant’s additional claims, the trial court noted they had already been decided and rejected on appeal, and, even if it were to consider the claims, it would deny them on the m

In 2011, Kenneth Hamilton was charged, along with other gang members, with two counts of murder. Hamilton entered into a negotiated plea agreement. Hamilton pleaded guilty to two counts of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)) and admitted a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)) as well as a firearm enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The parties stipulated to a determinate term of 20 years in prison. Hamilton was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement.
In 2019, Hamilton filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. The court appointed counsel and solicited briefing. After reviewing the briefing and the record of conviction, the court found Hamilton was statutorily ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 and denied the petition.
Hamilton filed a timely notice of appeal.
Although Hamilton was not convicted of murder as required by section 1170.95, he argues he must be eligible because he was originally charged with murder on an aiding and a

A jury found defendant William Alfredo Gonzalez guilty of robbery and driving or taking a vehicle without the consent of the owner. (Pen. Code, § 211; Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).) Gonzalez admitted an allegation that he had a prior conviction for felony theft of an automobile. (§ 666.5, subd. (a).) The court sentenced Gonzalez to a term of four years, with 259 days of presentence custody credits. The court also imposed several fines and fees.
On appeal, Gonzalez seeks remand for consideration of pretrial mental health diversion under section 1001.36 following the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618 (Frahs). Appellant also requests we stay or strike the fees and fines because the superior court imposed them without conducting an ability-to-pay hearing. In the alternative, Gonzalez contends his trial attorney failed to provide effective assistance of counsel when she failed to seek a determination of his eligibility under Frahs and/or failed to reque

Kevin K. Johnson, APLC, Kevin Johnson, and Jeanne MacKinnon (collectively, the attorney defendants) filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint on behalf of their clients Christian Clews (Christian), Barbara Clews (Barbara), and Clews Land & Livestock, LLC (CLL) (collectively, Clews Horse Ranch) challenging a decision of the City of San Diego (City) to approve the construction of a private secondary school adjacent to the Clews’s commercial horse ranch. The petition asserted the City’s approval of the project and adoption of a mitigated negative declaration for the project violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA, Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.), the San Diego Municipal Code (Municipal Code), and the City’s land use plan. The trial court denied relief and, in Clews Land and Livestock, LLC v. City of San Diego (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 161 (Clews), we affirmed the judgment. Hereafter, we will refer to the mandate proceeding and related appeal as the CEQA L