CA Unpub Decisions

Amber B. (Mother) appeals the jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders of the juvenile court concerning her daughter, dependent child C.J. We affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff and appellant Lieba Chanin appeals from the trial court’s order requiring that she deposit current and past due rent pending the outcome of an arbitration with defendants and respondents. In response to plaintiff’s appeal from the court’s order, defendants move to dismiss the appeal under the disentitlement doctrine, arguing that plaintiff’s refusal to deposit the required sums prevents her from seeking relief on appeal. We agree and therefore dismiss the appeal.

This case involves a gang murder. Defendant Travis Jordan Brown was initially found guilty of first degree murder and street terrorism, and in a prior opinion, we reversed the murder conviction and remanded for a new trial. On remand, defendant was convicted of first degree murder once again with a gang special circumstance. In this appeal, he argues the trial court abused its discretion by refusing his request to disclose juror information from the first trial. He also claims that without the testimony of his accomplice, there was insufficient evidence to connect him to the murder, and therefore, his motion to acquit should have been granted. We disagree with both contentions and therefore affirm the judgment.

Petitioner Joanna M. (mother) seeks an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s orders terminating her reunification services at a contested and combined six-, 12- and 18-month review hearing and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing on May 5, 2021, as to her seven children who range in age from two to 16 years of age. Douglas M. (father), mother’s husband and the father of the youngest six children, also filed an extraordinary writ petition in our case No. F082255 currently pending in this court. Mother contends the court erred in terminating reunification services because the Fresno County Department of Social Services (department) failed to make reasonable efforts to assist her in reunifying with the children. We deny the petition.

Petitioner Joanna M. (mother) seeks an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s orders terminating her reunification services at a contested and combined six-, 12- and 18-month review hearing and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing on May 5, 2021, as to her seven children who range in age from two to 16 years of age. Douglas M. (father), mother’s husband and the father of the youngest six children, also filed an extraordinary writ petition in our case No. F082255 currently pending in this court. Mother contends the court erred in terminating reunification services because the Fresno County Department of Social Services (department) failed to make reasonable efforts to assist her in reunifying with the children. We deny the petition.

Petitioner Douglas M. (father) seeks an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s orders terminating his reunification services at a contested and combined six-, 12- and 18-month review hearing and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing on May 5, 2021, as to his six children who range in age from two to 13 years of age. Joanna M., father’s wife and the mother of his children (mother), also filed an extraordinary writ petition in our case No. F082257 currently pending in this court. Father contends the court erred in terminating reunification services because the Fresno County Department of Social Services (department) failed to make reasonable efforts to assist him in reunifying with the children. We deny the petition.

Petitioner Douglas M. (father) seeks an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s orders terminating his reunification services at a contested and combined six-, 12- and 18-month review hearing and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing on May 5, 2021, as to his six children who range in age from two to 13 years of age. Joanna M., father’s wife and the mother of his children (mother), also filed an extraordinary writ petition in our case No. F082257 currently pending in this court. Father contends the court erred in terminating reunification services because the Fresno County Department of Social Services (department) failed to make reasonable efforts to assist him in reunifying with the children. We deny the petition.

Appellants Marco V. (father) and T.B. (mother) appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) as to their now 20 month-old daughter, R.V. After reviewing the juvenile court record, the parents’ court appointed counsel informed this court they could find no arguable issues to raise on the parents’ behalf. This court granted the parents leave to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844.)
Appellants filed letters but failed to address the termination findings or orders or set forth a good cause showing that any arguable issue of reversible error arose from the section 366.26 hearing. (In re Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) Consequently, we dismiss the appeal.

Charged with eight offenses, defendant Marisa Elena Lopez Miranda pled no contest pursuant to a plea agreement to three counts, including one felony, and admitted two prior prison term allegations (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). One of the prior prison term allegations was based on a 2006 felony case involving drug offenses and possession of a bad check, and the second was based on a 2009 felony conviction for forgery. Her plea was conditioned on her receiving a five-year prison sentence, which was comprised in part of two one-year enhancements for each of the prior prison terms. The People in return dismissed the remaining counts. The court imposed the five-year sentence, but suspended the execution of the sentence and placed Miranda on probation.
Later, the trial court granted Miranda’s petition under Proposition 47 to have her 2009 forgery conviction reduced to a misdemeanor. After numerous probation violations, the court terminated probation, lifted the suspension of execution

Appellants filed this appeal to challenge an order denying their petition to file a late claim under the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.). We conclude the trial court properly denied the petition because (1) the documents submitted to the defendants within six months of the accrual of appellants’ causes of action did not constitute a “claim as presented” for purposes of sections 910.8 and 911; (2) the application for leave to present a late claim was not submitted to the public entity within the one-year period specified in section 911.4, subdivision (b); (3) the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not bar the defendants from asserting appellants failed to present a timely claim and failed to present a timely application to present a late claim; and (4) the doctrine of equitable tolling does not apply and, therefore, cannot be relied upon to extend the amount of time appellants had to comply with the claim presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act.
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Family Code section 2556 permits a party to a marital dissolution proceeding to file a postjudgment motion to obtain adjudication of the division of a community asset that has been omitted or not adjudicated by the judgment. Here, appellant Aurelio Robles (Husband) pursued such a motion, alleging real property located in Mexico was a community asset. The family court denied the motion, concluding the claim about the real property had been presented multiple times and rejected on the ground that no such community asset existed. Husband appealed. As explained below, Husband has not carried his burden of affirmatively demonstrating the family court committed a prejudicial error.
We therefore affirm the postjudgment order.

Defendant Christopher Michael Copeland was charged with several offenses in relation to an incident in which he and two companions forced themselves into a home where three minors were present, and eventually departed with several items of value. Relatively early in the case, the People extended to defense counsel an offer of 14 years in prison, which would have involved Copeland pleading to one count of home invasion robbery, admitting his personal use of a firearm, and admitting a prior prison term enhancement. Defense counsel did not communicate the offer to Copeland.
Copeland eventually learned of the prior offer, when a newly assigned prosecutor informed him it was no longer available. Thereafter, the People recognized they were constitutionally required, under the circumstances, to re-extend the offer. At the next court date, Copeland accepted the plea agreement and he pled no contest to one count of home invasion robbery (Pen. Code, § 213, subd. (a)(1)(A)) and admitted the fir

In 2002, Melissa Sue Rogers pled guilty to first degree murder and admitted personally using a firearm. In 2019, she filed a petition for resentencing relying on newly enacted Penal Code section 1170.95, which the trial judge denied.
On appeal, Rogers argues the trial judge erred by accepting the prosecution’s representation of the facts at the prima facie stage and by failing to give her the opportunity to brief the issues. The People correctly concede this was error. We therefore reverse and remand for the trial judge to determine whether Rogers is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on her petition by conducting a proper prima facie review, with the benefit of briefing from the parties.

Appellant K.E. (Mother) and respondent D.R. (Father) are the parents of B.E.-R., who was seven years old at the time the court entered the custody order at issue in this appeal. The parties were never married and lived together only very briefly. For most of B.E.-R.’s life, he has lived outside of San Diego in various locations, with Mother, and until the most recent court order, Mother had always been B.E.-R.’s primary custodial parent. The record demonstrates that while Mother and Father have at times successfully managed co-parenting, their relationship has often involved conflict and disagreement.
At the time of the proceeding that led to the order from which Mother appeals, Mother and B.E.-R. were living in Phoenix, Arizona and Father was living in San Diego County. The parties were sharing joint legal and physical custody of B.E.-R. pursuant to a permanent custody order that was entered in spring 2017. In that order, the court granted Mother’s request to move the child’s