CA Unpub Decisions

Appointed counsel for defendant David Luna filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and asking this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) After reviewing the entire record, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

Appointed counsel for defendant Andrew Lee Mason has asked this court to conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) After reviewing the entire record, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

Amedee Geothermal Venture I (Amedee) claims the Lassen Municipal Utility District (LMUD) caused the catastrophic failure of its generator by replacing a 34.5 kilovolt power line with one with a 12.47 kilovolt capacity. Amedee brought an unsuccessful action against LMUD in federal court before filing this case in San Francisco Superior Court. The case was subsequently transferred to Lassen County and the claims for negligence causing a dangerous condition and breach of contract were tried to a jury. The jury returned a defense verdict, and a bench trial on Amedee’s inverse condemnation also found in favor of LMUD.
On appeal, Amedee contends (1) the trial court erred in refusing to categorically exclude LMUD ratepayers from the jury, (2) the jury misinterpreted a limitation of liability clause in the transmission agreement between Amedee and LMUD, (3) the trial court erroneously dismissed Amedee’s claim for negligence under Government Code section 815.2 based on governmental immunity,

After defendant Danielle Lee Jaco pleaded no contest to identity theft (Pen. Code, § 530.5), the trial court granted her five years’ probation. On appeal defendant contends the imposition of an electronics search condition as a condition of her probation is invalid under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent). We agree. In supplemental briefing, defendant challenges the trial court’s order imposing a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4), a $40 court operations assessment (§ 1465.8), and a $30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373). Relying on People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, 1168, 1172 (Dueñas), defendant argues these fines and fees should be stayed until the trial court holds an ability to pay hearing. We disagree with Dueñas and its reasoning. Accordingly, we strike the electronics search condition from the probation order. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

Penal Code section 1170.95 permits resentencing of petitioners who could no longer be convicted of murder because of changes to sections 188 and 189 that became effective January 1, 2019. The changes to sections 188 and 189 have no impact on a defendant who was convicted as the actual killer. As People v. Nash explained: “The Legislature declared . . . that it was necessary to ‘amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Nash (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1055, italics added.)
The trial court denied petitioner Jose Luis Perez’s section 1170.95 petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage. The trial court concluded that Perez was ineligible for resentencing because he

In this second appeal, defendant Rudy Latscha challenges the judgment following his resentencing. He argues we must reverse the judgment because (1) the trial court did not order a new probation report prior to the resentencing hearing; (2) the trial court misunderstood the extent of its discretion when it declined to strike two firearm enhancements or impose lesser enhancements; and (3) the trial court failed to comply with this court’s remand order concerning the assessment of fines and fees. As set forth below, we disagree. Defendant, however, is correct that the abstract of judgment must be modified to reflect properly his custody credits and local conduct credit. We order the abstract of judgment to be modified and otherwise affirm the judgment.

Courtney Darrel Pierre appeals from a judgment entered after a jury verdict. Our review is under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.
An amended information charged Pierre with felony vandalism for damage over $400 (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a); count 1) and misdemeanor injuring a child’s parent (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 2). Pierre pleaded not guilty to both counts and the matter proceeded to a jury trial.
At trial, the prosecution called the victim, the victim’s sister, and the investigating officer to testify. According to the victim, she and Pierre had been in a relationship for approximately seven to eight years and had two children together. Pierre never lived with the victim and their relationship ended in December 2016.
On the evening of April 17, 2018, Pierre went to the victim’s apartment unannounced while the children and victim were home. He entered the apartment without the victim’s permission and became upset when he discovered another man in the victim’s bedro

Appellant Marcus Jones challenges the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. We agree that the trial court erred by making factual findings prior to issuing an order to show cause (OSC). The matter is remanded for issuance of an OSC and further proceedings consistent with section 1170.95, subdivision (d). Respondent’s request for judicial notice is denied.

Frank Teofilo Amador (defendant) appeals from the judgment following his convictions on three counts based on an incident of domestic violence. Defendant’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), identifying no issues and requesting that this court review the record and determine whether any arguable issue exists on appeal. We did so, and requested supplemental briefing from the parties regarding (1) imposition of mandatory assessments, and (2) application of the “Three Strikes” law.
Having considered that briefing, we conclude the trial court erred by imposing assessments on only one of the counts of which defendant was convicted, and direct the trial court to impose those assessments on the other two counts as well. We also remand for the trial court either to double the sentence on defendant’s third count, pursuant to the Three Strikes law, or to dismiss the prior strike conviction as to that count.

A jury convicted appellant Surind Phon of second degree murder after he drove alongside another car and fatally shot the other driver. He contends that his conviction must be reversed because the trial court refused his request to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. We
affirm.

Defendant Martin Libich was convicted of aiding and abetting his then-girlfriend’s stalking and electronic harassment of Leandra Y., his ex-girlfriend, and electronic harassment of Lux Y., his child with Leandra. On appeal, he argues we must reverse the stalking conviction because one of the aiding-and-abetting instructions misidentified the victim as Lux rather than Leandra. Although we agree the instruction was confusing, we conclude that the prosecutor’s closing argument resolved the ambiguity and that it is not reasonably likely the jury misunderstood the relevant legal principles. Defendant also argues—and the People concede—that Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (A.B. 1950), which reduced maximum felony probation terms to two years, applies to him retroactively because it became effective while his appeal was pending. Defendant asks us to reduce the term of his probation on appeal whereas the People urge us to remand. We conclude that under the circumstances

This matter arises from a loan agreement 4402 Mammoth Investors, LLC (Mammoth) entered to purchase a residential property; a personal guaranty of the loan executed by Arthur Aslanian, Mammoth’s principal; and an alleged breach of the agreements. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the original lender’s assignee, Stonehaven, LLC (Stonehaven), and against Aslanian. On appeal, Aslanian argues that he was improperly denied his right to a jury trial, and that this court should modify the judgment amount based on postjudgment proceedings in Mammoth’s bankruptcy case. We affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Mario Campa of four counts of attempted willful, premeditated, and deliberate murder, with true findings as to each count that Campa committed the crime for the benefit of a gang and that a principal used a firearm causing great bodily injury. The court sentenced Campa to 80 years to life in prison. On appeal, Campa contends: (1) the court violated his due process rights when it granted the People’s motion not to disclose impeachment evidence concerning one of the investigating officers; (2) the court erred in admitting testimonial hearsay evidence; (3) insufficient evidence supports the gang enhancements; (4) the court imposed an unauthorized sentence; and (5) the court violated his due process rights by imposing various fines and fees without first determining his ability to pay. We agree that Campa’s sentence is unauthorized and remand the matter for resentencing. We otherwise affirm the judgment.

Tony Belfield appeals the trial court’s decision on resentencing declining to strike a five-year recidivist enhancement imposed under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a). His court-appointed counsel has filed a brief seeking our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. We have reviewed the record and conclude there are no issues requiring further review. We affirm.
In People v. Belfield (Nov. 29, 2018, A149964) [nonpub. opn.], we affirmed Belfield’s conviction for second-degree murder and remanded for the trial court to apply its newly-conferred discretion regarding whether to strike a section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearms enhancement. On remand the trial court struck the enhancement, effectively reducing Belfield’s sentence from 75 years to life to 50 years to life. The court declined to consider Belfield’s further request to strike a five-year enhancement imp