CA Unpub Decisions

Mother K.E. appeals from orders made at an 18-month status review hearing denying return of her daughter to her care. She contends there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings that placement with her would put the minor at substantial risk of harm and that reasonable services had been provided. We affirm.

John Anthony Cornejo died of a methamphetamine overdose after having been arrested by California Highway Patrol (CHP) officers during a traffic stop and observed to put in his mouth and swallow something he insisted was gum, not drugs. Plaintiffs, his parents, prevailed in a wrongful death suit predicated on the negligence of the officers who took Cornejo to jail rather than to the hospital. After this court affirmed the judgment, plaintiffs sought an award of attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. This appeal is from the trial court’s denial of the motion for attorney fees. We affirm.

Defendant Lonnel Moore appeals after a jury convicted him of human trafficking of a minor (Pen. Code, § 236.1, subd. (c)), soliciting a child under the age of 16 to prostitute (§ 266h, subd. (b)), inducing a child to engage in a lewd act (§ 266j), and committing a lewd act upon a child (§ 288, subd. (c)(1)). His sole contention on appeal is that substantial evidence did not support the jury’s special allegation finding that the trafficking involved force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress, menace, or threat of unlawful injury. (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(2).) We affirm.

Plaintiffs Alva Denise Walker, Cleve Robert Walker, and Lindsey Jameice Walker appeal from a judgment after a jury trial. They contend the trial court erroneously dismissed their cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 789.3 by way of an in limine ruling. Because plaintiffs have not provided an adequate record to show error, we shall affirm.

Defendant Deon Jefferson Taylor appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of three counts of robbery. His court-appointed counsel has filed a brief raising no issues and seeking our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). The brief includes counsel’s declaration stating that he informed defendant of his intent to file a Wende brief on his behalf, and that he apprised defendant of his right to file a supplemental brief. Counsel’s proof of service accompanying the brief, which is signed under penalty of perjury, shows counsel served defendant by mail with a copy of the brief on January 13, 2021, the same day the brief was filed. Several months have now elapsed, and defendant has not filed a supplemental brief. Having independently reviewed the record, we conclude there are no reasonably arguable issues requiring further review. We affirm the judgment.

This juvenile dependency case arose after Sherry B. (Mother) absconded with her young daughter, I.A., allegedly to protect the child from suspected sexual abuse by her presumed father, Jorge S.-A. (Father). The juvenile court sustained the dependency petition and vested custody of I.A. with her paternal grandmother. Reunification services were provided, and I.A. eventually was returned to Father’s custody, with Mother having monitored visitation. In the months that followed, Mother received ongoing enhancement services. The court later terminated jurisdiction and issued exit orders which granted sole physical and legal custody of I.A. to Father and supervised visitation to Mother.
Mother appeals from the exit orders. She asserts she was not provided reasonable services, the exit orders are arbitrary and not sufficiently specific, and the court violated the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C § 1901 et seq.). We reject these contentions an

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County, John D. Molloy, Judge. Affirmed.
Jean Ballantine, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2014, defendant Corey Lamont Macedon pleaded guilty to first degree special circumstance murder. In December 2020, he filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. In January 2021, the trial court summarily denied the petition on the ground defendant was statutorily ineligible. Defendant appealed. Unable to identify any arguable issues, appellate counsel has sought independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders). Affirmed.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Runston G. Maino, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Alex Coolman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Adrian R. Contreras, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Christopher Carramusa pled guilty to one count of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), and admitted a prior strike under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 668, 1170.12), a prior serious felony (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)), and four prison priors (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668). The plea agreement left the determination of Carramusa’s sentence to the discretion of the trial court. The trial court declined to strike Carramusa’s prior strike, and it sentenced Carramusa to an upper-term sentence of 17 years in

Norholm Builders, Inc. (Norholm Builders) and Poul Norholm appeal on the clerk’s transcript from an order granting respondents Michael and Maria Cirovic’s motion for new trial on appellants’ cross-complaint. The jury returned a special verdict finding in favor of appellants and awarding Norholm Builders damages for breach of contract. Respondents claimed that the jury had committed misconduct by including appellants’ attorney fees in the award of damages. The trial court granted a new trial on the ground of jury misconduct. We agree with appellants that there was no misconduct. Accordingly, we reverse.

Defendant and appellant Eric Jimenez pleaded no contest to second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), admitted the allegation that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and received the negotiated sentence of 25 years to life in prison. He then filed a request for a certificate of probable cause, seeking leave to appeal the trial court’s denial of his two requests to represent himself pursuant to Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806. The trial court denied the request.

Thirty-seven years ago, appellant Carlos Castro was charged along with three other men in the robbery-murder of Arturo Hernandez-Guerrero. In 1983, he pled guilty to second degree murder. In 2019, he filed a petition to vacate that conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court found appellant made a prima facie case that he was entitled to relief, issued an order to show cause, and then, following a hearing which the court limited solely to argument by the prosecutor and defense counsel, denied the petition. The trial court found the record of conviction established appellant was a major participant in the robbery of the victim and knowingly engaged in criminal activities which he knew carried a great risk of death.
Defendant appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition, contending the People failed to offer any evidence at the hearing on the order to show cause. Alternatively, defendant contends 1) the trial court violated his due process rights by

In an amended information, defendant and appellant David Osby was charged with robbery (Pen. Code, § 211 [count 1]), resisting an officer (§ 69 [count 2]), and attempted robbery (§§ 211/664 [count 3]). It was alleged that Osby used a deadly weapon, a knife, in the commission of count 1. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The amended information further alleged that Osby suffered three prior serious felony convictions with respect to counts 1 and 3 within the meaning of the three strikes law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d).) With respect to all three counts, it was alleged that Osby suffered three prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
The jury found Osby guilty in counts 1 and 2, but acquitted him in count 3. It found the prior conviction allegations to be true.
Osby was sentenced to a total of 25 years to life in prison, plus a determinate term of 17 years. The co

Appellant Jonathon Osha Bell and his codefendant Joe Taylor were convicted of robbing Robyn P., her roommate Reanon G., and her grandmother Virginia P. in the early morning hours of August 16, 2016, and of robbing Katherine L. later that morning. According to the victims, the robberies were executed in a similar manner: Taylor arranged a meeting with a transgender sex worker (first Robyn, then Katherine) through an online advertisement, entered her apartment alone, threatened her with a gun (later determined to be a realistic-looking pellet gun), and called in Bell to join him in taking the victims’ property and dissuading them from reporting the crimes. The day after the robberies, Bell was arrested in his car, which resembled one seen in surveillance video to have parked near Katherine’s apartment shortly before she was robbed. Katherine’s phone was found in Bell’s car. Many of the victims’ possessions were found in Bell’s and Taylor’s homes, and the men’s DNA and fin

In 2005, a jury convicted petitioner David Armaro Olayo of first degree felony murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), robbery (§§ 211, 212.5), and burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a)) and found true various sentence enhancements. The superior court sentenced petitioner to 25 years to life.
In 2019, petitioner filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95, which was enacted by the Legislature through its passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (S.B. 1437). (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) Section 1170.95 allows individuals convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition the superior court to vacate the conviction under recent changes to the law. After briefing and argument by the parties, the superior court denied the petition, determining that S.B. 1437 was unconstitutional and that petitioner had failed to state a prima facie case for relief.
Petitioner contends that the superior court erred when it