CA Unpub Decisions

C.A. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating her parental rights as to now eight year old Jon.G., six year old Joh.G., six year old Ja.G., four year old Ja.H., and two year old Je.H. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. (All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise specified.) She contends the juvenile court erred by finding inapplicable the parent child relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) and by failing to select legal guardianship as the permanent plan for the children.
R.H., who is the father of Ja.H. and Je.H., and J.G., who is the father of Jon.G., Joh.G., and Ja.G., have each appealed from the orders terminating parental rights. In their respective appellate briefs, R.H. and J.G. each state they do not raise any separate appellate issues but instead join and adopt Mother’s opening brief and argue that if Mother’s parental rights are reinstated, their

In this juvenile dependency case, Rose M. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights as to her minor child, N.M. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26). Mother contends the order must be reversed because the court erred by failing to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)). Finding no error, we affirm.

Appointed counsel for appellant Willie James Rogers asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Rogers was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. This court did not receive a supplemental brief from Rogers. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to Rogers, we affirm.

Defendant Julio Lerma Barrera was charged with one felony count of evading a peace officer while driving recklessly (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 1) and one misdemeanor count of failing to appear on a citation (Pen. Code, § 853.7; count 2). Count 2 was dismissed prior to trial. Defendant was convicted on count 1 following a trial by jury and sentenced to the middle term of two years in prison.
On appeal, defendant’s sole claim is that his conviction is not supported by substantial evidence that he drove with “willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property” under section 2800.2, subdivision (a), and he seeks modification of the judgment to reflect a misdemeanor conviction for violation of section 2800.1. The People dispute defendant’s entitlement to the relief sought.
We conclude defendant’s conviction is supported by substantial evidence and affirm the judgment.

In 2014, defendant and appellant Kenneth Wayne Salter pled guilty to three felony counts arising out of conduct that included his assaulting two victims with a deadly weapon, one of whom was a security guard whom Salter seriously injured. The plea was a negotiated bargain where the trial court struck one strike and five prison priors. Salter admitted a different strike conviction and two serious prior convictions. He received a sentence of 24 years and four months. The conviction became final when no direct appeal was filed.

Yomajara Lizarraga physically abused his girlfriend, M.T., repeatedly for nine months. He was charged with injuring M.T., a person with whom he had a dating relationship (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a); count 1), and false imprisonment of M.T. by violence (Pen. Code, § 236; count 2). He pled no contest to count 1 in exchange for dismissal of count 2. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and granted Lizarraga a three-year term of formal probation.
Lizarraga appeals, challenging the imposition of certain probation conditions, fines and fees. He asserts that (1) the criminal protective order (“CPO”) and no contact probation condition were overbroad and violated his First Amendment right to free association, (2) the dangerous weapons probation condition is void for vagueness, and (3) the court erred in the imposition of fines and fees by failing to hold an ability to pay hearing, relying on an improper statute to determine ability to pay to all proposed fines and fees, an

Jaimie Davis (Davis) sued her tax advisors Roy Hosaka (Hosaka) and Hosaka Nagel & Company (Hosaka Nagel) (collectively, Respondents) for fraudulent concealment and breach of fiduciary duty after she suffered investment losses. Davis alleged Respondents fraudulently induced her to purchase high-risk investments and failed to disclose material information about their relationship with the individuals and companies selling the investments. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Respondents on both causes of action. After denying Davis’s motion for a new trial, the trial court entered judgment on the verdict.
Davis appeals from the judgment. She contends the trial court erred by excluding evidence related to a separate Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement action against one of the companies with which Davis invested, the jury’s verdict is not supported by the evidence, and the court erred by denying her motion for a new trial. We conclude Davis has not met her burden to

Plaintiff and respondent Stephanie McCarley sued defendants and appellants Anesthesia Service Medical Group, Inc. (ASMG) and Dr. Edgar Canada, among others, for medical negligence, alleging she suffered a brain injury when Dr. Canada failed to take steps to raise her blood pressure while under anesthesia for a procedure. She made a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer to Dr. Canada, to which he did not respond. The matter proceeded to trial, and McCarley obtained a judgment that included damages for future attendant care and prejudgment interest based on the section 998 offer.
Defendants appeal. They contend Dr. Canada was within the standard of care as a matter of law; the trial court improperly excluded proposed expert testimony regarding polycystic ovary syndrome (PCOS); the award of future attendant care was based on speculation; and the section 998 offer was invalid. We conclude substantial evidence supports the jury’s negligence finding and the future attendant care award,

This appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of defendant Sean Joyner’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. To facilitate our review, we will summarize the relevant background facts from our opinion in defendant’s previous appeal from the underlying conviction. (People v. Joyner (Oct. 25, 2013, C071202) [nonpub. opn.].)
Defendant and codefendant Nicholas Newsome, both of whom were gang members, confronted the victim, a rival gang member, outside of a nightclub. The victim turned around and someone shot and killed him. Defendant later texted several incriminating messages to the mother of his son, although he would not tell her whether he was the shooter. (People v. Joyner, supra, C071202 at pp. 1-2.)
At trial, the jury was instructed on theories of direct aiding and abetting, murder with malice aforethought, and voluntary manslaughter. The jury did not receive any instructions on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
The jury

Appointed counsel for defendant, Xavier Akeem Adams, has asked this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the trial court’s order.

Defendant Kenneth Svien appeals the trial court’s order overruling his demurrer challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction to consider a probation violation allegation. Defendant asserts his probationary term expired approximately a year prior to the filing of the probation violation petition at issue in this appeal and he did not agree to an extension of the probationary term. The People disagree, arguing defendant agreed to an extension of his probationary term and is thus estopped from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction. We conclude the record is devoid of evidence showing defendant agreed to extend his probationary term. We thus reverse the trial court’s order overruling the demurrer and the subsequent order finding defendant in violation of probation.

A jury found defendant Jorge Vasquez guilty of three counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a minor under 14 years but found not true that he committed the offenses during a burglary; the jury acquitted him of burglary and of annoying and molesting a different minor. After the trial court denied his motion for new trial based on the court’s failure to instruct on the defense of mistake of fact, he was sentenced to 25 years in state prison.
Defendant raises his instructional error challenge again on appeal, contending the trial court prejudicially erred by instructing the jury that “mistake of person” was not a defense to a charge of committing a lewd and lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 under Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a). He further contends that the court should have stayed the terms for two of the lewd conduct counts under section 654 because he engaged in a course of conduct with the singular intent of sexual gratification. In supplemental briefing, defe

Business and Professions Code section 494.5 requires that a state governmental licensing entity refuse to renew a license and suspend a license if a licensee’s name is included on the Franchise Tax Board’s (FTB) semiannual certified list of the 500 largest tax delinquencies (Top 500 list) unless the licensing entity has received a release from FTB. (§ 494.5, subds. (a), (b)(1), (f)(1).)
Petitioner Timothy A. Kersten’s name appeared on FTB’s certified Top 500 list in October 2013. Kersten failed to obtain a release, and respondent California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) refused to renew his driver’s license, and respondent California Dental Board (Dental Board) suspended his dental license pursuant to section 494.5. Although Kersten’s name did not appear on FTB’s April 2014 Top 500 list or any subsequent list, respondents did not reinstate or renew his licenses because Kersten failed to obtain a release from FTB.
Kersten, in pro. per., filed a petition for writ of

Defendant Thomas James Turner was charged with a series of domestic violence acts against the same victim. A jury found him guilty of a single violation of Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a), and further found that defendant caused great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence (§ 12022,7, subd. (e)). The trial court found three prior strike convictions and section 667, subdivision (a) allegations true, and sentenced defendant to a term of 39 years to life.
In multiple briefs, defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred in denying his Faretta motion to represent himself; (2) the trial court prejudicially abused its discretion by stationing a sheriff’s deputy behind him while he testified at trial; (3) the conviction offense did not qualify him for three strikes and section 667, subdivision (a), sentencing; (4) he should not have been sentenced to two section 667, subdivision (a), enhancements; (5) his prior conviction for a violation of section 417.8, e