CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Edward Gene Wilson appeals from his conviction by a jury of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd (a)(2) ). The jury also found true allegations of personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The jury found defendant not guilty of attempted murder.
Defendant asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct while cross-examining a defense expert and compounded that misconduct in closing argument by assertedly leading the jury to believe defendant had a duty to retreat from his perceived assailant. We affirm.

Plaintiff Felix The sued defendant Justin Mendoza and his mother, Zenaida Mendoza, for breach of contract due to failure to make timely payments on a promissory note and sought reformation of the deed of trust securing the note so that Felix The could foreclose on their property. A default and default judgment were entered, the deed of trust was subsequently assigned to IRA Resources fbo Richard M. Glantz, 35-36506 (“IRA Resources”), and IRA Resources initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings on the property.
Justin Mendoza then successfully moved to set aside the default and default judgment, and filed a cross-complaint naming IRA Resources as a cross-defendant. IRA Resources moved to strike causes of action in the cross-complaint for wrongful foreclosure, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.
The trial court denied the motion,

Juan Chambasis appeals from the trial court’s refusal at resentencing to strike firearm enhancements under Penal Code section 12022.53. Chambasis’s appointed counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We affirm the judgment.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, James Richard Dabney, Judge. Affirmed.
Marilee Marshall, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Rene Judkiewicz, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Christopher Love (defendant) appeals from an order denying his Penal Code section 1170.95 petition to vacate his decades-old murder conviction. We consider whether the trial jury’s true finding on a special circumstance allegation attached to the murder charge establishes he is not entitled to relief as a matter of law.

APPEAL from postjudgment orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Olivia Rosales and Michael A. Cowell, Judges. The appeal from the order denying discovery as untimely is dismissed. The order denying the motion to vacate fines, fees and assessments is affirmed.
Cynthia L. Barnes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Richard Page appeals from postjudgment orders denying a motion for discovery and a motion to vacate fines, fees and assessments imposed at his sentencing in 2010. No arguable issues were identified by Page’s appointed appellate counsel after her review of the record. We also have identified no arguable issues after our own independent review of the record and analysis of the contentions presented by Page in a supplemental brief. We dismiss Page’s appeal from the order denying discovery as untimely and affirm the order denying the motion to vacate fines, fees and assessment

The jury found defendant and appellant Oscar Hernandez guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) [count 1]) and second degree murder of a human fetus (§ 187, subd. (a) [count 2]). With respect to both counts, the jury found true the allegations that Hernandez discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury and death. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) As to count 1, the jury found true the allegation that the murder was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), and the special circumstances that Hernandez committed multiple murders (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and committed the murder in count 1 while he was an active gang member to further the activities of the gang (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)).
At the sentencing hearing, Hernandez admitted to having served four prior prison terms, two of which he served concurrently. The trial court sentenced Hernandez to life without parole in count 1, and a consecutive 15 years to life in count 2, plus 2

Defendant Jeffrey Servantez (defendant) swung a knife at a sidewalk cellphone vendor and a jury convicted him of assault with a deadly weapon. Defendant did not object to the instruction the trial court gave the jury on the elements of assault with a deadly weapon, but he now seeks reversal for instructional error. Specifically, we are asked to decide whether the trial court prejudicially erred in giving the jury an instruction that in theory would allow it to find defendant’s knife was an inherently deadly weapon.

Laura F. (mother) filed the present petition for extraordinary writ challenging the juvenile court’s order terminating her reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to her two youngest children, Camila S. (born in April 2006) and Sofia (born in October 2011). Mother’s sole contention in this petition is that the juvenile court erred in finding she was provided reasonable reunification services by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). We conclude that the juvenile court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, and thus we will deny the petition.

Otto Clifford Marion appeals the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of assault with a deadly weapon, i.e., a box cutter (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and battery (§ 242). The trial court sentenced him to 4 years in state prison, plus 180 days in county jail. Appellant contends (1) the court violated its sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on simple assault (§ 240) as a lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon; and (2) the court abused its discretion in denying probation. We affirm.

In this dependency case, the juvenile court found jurisdiction over the minor, M.J., based upon nine separate counts under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b) and (j), relating to past episodes of domestic violence, J.J.’s (mother’s) substance abuse, mother’s serious mental health concerns, and M.B.’s (father’s) ongoing substance abuse. After mother suffered a disabling psychiatric episode during the proceedings below and was hospitalized, the juvenile court removed the minor from her care and placed the minor in a foster home.

Appellant Milton Mateo was convicted of attempted premeditated murder in July 2014. We affirmed his conviction in February 2016 (see People v. Mateo (Feb. 10, 2016, B258333) [nonpub. opn.]), and appellant sought review in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted review (May 11, 2016, S232674), then remanded the case to this court with instructions to reconsider it in light of changes to the Penal Code enacted with Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) (Senate Bill 1437), which went into effect on January 1, 2019. In July 2019 we again affirmed appellant’s conviction, and held that his request for relief under Penal Code section 1170.95 must be presented to the superior court in the first instance. (See People v. Mateo (July 9, 2019, B258333) [nonpub. opn.] (Mateo II).) Appellant again sought review in the Supreme Court, which was denied.

Malekeh Khosravan appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted the motions for summary judgment filed by defendants Chevron Corporation, Chevron U.S.A. Inc., and Texaco, Inc. (Chevron defendants), and Exxon Mobil Corporation and ExxonMobil Oil Corporation (Exxon defendants). Malekeh and her husband Gholam Khosravan brought claims for negligence, premises liability, and loss of consortium, alleging Khosravan contracted mesothelioma caused by exposure to asbestos while he was an Iranian citizen working for the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) from the late 1950s to 1980 in facilities controlled by defendants. The trial court concluded the Chevron and Exxon defendants did not owe a duty of care to Khosravan.

Defendant Sophia Raquel Vigil pleaded no contest in three consolidated cases to taking or unauthorized use of a vehicle with intent to temporarily deprive the owner of possession with a specified prior (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 666.5, subd. (a)), using personal identifying information without authorization (§ 530.5, subd. (a)), and second degree burglary (§ 460, subd. (b)). Defendant was sentenced to a total term in prison of three years.
On appeal, defendant’s appointed counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) that states the case but raises no issues. We notified defendant of her right to submit written argument on her own behalf within 30 days. That period has elapsed, and we have received no response from defendant.
Pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have reviewed the entire record and determined that there are no arguable issues on appeal. We affirm the judgment.

Appellant Tiffany Sanders appeals the imposition of fines and fees by the trial court in her criminal case without holding a hearing on her ability to pay them. For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Penal Code section 1237.2 bars her claims and therefore dismiss the appeal.