CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Lona Williams cut a woman’s face with a broken glass pipe and stole $50 from her. A jury found defendant guilty of second degree robbery and assault with a deadly weapon, and found that she inflicted great bodily injury. The trial court denied defendant’s Romero motion and sentenced her to an aggregate term of 15 years.

We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, Title 8, Standard 8.1. (See also People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 853–855.)
A jury convicted defendant Jose Rivas of four counts of violating Penal Code section 288, subdivision (c)(1) [lewd act with a child 14 or 15 years old]. The complaining witness was his step-granddaughter. As described by the trial court at sentencing, “Count 1 involved the defendant getting on top of the victim and thrusting his lower body onto the victim’s lower body. [¶] Count 2 involved the defendant grabbing the victim’s hand and placing it onto his penis[.] [¶] Count 3 involved the defendant placing his hand on her vagina and attempting to insert his finger into the victim's vagina[.] [¶] Count 4 involved the defendant lifting the victim’s sports bra … allowing him to place his mouth on the victim’s nipple.” Defendant was sentenced to four years in prison, ordered to pay

Attorney Lyle Middleton claimed that in 1999 he was given a Deed of Trust on a piece of property in order to secure the owner’s obligation to pay his attorney fees. Prior to the owner’s death, the owner placed the property in a trust. In 2017, the trust agreed to sell the property. Attorney Middleton delivered his demand to escrow to collect on the obligation secured by the Deed of Trust. The trust responded by petitioning to have the Deed of Trust declared invalid pursuant to several statutes, one of which was Business and Professions Code section 6148 (section 6148), which requires that, in order for a contract for legal services to be valid certain terms must be in writing. The trial court found that the underlying agreement secured by the Deed of Trust did not comply with section 6148, and extinguished the lien. The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in its application of section 6148 to the facts of this case. We agree with the trial court and affirm.

William Milks appeals from an order denying his motion to vacate entry of a sister-state (Nevada) judgment. He contends the Santa Barbara County Superior Court erred when it denied his motion because the Nevada judgment is void. We affirm.

Instant InfoSystems, Inc. (Instant Info) contracted with Open Text, Inc. (OpenText) to sell and provide technical support for OpenText’s software. OpenText later terminated the contract, which prompted Instant Info to sue and OpenText to counter-sue. A jury found for Instant Info on a cause of action for money had and received. But the jury also found for OpenText on a claim for breach of contract (relating to unpaid invoices) and on one of two causes of action seeking redress for Instant Info’s unauthorized access of OpenText’s databases. That unauthorized access verdict, however, was later overturned by the trial court on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. OpenText asks us to decide whether Instant Info’s common count for money had and received fails as a matter of law, whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict on two claims, and whether a jury instruction and evidentiary rulings concerning the unclean hands doctrine warrant reversal. Instant

Plaintiff employees Annette Elliott and Yolanda Jefferson each asserted a claim against defendant The Regents of the University of California (Regents) for the negligent hiring, training, and supervision of its former employee Kian Lam, after it was discovered that Lam used a hidden camera to record plaintiffs in the office bathroom. The Regents successfully moved for summary judgment in both cases, and judgments were entered in their favor. On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the orders and judgments should be reversed because: (1) Government Code section 815.2 provides a sufficient statutory basis to impose direct liability on the Regents; (2) there was a special relationship with plaintiffs that established a duty of care to support vicarious liability; (3) the trial court erred in its analysis and consideration of evidence on the foreseeability of Lam’s acts; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ request for leave to further amend their complaints. W

Plaintiff employees Annette Elliott and Yolanda Jefferson each asserted a claim against defendant The Regents of the University of California (Regents) for the negligent hiring, training, and supervision of its former employee Kian Lam, after it was discovered that Lam used a hidden camera to record plaintiffs in the office bathroom. The Regents successfully moved for summary judgment in both cases, and judgments were entered in their favor. On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the orders and judgments should be reversed because: (1) Government Code section 815.2 provides a sufficient statutory basis to impose direct liability on the Regents; (2) there was a special relationship with plaintiffs that established a duty of care to support vicarious liability; (3) the trial court erred in its analysis and consideration of evidence on the foreseeability of Lam’s acts; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ request for leave to further amend their complaints. W

Appellants Jonah Kaleikaumaka Namauu and Brandon Aaron Thomas appeal from judgments entered after a jury found them guilty of first degree murder with a special circumstance and other crimes related to a shooting in which Namauu fired a gun from Thomas’s car into another car with two occupants, killing the driver.
Between their two appeals, Namauu and Thomas raise multiple claims of error. Stated broadly, they separately or jointly challenge the trial court’s admission or exclusion of certain evidence, the trial court’s denial of Thomas’s suppression motion, the sufficiency of the evidence regarding their participation in a criminal street gang, and certain aspects of their sentences, including the fines and fees imposed on them.
For Namauu, we vacate his sentence and remand his case to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion whether to strike Namauu’s prior serious felony enhancement. We also direct the trial court to strike Namauu’s prior prison term enhancement

A married couple created a trust to hold and manage their property. After the husband died, the wife married her long-term boyfriend and then developed dementia.
Over the next few years, the second husband arranged for the trust to reimburse him hundreds of thousands of dollars in expenses. The wife’s adult daughter eventually learned of this and filed a petition under Probate Code section 850 (§ 850) to recover real estate and other assets, accusing the second husband of looting her parents’ trust for his own benefit.
The trial court found the second husband had unduly influenced his wife in bad faith and had breached his fiduciary duty to her. It ordered him to transfer title in a house to the trust, to reimburse the trust for $431,097 in unreasonable expenses, and to pay an additional $431,097 in double damages. The second husband appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. D. Brett Bianco, Judge. Dismissed.
Nancy R. Brucker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Before the prison sentence of appellant Charles Gene Littlejohn-Zabel, Jr., was concluded, the Tuolumne County District Attorney (the District Attorney) filed a petition in the trial court to have appellant civilly committed under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq., SVPA). Appellant responded to the petition by filing an answer stating affirmative defenses as one might do in an ordinary civil lawsuit, and additionally, appellant presented a cross-complaint against certain state agencies and officials (collectively the State) for alleged disability discrimination in the provision of mental health services to appellant and other inmates. The District Attorney and the State each interposed demurrers to appellant’s answer and cross-complaint. The trial court sustained one of the main grounds raised for demurrer to the cross-complaint: namely, the cross-complaint was not a permissible pleading in special proceedings under the SVPA. In light of that dete

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Julian C. Recana, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert F. Somers, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and William N. Frank, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

These consolidated appeals concern two competing lawsuits brought in the name of a nonprofit charitable organization, Disability Services Corporation (DSC). The cases arise from a struggle between two rival factions of DSC’s board of directors (board) to control the corporation. In each of the two actions, one rival faction engaged separate counsel to file suit against the other rival faction for malfeasance in the management of DSC’s assets. Neither action is a shareholder derivative suit; in both DSC sues one board or the other in its individual corporate capacity.

These consolidated appeals concern two competing lawsuits brought in the name of a nonprofit charitable organization, Disability Services Corporation (DSC). The cases arise from a struggle between two rival factions of DSC’s board of directors (board) to control the corporation. In each of the two actions, one rival faction engaged separate counsel to file suit against the other rival faction for malfeasance in the management of DSC’s assets. Neither action is a shareholder derivative suit; in both DSC sues one board or the other in its individual corporate capacity.