CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Carlos Reyes (Plaintiff) sued his former employer, Ralph’s Grocery Company (RGC), and its parent company after he was fired for accruing too many points under RGC’s policies on missing work, which generally require employees to provide at least an hour’s notice if they will be absent or late. The primary thrust of Plaintiff’s lawsuit is that he was terminated not because of his noncompliance with the policies but because of his disability (asthma) and his age. The trial court granted summary judgment for RGC and its parent company (collectively, Defendants). We consider whether Plaintiff raised an issue of material fact requiring trial as to four of his causes of action: disability discrimination, age discrimination, failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, and failure to engage in the interactive process to determine a reasonable disability accommodation.

Plaintiff Carlos Reyes (Plaintiff) sued his former employer, Ralph’s Grocery Company (RGC), and its parent company after he was fired for accruing too many points under RGC’s policies on missing work, which generally require employees to provide at least an hour’s notice if they will be absent or late. The primary thrust of Plaintiff’s lawsuit is that he was terminated not because of his noncompliance with the policies but because of his disability (asthma) and his age. The trial court granted summary judgment for RGC and its parent company (collectively, Defendants). We consider whether Plaintiff raised an issue of material fact requiring trial as to four of his causes of action: disability discrimination, age discrimination, failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, and failure to engage in the interactive process to determine a reasonable disability accommodation.

Plaintiff Carlos Reyes (Plaintiff) sued his former employer, Ralph’s Grocery Company (RGC), and its parent company after he was fired for accruing too many points under RGC’s policies on missing work, which generally require employees to provide at least an hour’s notice if they will be absent or late. The primary thrust of Plaintiff’s lawsuit is that he was terminated not because of his noncompliance with the policies but because of his disability (asthma) and his age. The trial court granted summary judgment for RGC and its parent company (collectively, Defendants). We consider whether Plaintiff raised an issue of material fact requiring trial as to four of his causes of action: disability discrimination, age discrimination, failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, and failure to engage in the interactive process to determine a reasonable disability accommodation.

This case involves the sentences imposed on seven criminal cases involving crimes defendant Joshua Tannenbaum committed in five counties: Yolo, Butte, Shasta, San Joaquin, and Glenn. The Yolo County Superior Court was the final sentencing court. After adjudication of the other cases, the Yolo County Superior Court resentenced defendant Joshua Tannenbaum. In that resentencing, the court corrected an earlier sentencing error it had made, and imposed consecutive sentences on the other convictions as well as the Yolo County matter, for an aggregate term of nine years.
On appeal, defendant contends the Yolo County Superior Court erred in imposing consecutive sentences because, by operation of law, the Glenn County Superior Court’s silence on the matter made all the previously imposed terms from Butte, Shasta and San Joaquin counties concurrent and a subsequent sentencing court could not alter a previous court’s discretionary sentencing choices. Alternatively, defendant contends the Yolo

Plaintiffs Cecil W. Dillon and Kenneth Kirsten sued their former partner, defendant William G. Karr, for contribution to the repayment of a loan the three of them had entered into while in business together. The trial court ruled for plaintiffs, ordering defendant to pay his one-third share with interest.
Defendant challenges that ruling on appeal. He maintains that his obligation to contribute should have been excused because funds from the loan were not used as required and he was never provided an accounting.
We affirm the judgment.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Kim Nguyen, Judge. Reversed.
Karen J. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellants.
Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Richard S. Kemalyan, Judge. Affirmed.
A.William Bartz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen and David W. Williams, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Appellant Francisco Martinez appeals from his conviction for robbery. He contends the court erred by denying his request to sanitize his prior robbery conviction to omit the fact that it was the same crime as the charged offense. He also argues that there was insufficient evidence to support giving a jury instruction on flight. We affirm.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court for Los Angeles County, Sergio C. Tapia, II, Judge. Affirmed.
Adrian K. Panton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Toni R. Johns Estaville and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In a prior appeal, defendant Edwin Phillips appealed from his conviction of one count of indecent exposure with a prior. (Pen. Code, § 314, subd. (1).) We conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to conduct a mental health diversion eligibility hearing under section 1001.36. We directed that if the court found that the statutory criteria were met, it could grant diversion and, if defendant successfully completed diversion, the court must dismiss the charges; but if the court found the statutory criteria were

APPEAL from orders and a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Lia Martin, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Wyatt Law and Andrew M. Wyatt for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Hurrell Cantrall, Thomas C. Hurrell, Melinda Cantrall; and Anthony J. Bejarano, Assistant General Counsel, Los Angeles Unified School District, for Defendant and Respondent.
Junnie Verceles appeals the order granting the Los Angeles Unified School District’s special motion to strike his complaint for discrimination and retaliation in violation of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.). Verceles contends the trial court erred in finding his causes of action arose from protected activity within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e), and he had failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits of his claims. Verceles also appeals the court’s award of attorney fees to the District. We reverse.

Christine Ellen Chalquest appeals from the judgment after a jury convicted her of driving under the influence of alcohol with a qualifying prior conviction (Veh. Code, §§ 23550.5, subd. (a), 23152, subd. (a); count 1), a felony, and driving with a blood alcohol content over 0.08% with a qualifying prior conviction (§§ 23550.5, subd. (a), 23152, subd. (b); count 2), a felony. Chalquest admitted she had a prior conviction for driving under the influence and causing bodily injury (§ 23153, subd. (a)). The trial court placed her on probation for five years with terms, including one year in county jail.
Chalquest contends the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence her statements obtained in violation of Miranda. We affirm.

Ramin Peyman appeals from an order denying his request for a modification of his obligations for child and spousal support to zero. Ramin filed the request 10 days after the family court ordered Ramin to pay $6,027 in monthly child support and $4,500 in monthly spousal support following a six-day postjudgment hearing. On appeal, Ramin contends the family court abused its discretion in denying the requested modification because he had not been receiving any pay from his law firm since September 2018 (before the hearing), and Ramin’s law partner obtained a temporary restraining order (after the hearing but before the support order) preventing Ramin from drawing income from his law practice. Ramin argues his deteriorating financial condition constituted a material change in circumstances warranting modification of his support obligations. Because most of Ramin’s argued changed circumstances occurred before the family court issued its statement of decision setting Ramin’s support obl

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Gregory Keosian, Judge. Affirmed.
Christopher Norgaard, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Herzlich & Blum, Allan Herzlich and Jerome J. Blum for Plaintiff and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Joan P. Weber, Judge. Affirmed.
Russell S. Babcock, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2007, defendant Tommy Lee was convicted of second degree murder. On July 2, 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. On July 13, 2020, the court summarily denied the petition and defendant appealed. Unable to identify any arguable issues, appellate counsel has sought independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders). Affirmed.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Robert C. Longstreth, Judge. Affirmed.
Armando T. Anguiano, in pro per; Arizmendi Law Firm and Ruben F. Arizmendi, for Defendant and Appellant.
William J. Freed, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Armando T. Anguiano challenges a judgment granting a petition filed by his ex-wife, Rosa Anguiano, to remove him as co-trustee of their family trust, appoint Rosa as sole trustee, terminate the trust, and distribute its assets to her. Armando raises several claims of error. As explained below we reject Armando’s arguments and affirm the judgment.