CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Leandro Sorice sued his former attorneys, claiming they collected an excessive fee from the proceeds of a settlement. Defendants moved to compel arbitration of the fee dispute, but the trial court denied the motion, concluding that the fee agreement containing the arbitration clause was voidable at plaintiff’s option under Business and Professions Code section 6148.

Plaintiff Harmik Serbrakian appeals from an adverse judgment on his wage and hour claims against defendant Mostafa M. Talebi, raising numerous challenges based largely on his conflicting views of the trial evidence. We affirm.

Herbert Charles Miller appeals from the superior court’s order denying his petition under Penal Code section 1170.95. That statute allows certain defendants convicted of murder under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition the court to vacate their convictions and for resentencing. Here, the trial court properly determined Miller is not eligible for resentencing as a matter of law because the jury found true a multiple-murder special circumstance allegation within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3).

Peng Chen and Xueling Li appeal the trial court’s ruling vacating the default judgment and setting aside the default they had obtained against Shao Fa Chiu in litigation arising from a business transaction. We affirm the judgment.

Jesus S. (Minor) appeals an order imposing conditions of juvenile probation after he admitted carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle. His counsel has filed an opening brief raising no issues and asking this court for an independent review of the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Minor has been apprised of his right personally to file a supplemental brief, but he has not done so.

Defendant Joshua Lee Perry was charged with murder (Pen. Code, § 187), with enhancing allegations of prior serious or violent felony convictions (§ 1170, subds. (h)(3)(A), (f)), a prior “three strikes” conviction (§§ 667, 1170.12), probation ineligibility due to prior felony convictions (§ 1203, subd. (e)(4)), and that the charged offense was committed while released on bail. (§ 12022.1)

In this marital dissolution action, Fatima Syed appeals from a choice of law order made during trial on several reserved issues, including spousal and child support and property division. We conclude the order is not appealable and dismiss the appeal.

Defendant Spark Public Relations, LLC (Spark) acquired plaintiff Aaron Mann’s company, SocialArc, Inc. (SocialArc) and entered into an employment agreement with Mann. During the acquisition process, SocialArc executed a loan agreement with Spark, for which Mann signed a personal guaranty. Spark subsequently concluded Mann failed to meet certain performance metrics and terminated his employment. In response, Mann sued Spark and its chief executive officer, defendant Alan Soucy, alleging various claims related to his employment agreement. Spark and Soucy filed a cross-complaint against Mann, alleging breach of the personal guaranty and fraud.

Appellant M.J. (the minor) was placed on probation after he admitted allegations of misdemeanor sexual battery (Pen. Code, § 243.4, subd. (e)(1)) and misdemeanor battery against a person with whom the minor is in a dating relationship (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)). On appeal, he challenges three probation conditions on constitutional grounds. He also contends that his defense counsel was prejudicially deficient for failing to object to the probation conditions at the time of their imposition. We conclude that remand is required for two of the probation conditions, as one is an impermissible delegation of judicial authority and the other one is unclear because the written order conflicts with the juvenile court’s oral pronouncement. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions.

This dependency case arose out of what may have been a miscommunication, or maybe it was an outright lie. David P., father of then 12 year old Henry P., accused his wife, Jane W., of domestic violence, apparently because he did not want her to leave him and take their son with her. Jane was arrested as a result of David’s accusation. After her release from custody, she obtained a restraining order against him. David responded by seeking his own restraining order because he wanted to “delay the process.”

This dependency case arose out of what may have been a miscommunication, or maybe it was an outright lie. David P., father of then 12 year old Henry P., accused his wife, Jane W., of domestic violence, apparently because he did not want her to leave him and take their son with her. Jane was arrested as a result of David’s accusation. After her release from custody, she obtained a restraining order against him. David responded by seeking his own restraining order because he wanted to “delay the process.”

Appellant was convicted in 2009 of attempted murder. He had fired several shots at a person who had been arguing with his nephew, Marino Cuica. The shots missed Marino’s antagonist but struck and injured a teenage girl who was in the area.
The court sentenced appellant to the low term plus the 20-year enhancement for the firearms enhancement that had been found true. We affirmed the convictions in 2011.

While walking on a public sidewalk in a residential neighborhood in the City of Cypress (City), Marie Chandler tripped on a crack and fell. As a result of her fall, Chandler suffered significant injuries. She thereafter filed a complaint against the City, asserting a single cause of action for dangerous condition of public property under Government Code section 835. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City. After independently reviewing the record, we affirm. As explained below, the defect in the sidewalk was trivial as a matter of law; the City also made a prima facie showing it had no notice of the crack in the sidewalk.

Ryan Patrick Natividad appeals from a postjudgment order after the trial court ordered him to pay over $75,000 in restitution. Natividad argues the trial court abused its discretion by ordering he pay restitution. We disagree and affirm the postjudgment order.