CA Unpub Decisions

After Fresno police received a tip that defendant was carrying a weapon, Detective Ger Vang and Officer Scott Gray were dispatched to a local apartment complex. They approached defendant in the carport of the complex and asked for permission to search his vehicle, which he ultimately gave. Detective Vang found a box of .40 caliber ammunition on the rear passenger seat. The officers arrested defendant for possession of ammunition by a felon. The officers then searched defendant and found a gun in the backpack he was wearing.
Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition. (Pen. Code, §§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), 30305, subd. (a)(1).) The district attorney also alleged defendant had two prior strike convictions, assault with a deadly weapon and second degree murder, both based on convictions in North Carolina.

“[A]n action that originally was based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events. A reversal would be without practical effect, and the appeal will therefore be dismissed.” (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2021) Appeal, § 777, p. 797.) “ ‘ “[T]he critical factor in considering whether [an] appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error.” (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60.)’ ” (Sturgell v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 35, 43–44, quoting In re David B. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 633, 644.)
The one-year conservatorship initiated by the order at issue in this appeal expired on January 8, 2022. On May 10, 2022, the court granted the public guardian’s petition for reappointment as conservator, effective January 9, 2022.

Erick Dasean McDaniel appeals from the trial court’s postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. McDaniel argues, and the People concede, that the merits of his petition must be reconsidered under recent ameliorative changes to section 1170.95. We agree and reverse, remanding to the trial court for further proceedings.
In 2011, McDaniel was charged with one count of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). Firearm use enhancements were also alleged. Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, he pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)), admitted an allegation that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. Almost nine years later, after section 1170.95 was enacted, he filed a petition for resentencing, asserting that he pled no contest to manslaughter in lieu of proceeding to trial on a murder charge that could be prosecuted under a felony murder theory.

On November 5, 2019, Fauolo was convicted by a jury of assault with a semi-automatic firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b)) (count 2) and being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29820, subd. (b)) (count 6). The jury also found true enhancements as to count 2: the personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and personal infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The trial court also found true the allegation that Fauolo had a prior serious or violent felony conviction. (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(j), 1170.12.)
On August 12, 2020, the court sentenced Fauolo to a total term of 24 years in state prison, calculated as follows: the middle term of six years on count 2, doubled pursuant to section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1), plus the middle term of four years for the firearm enhancement, a three-year term for the great bodily injury enhancement, and a five-year term for the prior serious felony enhancement.

On May 12, 2020, Westbrook, as a self-represented litigant, filed a complaint against Chen. The claims arose out of a dispute between Chen and Westbrook Group Inc., dba Westbrook Realty (WBREA). In December 2018, Chen entered into an independent contractor agreement with WBREA (hereafter, the IC Agreement). In or about February 2019, Chen began working with clients, the Shivarudrappas (the Client), and a transaction involving the Client closed in December 2019. Thereafter, WBREA and Chen had a dispute concerning commissions on that transaction. Westbrook alleged that the dispute was resolved on or about January 17, 2020, through the execution of a document identified in the complaint as a “Settlement Agreement.” That document, the “Settlement Agreement,” was a check attached to the complaint dated January 17, 2020, from WBREA to Chen in the amount of $6,050.00.

E.M. was taken into protective custody shortly after her birth in February 2020, based on J.M.’s history of substance abuse and extensive criminal history related to substance abuse, her prior dependency experience in which she did not reunify with E.M.’s half siblings, and concerns about her mental health and ability to provide E.M. with a safe and stable home. When the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) first contacted J.M. at the hospital following E.M.’s birth, J.M. claimed to be residing temporarily at Grandma’s House of Hope Transitional Housing Program (Grandma’s House), and acknowledged she had a history of homelessness.
J.M. also acknowledged her history of substance abuse, stating her “substance of choice is methamphetamine.” She claimed she had last used methamphetamine in September 2019, before knowing she was pregnant. She stated that prior to her relapse in September 2019, she had been sober for approximately seven years.

E.M. was taken into protective custody shortly after her birth in February 2020, based on J.M.’s history of substance abuse and extensive criminal history related to substance abuse, her prior dependency experience in which she did not reunify with E.M.’s half siblings, and concerns about her mental health and ability to provide E.M. with a safe and stable home. When the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) first contacted J.M. at the hospital following E.M.’s birth, J.M. claimed to be residing temporarily at Grandma’s House of Hope Transitional Housing Program (Grandma’s House), and acknowledged she had a history of homelessness.
J.M. also acknowledged her history of substance abuse, stating her “substance of choice is methamphetamine.” She claimed she had last used methamphetamine in September 2019, before knowing she was pregnant. She stated that prior to her relapse in September 2019, she had been sober for approximately seven years.

In 2006, Robinson “first took up residence” in a mobilehome located on a particular space within The Groves. The Robinson real property was assessed to have a base year value of $348,000 that year.
Several years later, in September 2012, Robinson filed with the Board a verified assessment appeal application under section 1603 to contest the Robinson real property assessment and the coach assessment (the application). The application asserted the Robinson real property had suffered a decline in value, the property’s then base year value was incorrect, and the assessor had used an incorrect methodology of determining the base year value of the property. The principal issue before the Board was the determination of the fair market value of the property, including both the Robinson real property and improvements, as of January 1, 2012.

In 1986, Fisher “first took up residence” in a mobilehome located on a particular space within The Groves through her purchase of her mobilehome for the price of $80,000. At the time, The Groves was not a resident-owned mobilehome park, so Fisher did not have a taxable land interest and instead paid rent for the use of the space upon which the coach was located, as well as the use of the community land and facilities within The Groves. After The Groves converted to a resident-owned mobilehome park, in 2006, Fisher purchased a share in The Groves corporation for $84,000. The County’s assessor “did not recognize the share price as representing the value of the land, and established a base year value of $290,000.”
Several years later, in September 2011, Fisher filed with the Board a verified application for assessment reduction under section 1603 to contest the Fisher real property assessment (the application).

This case is comprised of crimes committed on two different days and involved two trials. An information charged Castellanos with aggravated assault of David Rodriguez with a deadly weapon (vehicle) on August 7, 2011. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count 3.) The information also charged Castellanos with the August 13, 2011, special circumstance gang murder of Tyler Sanchez (§§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(22); count 1) and attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder of Mauricio Marin (§§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a); count 2). The information alleged personal discharge of a firearm causing death and/or great bodily injury enhancements
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) as to counts 1 and 2, as well as a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) with respect to counts 2 and 3. It also alleged Castellano had a prior serious and violent felony conviction under sections 667, subdivisions (a), (d), and (e)(1), and 1170.12, subdivisions (b) and (c)(1).

Mother had four children—Sophia C., Jo.A., C.A., and J.A. Sophia, Jo.A, and C.A. have different fathers and were removed from mother’s custody in prior dependency proceedings due to her untreated mental health problems. Sophia’s father had sole legal and physical custody of her, and maternal uncle Jaime D. had legal guardianship of Jo.A. and C.A. J.A. is the only child who is part of this appeal.
On April 30, 2021, the department filed a petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), on behalf of J.A. alleging he was at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness due to mother’s substance abuse and mental health problems and because his half siblings had been abused or neglected. The Indian Child Inquiry Attachment form (ICWA-010(A)) indicated mother had been asked about J.A.’s Indian status and she gave no reason to believe J.A. was or could be an Indian child. Father’s whereabouts were unknown and he had not been asked about Indian ancestry

In April 2021, the child was taken into protective custody, shortly after her birth, as a result of mother’s untreated mental health issues and prior stabbing of her infant child in 2011. The department filed a petition alleging the child was at substantial risk of suffering nonaccidental and serious physical harm under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j). Mother was interviewed by a department social worker regarding potential Indian ancestry prior to the detention hearing, and mother informed the worker that she had Indian ancestry with an unknown tribe. The whereabouts of the child’s alleged father, Michael C., were not known to mother.
None of mother’s living children were in her custody as two siblings were adopted by her cousin, B.W., as a result of dependency proceedings that initiated from the May 2011 stabbing of one of the siblings by mother.

Petitioner Paul Andrew Guice petitioned the trial court pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 for resentencing on his conviction for first degree murder. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the petition on the ground petitioner was the actual killer and therefore ineligible for relief.
On appeal, petitioner contends the trial court violated his statutory and constitutional right to be present at the section 1170.95 evidentiary hearing and his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance when he conceded, at the hearing, that petitioner was ineligible for resentencing. The People argue petitioner forfeited his contentions regarding his right to be present and, in any event, his contentions lack merit and his absence was harmless. The People additionally contend petitioner failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.

Petitioner Paul Andrew Guice petitioned the trial court pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 for resentencing on his conviction for first degree murder. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the petition on the ground petitioner was the actual killer and therefore ineligible for relief.
On appeal, petitioner contends the trial court violated his statutory and constitutional right to be present at the section 1170.95 evidentiary hearing and his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance when he conceded, at the hearing, that petitioner was ineligible for resentencing. The People argue petitioner forfeited his contentions regarding his right to be present and, in any event, his contentions lack merit and his absence was harmless. The People additionally contend petitioner failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.