CA Unpub Decisions

Anthony L. Johnson, a self-represented inmate in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend. As explained below, defendant Ralph Diaz, the Secretary of CDCR, is immune from liability for the injuries suffered by Johnson during an assault by another inmate. (See Gov. Code, §§ 820.2, 820.8, 844.6, subd. (a).) As a result of this immunity, the demurrer was properly sustained without leave to amend and we need not address whether Johnson properly complied with the claim presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act. (§ 810 et seq.)

R.G. appeals from an order adjudging him a developmentally disabled person who is a danger to himself and/or others and committing him to the custody of the State Department of Development Services. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6500.) He contends that the trial court’s conclusion violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because there was insufficient evidence for the court to have concluded that a causal relationship existed between his developmental disability and his dangerousness. Kern Regional Center has not responded. We affirm.

This is defendant Jesse Bryan Behill’s second appeal from a judgment. In his first appeal, we held he was entitled on remand to a hearing for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike firearm enhancements pursuant to recently enacted Senate Bill No. 620 (Senate Bill 620), effective January 1, 2018. (People v. Behill (Sept. 5, 2018, F074635) [nonpub. opn.].) Defendant now appeals from that hearing and argues the matter must be remanded again, this time to allow the trial court to strike his one-year prior prison term enhancement pursuant to Senate Bill No. 136 (Senate Bill 136), which became effective on January 1, 2020, during the present appeal The People contend defendant is not entitled to the benefit of Senate Bill 136 because the judgment of his conviction was final in 2018, before Senate Bill 136 took effect.

Three individuals worked under defendant, a crew leader for a farm labor contractor, in March 2016. Defendant paid the security deposit and first month’s rent for an apartment, and thereafter a house, for them to live in with several others. In exchange, the victims agreed to work for defendant’s crew through the end of the work “season.” The victims gave up their visas as a condition of the loan.

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on March 11, 2021, be modified

The juvenile court denied petitioner C.T. (mother) reunification services as to A.T. (minor) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) (reunification services terminated as to minor’s siblings) and (b)(11) (parental rights terminated as to minor’s sibling), and set the section 366.26 hearing. On petition for extraordinary writ, mother contends insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s application of the bypass provisions of section 361, subdivision (b)(10) and (b)(11). The petition is denied.

California has a relatively new process for families that seek to provide foster care for juvenile dependents; those deemed eligible under this process are called “resource families.” (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 16519.5, subds. (a), (c)(1); Legis. Counsel’s Dig. § 1, Assem. Bill No. 1997 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2016, ch. 612 [noting statewide implementation beginning in 2017]; all undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.)

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Harold T. Wilson, Jr., Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part with directions.
Michael Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Paige B. Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

A jury convicted, defendant and appellant, Brandon Dehaven of conspiring with his girlfriend, Candace Martinez, to steal lottery tickets from a convenience store where Candace was employed.

Defendant and appellant, Isaiah Davilon Lee Howard, filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4), which the trial court dismissed. Defendant contends the court erred in dismissing his petition on the grounds that section 1170.95 does not apply to those convicted of attempted murder. We affirm.

In 2019, we affirmed a judgment excusing the San Bernardino County Counsel’s office from the duty to prepare ballot titles and summaries for six initiatives proposed by Gage Bruce and David Gates. (Gates v. Blakemore (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 32, 34, 40 (Gates).) While that appeal was pending, Mr. Bruce submitted notices of intent to circulate for signatures four new initiatives (Nos. 9, 10, 11, & 12) to the San Bernardino County Registrar of Voters. In response, the county counsel’s office initiated this action for declaratory relief

Defendant and appellant Erik Michael Cordova fathered nine children with two women. For many years, he molested four of his six daughters. On May 6, 2019, a jury convicted him of 15 counts of lewd acts on a child under 14 years old (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) and six counts of forcible lewd acts on a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1)). The jury also found that defendant committed these offenses against more than one victim. (Pen. Code, § 667.61, subd. (e)(4), Stats. 2018, ch. 423, § 68, eff. Jan. 1, 2019, former § 667.61, subd. (e)(5).) He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 315 years to life.

The petition for rehearing filed by appellant on March 30, 2021, is denied. The opinion filed in this matter on Mar

A jury convicted defendant and appellant, Colin Lamont Brown, of committing two counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288 subd. (a); counts 1 & 2), three counts of forcible oral copulation of a child under the age of 14 (§§ 288a, 269, subd. (a)(4); counts 3-6), four counts of forcible sexual penetration of a child under the age of 14 (§§ 269, subd. (a)(5), 289, subd. (a); counts 7-10), and 10 counts of forcible lewd and lascivious acts upon a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 11-20). The trial court sentenced defendant to 320 years, consisting of consecutive terms of 25 years to life on counts 1 and 2, and consecutive terms of 15 years to life on counts 3 through 20.