CA Unpub Decisions

In October 2004, a jury convicted defendant Darrell James Tittle of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192) among other offenses. In January 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. On August 3, 2020, the court denied the petition, finding defendant was statutorily ineligible because he had not been convicted of murder. Defendant appealed. Unable to identify any arguable issues, appellate counsel has sought independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders). Affirmed.

After being arrested for driving under the influence and driving with a blood alcohol content of .08 percent or more (Veh. Code, § 23152, subds. (a), (b)), James C. Fail filed a petition for writ of mandate in the trial court seeking to overturn the suspension of his driver’s license by the Department of Motor Vehicles (Department). The trial court denied the petition, ruling that the Department properly suspended Fail’s driver’s license pursuant to the administrative per se law (§ 13353.2 et seq.). On appeal, Fail claims that there is “no substantial, competent evidence to support the necessary facts for a suspension.” (Boldface & capitalization omitted.) We affirm the judgment.

Appellant Kenneth Donald Green was tried before a jury and convicted of assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury and simple assault. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4), 240.) Imposition of sentence was suspended, and he was placed on felony probation for three years. He contends that a recent amendment to the law setting the probationary period at two years for most felonies must be applied to his case. He also contends a probation condition requiring him to participate in treatment if required to do so by the probation department improperly delegated judicial authority to the probation officer and was unconstitutionally vague. We conclude the case must be remanded.

Defendant Daniel Jordanallen Lynch timely appeals his judgment of conviction, arguing that the trial court’s imposition of certain fines and fees without a determination of his ability to pay them violates People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas), the Eighth Amendment, and equal protection. We conclude that defendant has forfeited these claims by failing to assert his inability to pay in the trial court. We further find that defendant has not established that his counsel was ineffective in failing to raise this argument. Accordingly, we affirm.

Defendant Frank Camacho and codefendants Joshua Parrish and Adam Villa were convicted of attempted murder, attempted robbery, and related firearm crimes. On appeal, defendant argues his conviction for attempted murder must be reversed in the wake of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) (Senate Bill 1437). We disagree.

This case arises out of a set of complex commercial real estate loans totaling $4.6 million that were made by Wells Fargo, National Association (Wells Fargo), to Frederick J. Simon, as trustee of the Frederick J. Simon Revocable Trust (Simon), to provide partial funding for the purchase of a shopping center in Placerville, California. The initial two commercial agreements were made in January 2007 and shared a 6.4 percent fixed interest rate. In March 2007, Wells Fargo offered Simon a better interest rate if the parties entered into “swap transactions” that had the net effect of converting Simon’s interest obligations into a rate of 1.03 percent above LIBOR. Because LIBOR was 5.25 percent at the time, the cumulative product of the loan agreements was a 6.28 percent fixed interest rate.

Milton Ricardo Jones, convicted of second degree murder in 2009 with a true finding he had personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death, appeals from a postjudgment order denying his motions for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95, to dismiss the firearm enhancement imposed pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (d), in light of Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2017, ch. 682, § 2) (Senate Bill 620), effective January 1, 2018, and for release from prison because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Geovanny Villela appeals the superior court’s order revoking his probation and sentencing him to two years in state prison for second degree robbery after finding he had violated the conditions of his probation by being in possession of a loaded firearm. No arguable issues have been identified following review of the record by Villela’s appointed appellate counsel or our own independent review. We affirm.

After declaring dependency jurisdiction in 2017, the juvenile court gave appellant Jason M. (Father) custody of his young children, despite his history of drug abuse. Supplemental petitions were sustained when Father continuously disobeyed orders to undergo drug testing. After years of noncompliance, the court removed the children from Father’s custody in 2020. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 387.) We conclude that substantial evidence supports the removal order and affirm.

Christopher Alvarado appeals the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of multiple sex crimes involving a young child. No arguable issues have been identified following review of the record by Alvarado’s appointed appellate counsel or our own independent review. We affirm.

Cindy Nash sued her landlords, Pauline and Joseph Romano (the Romanos), after she broke her ankle stepping on a paver in the backyard. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the Romanos. On appeal, Nash contends the court gave an erroneous jury instruction, the evidence compelled a verdict in her favor, and the Romanos’ counsel engaged in misconduct. She also contends the court erroneously awarded the Romanos expert fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 998. We decline to consider Nash’s challenge to the expert fees because she did not file a notice of appeal of the award. Nash’s remaining arguments are either forfeited or lack merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Justin Salmen appeals the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1.) The trial court sentenced appellant to a total term of 62 years to life in prison. The sentence consisted of 25 years to life on count 1, doubled to 50 years to life for a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)), plus one year for the personal use of a knife (§ 12022.5, subd. (b)), five years for a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and one year each for six prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

Jose Diaz appeals from the superior court’s order denying his motion to replace appointed counsel prior to the commencement of a postjudgment hearing being held pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin). No arguable issues were identified by Diaz’s appointed appellate counsel after her review of the record. We also have identified no arguable issues after our own independent review of the record and analysis of the contentions presented by Diaz in his handwritten supplemental brief. We affirm.

This is an appeal from an order denying a petition to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the petition on the ground that petitioner waived any right it may have had to arbitrate. We affirm.