CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Norbert Aguirre was accused of slashing a man’s face. At trial, Aguirre claimed he “is not the one that did it.” The jury disagreed and convicted him of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1), (4).) He was sentenced to 16 years in prison.

Bad Boys Bail Bonds, acting as the agent for The North River Insurance Company (collectively, North River), posted a bail bond to secure the release of a criminal defendant. When the defendant failed to appear at a bench warrant hearing, a superior court judge in the Metropolitan Courthouse ordered the bond forfeited. A different superior court judge in the Clara Shortridge Foltz Criminal Justice Center subsequently entered summary judgment against North River on the bond. A third superior court judge denied North River’s motion to set aside the summary judgment.

Senate Bill No. 1437 amended the mens rea requirements for murder and “restricted the circumstances under which a person can be liable for murder under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.)” (People v. Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241, 246 (Lamoureux).) As a result, the mens rea required for a murder conviction, malice aforethought, “shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2 [amending Pen. Code, § 188].)

Defendant Joseph Jermane Smith appeals after a jury convicted him of committing a lewd act on a child under the age of 14 by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear (count 1; Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1) ) and an aggravated sexual assault on a child under the age of 14 and 10 or more years younger than himself (count 2; § 269). The trial court imposed an indeterminate prison term of 15 years to life for count 2 and stayed the term for count 1 pursuant to section 654.

Li loaned money to Wang to purchase a home in the San Francisco Bay Area. Wang failed to record a security interest in the home in favor of Li, sold the home during the pendency of this litigation, and transferred proceeds from the sale to foreign bank accounts. The trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff Lanlan Fei (the assignee of Li’s interest in the loan) for breach of contract, fraudulent conveyance, and unjust enrichment against Wang, Wang’s wife (Bin He), and a company formed by the couple. Plaintiff was awarded $2,870,050 in damages, plus pre- and post-judgment interest. Defendants challenge the judgment as to fraudulent conveyance and damages for unjust enrichment. Wang also challenges the rejection of his cross-claim for breach of contract. For the reasons stated here, we will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Larry Weldon Burns pled no contest to offenses in Tulare County Superior Court case Nos. VCM341757 and VCF352578 on the same date. The trial court inadvertently sentenced defendant twice on case No. VCM341757 to slightly different terms of probation. On appeal, he contends that (1) the second sentence was void and (2) the minute order regarding his sentence incorrectly reflects the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment. The People agree, as do we. We strike the sentence pronounced on September 19, 2019, in case No. VCM341757 and direct the trial court to prepare a minute order reflecting the correct sentence as orally pronounced on August 2, 2018. As modified, we affirm.

In this child custody dispute, the child’s mother, S.B., appeals from an order of the trial court granting sole legal and sole physical custody of the child to W.B., the child’s father. The order also granted to S.B. visitation and/or parenting time with her child on two weekends per month. S.B. claims the trial court abused its discretion because there was no showing of changed circumstances to permit the court to modify the parties’ preexisting joint custody arrangement. However, fatal to S.B.’s appeal is the fact that she has failed to provide this court with an adequate record from which to meaningfully evaluate the merits of her claim of error. In view of this basic failure, S.B.’s burden as the appellant remains unmet and the presumption that the order of the trial court is correct prevails. Accordingly, while we provide some guidance to the parties with respect to future modification requests, the order of the trial court is hereby affirmed.

In this dissolution action, the trial court found the premarital agreement (PMA) signed by Yanina Adler and Mark Adler (together, the parties) was enforceable. Yanina appeals from the subsequent bench trial on reserved issues arguing that the trial court erred in determining her claims for: (1) reimbursement of income tax payments; (2) recalculation of the benefits paid at the termination of a defined benefit pension plan that the parties created for themselves; and (3) reimbursement of the salary she earned at the parties’ corporation.

Defendant Christopher Lee Newell appeals the trial court’s judgment sentencing him to an aggregate prison term of 14 years arising from three separate criminal cases. Relying upon People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas), defendant argues the trial court violated his right to due process under both the federal and state constitutions. He reasons there is no evidence in the record supporting the trial court’s determination that he would be able to pay the two $300 restitution fines (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b)) imposed, and thus, these fines are unconstitutional under Dueñas. We disagree with Dueñas and will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Alex Jonathan Braganza pleaded guilty to possessing less than an ounce of cannabis in 2011 while in prison, in violation of Penal Code section 4573.6. In 2017 voters passed Proposition 64, decriminalizing adult possession of less than an ounce of cannabis in most situations. Defendant filed a petition in superior court requesting dismissal of his conviction under Proposition 64, which the trial court denied. On appeal, defendant argues Proposition 64’s reach includes decriminalization of cannabis possession in prison. We will affirm.

A jury convicted defendant David Homan of one count of making a criminal threat and the trial court found defendant had sustained a prior serious felony conviction.
Defendant contends (1) reversal of his criminal threat conviction is required because there was insufficient evidence that the victim, a security guard, experienced sustained fear; (2) the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on attempted criminal threats as a lesser included offense to criminal threats; and (3) if this court concludes defendant waived the instructional error claim, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by objecting to the lesser included offense instruction. We affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant David Homan of one count of making a criminal threat and the trial court found defendant had sustained a prior serious felony conviction.
Defendant contends (1) reversal of his criminal threat conviction is required because there was insufficient evidence that the victim, a security guard, experienced sustained fear; (2) the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on attempted criminal threats as a lesser included offense to criminal threats; and (3) if this court concludes defendant waived the instructional error claim, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by objecting to the lesser included offense instruction. We affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant Alphonze Fitzhugh and codefendant Robert Antonio Barnes guilty of first degree murder, attempted murder, and attempted robbery. The jury found true the special circumstance that the murder was committed during the commission of or attempted commission of a robbery under Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(A). The trial court sentenced defendant to nine years plus life without the possibility of parole, and we affirmed his convictions on appeal.

Defendant Preston Gray was convicted by jury of dissuading a witness and acquitted of pimping and pandering. The witness he dissuaded was his girlfriend, M., the person he was alleged to have encouraged to become a prostitute and from whose acts of prostitution he allegedly derived support. The dissuasion occurred in a phone call made from the jail while defendant awaited trial. In the call, defendant told M., “the only way I could beat this case is if you don’t show up” and “don’t show up at none of the court dates . . . disappear on their ass.” Defendant was sentenced to serve three years in state prison.