CA Unpub Decisions

Nine-year old Christina H. challenges the juvenile court’s order removing her from the physical custody of her mother at the disposition hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 358, 361.) Claudia R. (mother) joins in Christina’s argument. We affirm.

C.S., mother of A.V. and his four older half siblings, appeals from a judgment terminating her parental rights to her youngest child, A.V., on the ground the minor’s attorney had an actual conflict of interest because he represented all five siblings. In addition, mother argues that the older half siblings did not receive notice of the permanent plan hearing relating to A.V., which deprived them of their right to participate in the permanency planning hearing. We affirm.

Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel, and Jodi L. Doucette, Special Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A.G. (mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, J.M. (the child). Mother argues the juvenile court erred by not applying the beneficial parent/child relationship exception to the termination of her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); all additional statutory references are to the Welf. & Inst. Code.) We find no error and affirm the order.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant William Clyde Richardson, Jr., of one count of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 1); one count of possession of ammunition by a felon (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a); count 2); and one count of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a); count 3). In a bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted that he had suffered one prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1)). Defendant was sentenced to a total term of four years in state prison with 448 days’ credit for time served as follows: the midterm of two years, doubled to four years on count 1; a concurrent term of four years on count 2; and a concurrent term of 364 days on count 3.

Defendant and appellant Arnulfo Reyna drove while under the influence of alcohol, causing a multiple car crash and injuries to several people, and then drove away. On September 4, 2019, pursuant to a plea to the court, defendant pleaded no contest to two counts of driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a); counts 1 & 3), two counts of driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or greater causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b); counts 2 & 4), and one count of hit and run resulting in injury (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(1); count 5).

Defendant was convicted of one count of driving or taking a vehicle without permission (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)), receiving stolen property, petty theft, evading police, misdemeanors relating to assault on an officer, resisting an officer, and possession of burglary tools. The brief crime spree ended with his arrest following a collision that occurred as he evaded arrest. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of six years in state prison, including four years for prior convictions for which he previously served prison terms (prison priors), pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). He appealed.

Shelly F. (Mother) appeals from orders of the juvenile court entered at the jurisdiction and disposition hearing regarding her minor children, Q.Z. and E.Z. (collectively, “the children”). She contends the juvenile court erred by finding the San Diego Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) made reasonable inquiry to determine whether the children were subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (“ICWA”) because neither parent filled out a written ICWA-020 Parental Notification of Indian Status form. We conclude the Agency and the court conducted sufficient inquiry under the circumstances and affirm the orders.

Defendant Timothy L. Gradney, a dental hygienist, was sued by plaintiff Deborah Gutierrez after he gave her an injection that allegedly caused nerve damage. Gradney defeated Gutierrez’s medical malpractice action at the summary judgment stage by offering two expert declarations, each concluding he was not negligent. Gutierrez provided only on her own declaration in response. As her primary argument, she claims the trial court erred because her reliance on res ipsa loquitor excused her failure to present contrary expert opinion testimony that disputed Gradney’s evidentiary showing.

This appeal is from an order of costs entered by the trial court after it dismissed a wrongful death action against S.B. (Father). K.G. (Plaintiff) contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike Father’s memorandum of costs based on standing. He contends Father did not actually incur the $2,904 costs awarded him because Father settled a coverage dispute with his insurer in which the insurer asserted a reservation of rights. Plaintiff also contends the court abused its discretion in denying a motion to compel compliance with a deposition subpoena for production of records regarding the settlement agreement between Father and his insurer in the coverage dispute. We disagree with Plaintiff’s contentions and affirm the order

Aaron James appeals challenging only the sentence imposed. Specifically, James contends the court erred in imposing five-year terms for each of the alleged serious felony priors (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)(1)). The three convictions resulted from a single proceeding, thus only one five-year term could lawfully be imposed. Second, James argues we must reverse the true finding on the one year prison prior in light of Senate Bill No. 136, which modified the definition of a “prison prior.” The Attorney General correctly agrees James could only receive one five-year enhancement for the serious felony convictions and that we should strike the true finding on the prison prior.

Employers Compensation Insurance Company (Insurance Company) appeals an order setting aside a default judgment based on extrinsic mistake. We affirm the challenged order.

Appointed counsel for defendant Timothy Michael Williamson asked this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

Defendant, Michael Lorenzo Jones, appeals the trial court’s denial without prejudice of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivisions (f) and (g). (Statutory section references that follow are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.) Defendant argues the trial court erred in determining that he had not established a prima facie case for relief. As we shall explain, we affirm the lower court’s order denying defendant’s petition without prejudice to defendant filing a new petition presenting evidence that establishes the stolen property he received and its fair market value.

Defendant Gregory A. Tucker pleaded guilty to kidnapping to commit robbery in 1983 when he was 19 years old. Decades later, the Legislature created a mechanism for early parole review for youthful offenders in Penal Code section 3051. The Supreme Court determined in People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) that defendants who will become eligible for such a parole hearing are entitled to create a record of evidence pertaining to youthful characteristics.